Last Call Review of draft-ietf-kitten-aes-cts-hmac-sha2-10
review-ietf-kitten-aes-cts-hmac-sha2-10-opsdir-lc-bradner-2016-08-08-00
Request | Review of | draft-ietf-kitten-aes-cts-hmac-sha2 |
---|---|---|
Requested revision | No specific revision (document currently at 11) | |
Type | Last Call Review | |
Team | Ops Directorate (opsdir) | |
Deadline | 2016-08-16 | |
Requested | 2016-07-11 | |
Authors | Michael J. Jenkins , Michael Peck , Kelley W. Burgin | |
I-D last updated | 2016-08-08 | |
Completed reviews |
Genart Last Call review of -10
by Vijay K. Gurbani
(diff)
Genart Telechat review of -10 by Vijay K. Gurbani (diff) Secdir Last Call review of -10 by Watson Ladd (diff) Opsdir Last Call review of -10 by Scott O. Bradner (diff) |
|
Assignment | Reviewer | Scott O. Bradner |
State | Completed | |
Request | Last Call review on draft-ietf-kitten-aes-cts-hmac-sha2 by Ops Directorate Assigned | |
Reviewed revision | 10 (document currently at 11) | |
Result | Ready | |
Completed | 2016-08-08 |
review-ietf-kitten-aes-cts-hmac-sha2-10-opsdir-lc-bradner-2016-08-08-00
This is an OPS-DIR review of draft-ietf-kitten-aes-cts-hmac-sha2-10. This ID describes additional encryption and checksum types for Kerberos 5 as well as a change in design that lowers the computing cost to verify the integrity of a received message. The updates use NIST defined standards. I did not check the crypto or security logic - I figure that any ID coming from the Security Area that has gone through 10 versions is going to be rather solid in those areas. :-) I did not find any operational concerns with the ID. Scott