IETF Last Call Review of draft-ietf-ippm-asymmetrical-pkts-11
review-ietf-ippm-asymmetrical-pkts-11-secdir-lc-farrell-2026-03-05-00
| Request | Review of | draft-ietf-ippm-asymmetrical-pkts |
|---|---|---|
| Requested revision | No specific revision (document currently at 14) | |
| Type | IETF Last Call Review | |
| Team | Security Area Directorate (secdir) | |
| Deadline | 2026-02-18 | |
| Requested | 2026-02-04 | |
| Authors | Greg Mirsky , Ernesto Ruffini , Henrik Nydell , Richard "Footer" Foote , Will Hawkins | |
| I-D last updated | 2026-09-03 (Latest revision 2026-03-16) | |
| Completed reviews |
Tsvart Early review of -07
by Lars Eggert
(diff)
Secdir IETF Last Call review of -11 by Stephen Farrell (diff) Genart IETF Last Call review of -10 by Christer Holmberg (diff) |
|
| Assignment | Reviewer | Stephen Farrell |
| State | Completed | |
| Request | IETF Last Call review on draft-ietf-ippm-asymmetrical-pkts by Security Area Directorate Assigned | |
| Posted at | https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/2BHcXf5aqB52EJjwjCpHpUmun_c | |
| Reviewed revision | 11 (document currently at 14) | |
| Result | Ready | |
| Completed | 2026-03-05 |
review-ietf-ippm-asymmetrical-pkts-11-secdir-lc-farrell-2026-03-05-00
Apologies for the late review. The obvious potential DoS vector is well covered here and the countermeasures seem OK given the way ippm stuff is seemingly deoployed. It might still be nice to add some a sentence cautioning that deploying an "open" reflector on the public Internet is likely a bad plan. I also wondered if a heartbleed-like problem could occur, but it sems like the extra padding TLV spec in RFC8972 covers that already.