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Last Call Review of draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-09
review-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-09-secdir-lc-hartman-2015-03-12-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 10)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2015-03-11
Requested 2015-03-02
Authors Mohamad Badra , Alan Luchuk , Jürgen Schönwälder
I-D last updated 2015-03-12
Completed reviews Secdir Last Call review of -09 by Sam Hartman (diff)
Opsdir Last Call review of -09 by Stefan Winter (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Sam Hartman
State Completed
Request Last Call review on draft-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis by Security Area Directorate Assigned
Reviewed revision 09 (document currently at 10)
Result Ready
Completed 2015-03-12
review-ietf-netconf-rfc5539bis-09-secdir-lc-hartman-2015-03-12-00
This is an update to netconf over TLS with mutual X.509 authentication.

In general, this looks fairly good.

I'd ask the security ADs to take a look at two things:

* The text on certificate validation in section 5.
Certificate validation has a number of options, none of which are
described or specified in this text.
Is that good enough for this application?  (Probably)

In section 7, there is a description of how the netconf server finds the
username of the client.
It talks about a certificate fingerprint without a reference to a
specific algorithm.
I'm aware of multiple algorithms for fingerprints.
This text is probably too vague for interoperability.