Last Call Review of draft-ietf-mext-binary-ts-
review-ietf-mext-binary-ts-secdir-lc-salowey-2010-03-15-00

I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's 
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the 
IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the 
security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat 
these comments just like any other last call comments.

I didn't find any security issues in the draft.  The security
considerations section points to draft-ietf-mext-flow-binding-05.  The
referenced section is a bit thin and doesn't really say what bad things
could happen if the binding is falsified.  If unprotected bindings are
not an option, this may be OK.  If they are an option it would be good
to have a better understanding of what the risks are with the various
levels of protection. If this is done it might be possible that there
are specific considerations around some of the data types defined in the
draft-ietf-mext-binary-ts-04, but I don't think that would be the case. 

Joe