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Telechat Review of draft-ietf-ipwave-ipv6-over-80211ocb-47
review-ietf-ipwave-ipv6-over-80211ocb-47-genart-telechat-even-2019-07-03-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-ipwave-ipv6-over-80211ocb
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 52)
Type Telechat Review
Team General Area Review Team (Gen-ART) (genart)
Deadline 2019-07-09
Requested 2019-07-03
Authors Nabil Benamar , Jerome Haerri , Jong-Hyouk Lee , Thierry Ernst , Thierry Ernst
Draft last updated 2019-07-03
Completed reviews Intdir Early review of -34 by Pascal Thubert (diff)
Iotdir Early review of -34 by Pascal Thubert (diff)
Genart Last Call review of -46 by Roni Even (diff)
Tsvart Last Call review of -46 by Joerg Ott (diff)
Genart Telechat review of -47 by Roni Even (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Roni Even
State Completed
Review review-ietf-ipwave-ipv6-over-80211ocb-47-genart-telechat-even-2019-07-03
Posted at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/gen-art/idnD-fdugJ0xrkhK10b2CFumx1Y
Reviewed revision 47 (document currently at 52)
Result Ready with Issues
Completed 2019-07-03
review-ietf-ipwave-ipv6-over-80211ocb-47-genart-telechat-even-2019-07-03-00
I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area
Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed
by the IESG for the IETF Chair. Please wait for direction from your
document shepherd or AD before posting a new version of the draft.

For more information, please see the FAQ at

<https://trac.ietf.org/trac/gen/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Document: draft-ietf-ipwave-ipv6-over-80211ocb-47
Reviewer: Roni Even
Review Date: 2019-07-03
IETF LC End Date: None
IESG Telechat date: 2019-07-11

Summary:
The document is ready to be published as a standard track RFC with an issue

Major issues:

Minor issues:

this is about my previous comment.
The text in section 5.1 "A vehicle embarking  an IP-OBU whose egress interface
is 802.11-OCB may expose itself to  eavesdropping and subsequent correlation of
data; this may reveal data considered private by the vehicle owner; there is a
risk of being tracked.  In outdoors public environments, where vehicles
typically circulate, the privacy risks are more important than in indoors
settings." and "there is a strong necessity to use protection tools such  as
dynamically changing MAC addresses"
 so even though there are privacy concerns there is no normative text saying
 that some method is needed. "strong necessity" is not normative .

A new sentence was added to section 5.1 "An example of change policy is to
change the MAC address of the OCB interface each time the system boots up"

I got more confused by section 5.2 text "The policy dictating when the MAC
address is changed on the 802.11-OCB interface is to-be-determined."

So what I got from section 5.1 and 5.2 is that protection tools to address
privacy concern are needed but without any normative text.  Dynamic changing 
of MAC address is an option, no other option is mentioned.  Example for when to
change MAC address is on system boot and the policy when to change MAC address
is to be determined.

To summarize what the document currently says is that privacy risks are more
important for outdoor public environment and it is left for implementations to
decide if and how to address it.

Nits/editorial comments: