Last Call Review of draft-ietf-mpls-tp-psc-itu-02

Request Review of draft-ietf-mpls-tp-psc-itu
Requested rev. no specific revision (document currently at 04)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2014-02-24
Requested 2014-02-13
Authors Jeong-dong Ryoo, Eric Gray, Huub van Helvoort, Alessandro D'Alessandro, Tae-sik Cheung, Eric Osborne
Draft last updated 2014-02-27
Completed reviews Genart Last Call review of -02 by Elwyn Davies (diff)
Genart Telechat review of -03 by Elwyn Davies (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -02 by Hilarie Orman (diff)
Opsdir Last Call review of -02 by Tina Tsou (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Hilarie Orman 
State Completed Snapshot
Review review-ietf-mpls-tp-psc-itu-02-secdir-lc-orman-2014-02-27
Reviewed rev. 02 (document currently at 04)
Review result Has Nits
Review completed: 2014-02-27


Security review of draft-ietf-mpls-tp-psc-itu-02.txt
MPLS Transport Profile (MPLS-TP) Linear Protection to Match the
Operational Expectations of SDH, OTN and Ethernet Transport Network

Do not be alarmed.  I have reviewed this document as part of the
security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents
being processed by the IESG.  These comments were written primarily
for the benefit of the security area directors.  Document editors and
WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call

The abstract for this document states:
   This document describes alternate mechanisms to perform some of the
   sub-functions of MPLS Transport Profile (MPLS-TP) linear protection
   defined in RFC 6378, and also defines additional mechanisms.  The
   purpose of these alternate and additional mechanisms is to provide
   operator control and experience that more closely models the behavior
   of linear protection seen in other transport networks.

The security considerations are the timeworn statement that

   No specific security issue is raised in addition to those ones
   already documented in RFC 6378 [RFC6378]

In RFC 6378 we find:    
   MPLS networks make the assumption that it is very hard to inject
   traffic into a network and equally hard to cause traffic to be
   directed outside the network.  The control-plane protocols utilize
   hop-by-hop security and assume a "chain-of-trust" model such that
   end-to-end control-plane security is not used.  For more
   information on the generic aspects of MPLS security, see [RFC5920].

To my great astonishment I found that "RFC5920 Security Framework for
MPLS and GMPLS Networks" is an excellent document, and it is my
suggestion that the current draft reference it directly in section 13
"Security Considerations".

Barring any surprises in the extensive state diagrams, I otherwise am
inclined to accept the "no new issues" handwave.