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Last Call Review of draft-ietf-karp-ops-model-07

Request Review of draft-ietf-karp-ops-model
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 10)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2013-08-18
Requested 2013-08-02
Authors Sam Hartman , Dacheng Zhang
I-D last updated 2013-08-16
Completed reviews Genart Last Call review of -07 by Ben Campbell (diff)
Genart Last Call review of -09 by Ben Campbell (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -07 by Radia Perlman (diff)
Secdir Telechat review of -09 by Radia Perlman (diff)
Opsdir Telechat review of -09 by Benoît Claise (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Radia Perlman
State Completed
Request Last Call review on draft-ietf-karp-ops-model by Security Area Directorate Assigned
Reviewed revision 07 (document currently at 10)
Result Has issues
Completed 2013-08-16
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing
effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These
comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors.
 Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other
last call comments.

This is a useful document as an informational RFC. The technical content is
interesting and useful.

I think the document would be much improved with an introduction about what is
different for "routing protocol security" rather than, say, an endnode
authenticating to an access point, or nodes forming a peer relationship in an
overlay network.  So, for instance, "normal security issues" (i.e., outside the
scope of KARP) might assume the network is up, so that it's possible to get
CRLs, or be available to be managed, whereas perhaps KARP is targetting cases
which depend on less infrastructure.  It would be nice if this document were to
have an introduction that talks about things like that.

As for typos...3rd line up from bottom of page 14 has a glitch involving a
bunch of spaces and an extra comma after the word "peers".  And I can't parse
the last sentence of the 1st paragraph of section 7. "...complexity of and
update and risk...."

Speaking of PKI...the document talks about certificates expiring, but not being
revoked (CRL, OCSP).