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Last Call Review of draft-ietf-intarea-nat-reveal-analysis-05
review-ietf-intarea-nat-reveal-analysis-05-secdir-lc-kelly-2013-03-21-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-intarea-nat-reveal-analysis
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 10)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2013-03-08
Requested 2013-02-28
Authors Mohamed Boucadair , Dr. Joseph D. Touch , Pierre Levis , Reinaldo Penno
I-D last updated 2013-03-21
Completed reviews Genart Last Call review of -05 by Peter E. Yee (diff)
Genart Telechat review of -06 by Peter E. Yee (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -05 by Scott G. Kelly (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Scott G. Kelly
State Completed
Request Last Call review on draft-ietf-intarea-nat-reveal-analysis by Security Area Directorate Assigned
Reviewed revision 05 (document currently at 10)
Result Ready
Completed 2013-03-21
review-ietf-intarea-nat-reveal-analysis-05-secdir-lc-kelly-2013-03-21-00
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing
effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These
comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors.
 Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other
last call comments.

The intended status is Informational. From the abstract, the document describes
a collection of solutions to reveal a host identifier (denoted as HOST_ID) when
a Carrier Grade NAT (CGN) or application proxies are involved in the path. The
document looks at several options for adding an identifier to packets that
facilitates source disambiguation by endpoints.

The document includes a section on privacy considerations, and the security
considerations section points out that servers should not rely on HOST_ID for
trust decisions, and that admins should be aware of the potential for unwanted
information leakage. It also says that  HOST_ID specification documents should
elaborate further on threats specific to the particular solution.

I think this pretty well covers it, and I have no concerns with this document.

--Scott

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