Early Review of draft-ietf-manet-nhdp-sec-threats-03
review-ietf-manet-nhdp-sec-threats-03-secdir-early-lepinski-2013-06-13-00

I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing
effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These
comments were

written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors.  Document
editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call
comments.

This document provides a taxonomy of attacks against the Mobile Ad Hoc Network
Neighborhood Discovery Protocol (NHDP) [RFC 6130]. The document also contains a
discussion of the impact of these attacks on running on top of NHDP (in
particular,

OLSRv2 and SMF)

Having reviewed the document, I do not see substantial issues in the document.
I believe it is reasonable to publish as an informational RFC.

One minor issue:

 The replay attack described in Section 4.5 did not seem substantially
 different than the attacks described in Section 4.4. It is not clear to me how
 replaying a message from another part of the network is any worse (or
 substantially different) than just fabricating a message claiming connectivity
 that does not exist (i.e., like what is described in 4.4.2). I would recommend
 either deleting 4.5 or else clarifying how these attacks are substantially
 different.

Trivial nit:

 In Section 5, "

a Compromised NHDP router will seek to manipulate" -- substitute "may seek"
instead of "will seek". We don't know for certain what a compromised router
will do (unless one assigns clear

motivation

 to the adversary, which this document does not).