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IETF Last Call Review of draft-ietf-ntp-over-ptp-05
review-ietf-ntp-over-ptp-05-tsvart-lc-perkins-2025-09-21-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-ntp-over-ptp
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 08)
Type IETF Last Call Review
Team Transport Area Review Team (tsvart)
Deadline 2025-09-24
Requested 2025-09-10
Authors Miroslav Lichvar
I-D last updated 2026-04-23 (Latest revision 2025-11-25)
Completed reviews Genart IETF Last Call review of -05 by Robert Sparks (diff)
Opsdir IETF Last Call review of -05 by Tony Li (diff)
Secdir IETF Last Call review of -06 by Daniel Migault (diff)
Tsvart IETF Last Call review of -05 by Colin Perkins (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Colin Perkins
State Completed
Request IETF Last Call review on draft-ietf-ntp-over-ptp by Transport Area Review Team Assigned
Posted at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tsv-art/JxGGbyyL7u8C25Zn5kaiByZQxYw
Reviewed revision 05 (document currently at 08)
Result Ready w/nits
Completed 2025-09-21
review-ietf-ntp-over-ptp-05-tsvart-lc-perkins-2025-09-21-00
This document has been reviewed as part of the transport area review team's
ongoing effort to review key IETF documents. These comments were written
primarily for the transport area directors, but are copied to the document's
authors and WG to allow them to address any issues raised and also to the IETF
discussion list for information.

When done at the time of IETF Last Call, the authors should consider this
review as part of the last-call comments they receive. Please always CC
tsv-art@ietf.org if you reply to or forward this review.

The draft outlines what is PTP and describes some of the limitations of
PTP-capable hardware and how these interact with implementations that try to
use that hardware to support NTP. It describes a new transport for NTP within
PTP packets, allowing NTP to make use of hardware that only timestamps PTP, and
extends NTP to make use of the timing information provided by PTP.

The draft is clearly written and generally well explained. From a transport
perspective it appears to be ready, excepting a minor nit noted below.

The PTP transport for NTP is sent within existing PTP messages. This generates
packets containing a new PTP TLV, that presumably has some potential to disrupt
the operation of non-upgraded PTP implementations, but otherwise appears to
match usual NTP behaviour and to fit within PTP, and introduces no new
transport issues.

The Network Correction Extension Field similarly does not appear to have any
novel transport implications.

The Security Considerations notes that “The PTP transport prevents NTP clients
from randomizing their source port”. It would be helpful it is also included a
brief statement of why this might be an issue and a reference for where to find
further information (presumably RFC 9109).

Regards,
Colin