Early Review of draft-ietf-manet-dlep-traffic-classification-12
review-ietf-manet-dlep-traffic-classification-12-secdir-early-emery-2024-08-10-00
| Request | Review of | draft-ietf-manet-dlep-traffic-classification |
|---|---|---|
| Requested revision | No specific revision (document currently at 13) | |
| Type | Early Review | |
| Team | Security Area Directorate (secdir) | |
| Deadline | 2024-08-13 | |
| Requested | 2024-07-23 | |
| Requested by | Jim Guichard | |
| Authors | Bow-Nan Cheng , David Wiggins , Lou Berger , Don Fedyk | |
| I-D last updated | 2024-08-10 | |
| Completed reviews |
Tsvart Early review of -06
by David L. Black
(diff)
Opsdir Early review of -12 by Tina Tsou (Ting ZOU) (diff) Rtgdir Early review of -12 by Darren Dukes (diff) Secdir Early review of -12 by Shawn M Emery (diff) Genart Last Call review of -12 by Stewart Bryant (diff) |
|
| Assignment | Reviewer | Shawn M Emery |
| State | Completed | |
| Request | Early review on draft-ietf-manet-dlep-traffic-classification by Security Area Directorate Assigned | |
| Posted at | https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/YmUZiOaEfvWasXe0OprjCk_O1NU | |
| Reviewed revision | 12 (document currently at 13) | |
| Result | Has nits | |
| Completed | 2024-08-10 |
review-ietf-manet-dlep-traffic-classification-12-secdir-early-emery-2024-08-10-00
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments. This standards track draft specifies a protocol for identifying various link control messages utilized by the Dynamic Link Exchange Protocol (DLEP). The security considerations sections does exist and discloses that the protocol opens up vulnerabilities for DoS by modifying or injecting protocol messages (e.g., decrease the max window size to a unrealistically small value). The mitigation of said vulnerabilities is deferred to RFC 8175's security considerations, which prescribes TLS for transport security and provides IEEE-802.1AE and IEEE-802.1X as examples to protect Layer 2 from injecting or altering messages. I believe this to be an accurate assertion. General comments: In order to help me fully understand the concepts of this protocol I think it would be nice to have examples for DSCP and PCP Sub-Data Items. Editorial comments: s/DLPE/DLEP/