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Last Call Review of draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5750-bis-06

Request Review of draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5750-bis
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 08)
Type Last Call Review
Team Ops Directorate (opsdir)
Deadline 2018-04-27
Requested 2018-04-13
Authors Jim Schaad, Blake C. Ramsdell , Sean Turner
Draft last updated 2018-05-04
Completed reviews Opsdir Last Call review of -06 by Éric Vyncke (diff)
Genart Last Call review of -05 by Ines Robles (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -05 by Matthew A. Miller (diff)
Genart Telechat review of -06 by Ines Robles (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Éric Vyncke
State Completed
Review review-ietf-lamps-rfc5750-bis-06-opsdir-lc-vyncke-2018-05-04
Reviewed revision 06 (document currently at 08)
Result Ready
Completed 2018-05-04
Reviewer: Eric Vyncke
Review result: Ready

I have reviewed this document as part of the Operational directorate's ongoing
effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These
comments were written with the intent of improving the operational aspects of
the IETF drafts. Comments that are not addressed in last call may be included
in AD reviews during the IESG review.  Document editors and WG chairs should
treat these comments just like any other last call comments.

Document reviewed: draft-ietf-lamps-rfc5750-bis-06
Intended Status: Standards Track

As the title indicates, this document is about how certificates are to be
handled by a S/MIME client; both for sending and receiving. It is well written
and clear.

Section 1.3 to 1.6 are explicitly about compatibility and interoperation with
previous version of the S/MIME specification.

Section 4 is about the provisioning of the certificates of other parties. In
the absence of a protocol for this purpose, the proposed technique is archaic
and manual; far from being easy for operations but I am afraid that there is no
other choice.

Section 4.3 specifies key lengths, which also means that another RFC will have
to be authored when those key lengths will become too weak.

In case of trouble or invalid certificates, the only specified action is to
inform the end user; which is again the usual procedure when dealing with