Last Call Review of draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-resumption-
review-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-resumption-secdir-lc-turner-2009-09-18-00

I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's 


ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. 


 These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security 


area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat these 


comments just like any other last call comments.






This ID is intended for the Standards Track.  It defines an efficient 


way to resume an IKE/IPsec session using a previous established IKE SA 


without the need to re-run the key exchange protocol from the beginning. 


 The approach is similar to that used by TLS session resumption, but 


modified for IKEv2.




Summary: This draft is basically ready for publication, but has nits
that should be fixed before publication.

Technical comments:



4.3.1 does not require gateways to reject reused tickets (it's a 


SHOULD).  Shouldn't there be some text in the security considerations 


about gateways accepting reused tickets or text to say it's not a 


security consideration because of x, y, and z?  It's different than the 


considerations put forth in 9.8 because it addresses why the client must 


not present reused tickets.






4.3.2 states: "The client SHOULD NOT use this exchange type unless it 


knows that the gateway supports it."  What is the mechanism to determine 


whether the gateways support these new exchanges?  What happens when the 


client sends a request and the gateway doesn't support the response? 


What error message is returned from the gateway?  This might all be 


defined elsewhere in the IKE suite of specs, but this ID should probably 


point to that text wherever it is.




Editorial comments:



4.3.2: Should the may be MAY in the following: The first message may be 


rejected in?




4.3.2:  r/value ./value.

5: Note 6 is missing a ")"



6.1: r/MUST be protected so that only unauthorized access is not 


allowed/MUST be protected so that only authorized access is allowed




9.3: r/as possible. and/as possible, and

Cheers,

spt