Last Call Review of draft-ietf-intarea-nat-reveal-analysis-05
review-ietf-intarea-nat-reveal-analysis-05-secdir-lc-kelly-2013-03-21-00
Request | Review of | draft-ietf-intarea-nat-reveal-analysis |
---|---|---|
Requested revision | No specific revision (document currently at 10) | |
Type | Last Call Review | |
Team | Security Area Directorate (secdir) | |
Deadline | 2013-03-08 | |
Requested | 2013-02-28 | |
Authors | Mohamed Boucadair , Dr. Joseph D. Touch , Pierre Levis , Reinaldo Penno | |
I-D last updated | 2013-03-21 | |
Completed reviews |
Genart Last Call review of -05
by Peter E. Yee
(diff)
Genart Telechat review of -06 by Peter E. Yee (diff) Secdir Last Call review of -05 by Scott G. Kelly (diff) |
|
Assignment | Reviewer | Scott G. Kelly |
State | Completed | |
Request | Last Call review on draft-ietf-intarea-nat-reveal-analysis by Security Area Directorate Assigned | |
Reviewed revision | 05 (document currently at 10) | |
Result | Ready | |
Completed | 2013-03-21 |
review-ietf-intarea-nat-reveal-analysis-05-secdir-lc-kelly-2013-03-21-00
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments. The intended status is Informational. From the abstract, the document describes a collection of solutions to reveal a host identifier (denoted as HOST_ID) when a Carrier Grade NAT (CGN) or application proxies are involved in the path. The document looks at several options for adding an identifier to packets that facilitates source disambiguation by endpoints. The document includes a section on privacy considerations, and the security considerations section points out that servers should not rely on HOST_ID for trust decisions, and that admins should be aware of the potential for unwanted information leakage. It also says that HOST_ID specification documents should elaborate further on threats specific to the particular solution. I think this pretty well covers it, and I have no concerns with this document. --Scott _______________________________________________ secdir mailing list secdir at mit.edu https://mailman.mit.edu/mailman/listinfo/secdir