Last Call Review of draft-ietf-lisp-impact-04

Request Review of draft-ietf-lisp-impact
Requested rev. no specific revision (document currently at 05)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2015-10-19
Requested 2015-10-08
Authors Damien Saucez, Luigi Iannone, Albert Cabellos-Aparicio, Florin Coras
Draft last updated 2015-10-15
Completed reviews Genart Last Call review of -04 by Russ Housley (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -04 by Hilarie Orman (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Hilarie Orman
State Completed
Review review-ietf-lisp-impact-04-secdir-lc-orman-2015-10-15
Reviewed rev. 04 (document currently at 05)
Review result Has Issues
Review completed: 2015-10-15


Secdir review of LISP Impact

Do not be alarmed.  I have reviewed this document as part of the
security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents
being processed by the IESG.  These comments were written primarily
for the benefit of the security area directors.  Document editors and
WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call

A new way of handling routing information has been defined in IETF
documents about the Locator/Identifier Separation Protocol (LISP).
The draft under discussion here elaborates on the possible
consequences of widespread use of LISP.

The draft punts on security considerations and refers to previous
documents describing threats to LISP and how LISP uses cryptography
for protecting the integrity of its messages.

It seems to me that if the purported impact of LISP is to "scale the
Internet", then its impact on security should be a major part of the
equation.  Will it make routing information more or less vulnerable
malicious manipulation?  How will it affect the stability of a network
that is under constant threat of attack?

I don't feel that the draft can achieve its purpose without addressing


PS. I was very disappointed to realize that this was not a draft
about my favorite programming language.