Last Call Review of draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-09
review-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-09-secdir-lc-ladd-2019-12-24-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2
Requested rev. no specific revision (document currently at 11)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2019-12-25
Requested 2019-12-11
Authors Scott Fluhrer, Panos Kampanakis, David McGrew, Valery Smyslov
Draft last updated 2019-12-24
Completed reviews Secdir Last Call review of -09 by Watson Ladd (diff)
Genart Last Call review of -09 by Christer Holmberg (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Watson Ladd
State Completed
Review review-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-09-secdir-lc-ladd-2019-12-24
Posted at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/vesWggelH0Vt9FHUPi2I_O5vm7c
Reviewed rev. 09 (document currently at 11)
Review result Not Ready
Review completed: 2019-12-24

Review
review-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-09-secdir-lc-ladd-2019-12-24

Twas the night before Christmas
when all through the house
someone was desperately trying to get a review done on time.

I didn't see anything wrong per se in the draft itself, but I found the capitalization of quantum computer an odd choice. IKEv2 is a complicated protocol, and I am not 100% sure that this draft does what we want it to: It would be great if someone could check very carefully in some symbolic model, ala what has been done in TLS. The guidance on sizes seems to rule out NIST level 1, but not any higher levels: might be worth calling out this explicitly.