Last Call Review of draft-ietf-ipfix-rfc5815bis-
review-ietf-ipfix-rfc5815bis-secdir-lc-kent-2012-03-08-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-ipfix-rfc5815bis
Requested rev. no specific revision (document currently at 03)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2012-03-13
Requested 2012-03-01
Other Reviews
Review State Completed
Reviewer Stephen Kent
Review review-ietf-ipfix-rfc5815bis-secdir-lc-kent-2012-03-08
Posted at http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/secdir/current/msg03143.html
Draft last updated 2012-03-08
Review completed: 2012-03-08

Review
review-ietf-ipfix-rfc5815bis-secdir-lc-kent-2012-03-08

Title: 

review of ipfix-5815bis




I reviewed this
document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to
review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These
comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area
directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat these
comments just like any other last call comments.





This document, "Definitions of Managed Objects for IP Flow
Information Export"is a "bis" of RFC 5815, which was published
about 2 years ago (April 2010).





This is a longish document (68 pages), and it's a MIB. Since I am not
a MIB expert I focused on the Security Considerations section of the
document, which is about a page and a quarter in length. The text in
this section is identical to the corresponding section from the
version of RFC 5815 that this document is updating.





The security considerations text is clear. It enumerates
tables/objects in the MIB that have a MAX-ACCESS other than "non
accessible" and that contain data that might be considered
sensitive. It notes why these tables/objects might require (read)
access security controls. Other text in this section focuses on
security issues applicable to MIBs in general. It admonishes users to
employ SNMPv3 and to enable crypto security.







I suggest the
following minor, editorial revisions to the end of this section (see
the attached PDF for the full MS Word change tracking
graphics).








   SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 did not include adequate
security.


   Even if the network itself is secure (for example by
using IPsec),


   there is no control as to who on the secure network
is


   allowed to access and GET/SET (read/change/create/delete)
the objects


   in these MIB modules.





   It is RECOMMENDED that implementers consider the security
features


   provided by the SNMPv3 framework (see [RFC3410] Section
8), including


   full support for the SNMPv3 cryptographic mechanisms
(for


   authentication and

 confidentiality

).





   Further, deployment of SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 is
NOT


   RECOMMENDED.  Instead, it is
RECOMMENDED


that


SNMPv3

 be
deployed


and

 that




  
cryptographic security

 be enabled

.  It is then a customer/operator


   responsibility to ensure that the SNMP
entity


granting


access to an


   instance of these MIB modules is properly configured
to


grant


access


   to objects only to those principals (users) that have
legitimate


   rights to indeed GET or SET (change/create/delete)
them.




Attachment:


secdir review of ipfix-rfc5815bis.pdf




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