Last Call Review of draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-09
review-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-09-secdir-lc-ladd-2019-12-24-00
Request | Review of | draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2 |
---|---|---|
Requested revision | No specific revision (document currently at 11) | |
Type | Last Call Review | |
Team | Security Area Directorate (secdir) | |
Deadline | 2019-12-25 | |
Requested | 2019-12-11 | |
Authors | Scott Fluhrer , Panos Kampanakis , David McGrew , Valery Smyslov | |
I-D last updated | 2019-12-24 | |
Completed reviews |
Secdir Last Call review of -09
by Watson Ladd
(diff)
Genart Last Call review of -09 by Christer Holmberg (diff) |
|
Assignment | Reviewer | Watson Ladd |
State | Completed | |
Request | Last Call review on draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2 by Security Area Directorate Assigned | |
Posted at | https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/vesWggelH0Vt9FHUPi2I_O5vm7c | |
Reviewed revision | 09 (document currently at 11) | |
Result | Not ready | |
Completed | 2019-12-24 |
review-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-09-secdir-lc-ladd-2019-12-24-00
Twas the night before Christmas when all through the house someone was desperately trying to get a review done on time. I didn't see anything wrong per se in the draft itself, but I found the capitalization of quantum computer an odd choice. IKEv2 is a complicated protocol, and I am not 100% sure that this draft does what we want it to: It would be great if someone could check very carefully in some symbolic model, ala what has been done in TLS. The guidance on sizes seems to rule out NIST level 1, but not any higher levels: might be worth calling out this explicitly.