Last Call Review of draft-ietf-oauth-device-flow-10
review-ietf-oauth-device-flow-10-secdir-lc-wood-2018-06-15-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-oauth-device-flow
Requested rev. no specific revision (document currently at 15)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2018-06-12
Requested 2018-05-29
Draft last updated 2018-06-15
Completed reviews Secdir Last Call review of -10 by Christopher Wood (diff)
Genart Last Call review of -10 by Robert Sparks (diff)
Opsdir Last Call review of -10 by Qin Wu (diff)
Genart Telechat review of -11 by Robert Sparks (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Christopher Wood
State Completed
Review review-ietf-oauth-device-flow-10-secdir-lc-wood-2018-06-15
Reviewed rev. 10 (document currently at 15)
Review result Has Nits
Review completed: 2018-06-15

Review
review-ietf-oauth-device-flow-10-secdir-lc-wood-2018-06-15

Hello,

I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat
these comments just like any other last call comments.

   The summary of my review is: Ready with nits.

Overall, the document is in fine shape. I have a few general comments 
(not quite nits,
though not quite issues either), listed below:

- Section 3.5, fifth paragraph: Requiring clients to poll at a 
“reasonable” polling interval
without a suggestion of what is reasonable seems strange. Could you 
suggest a value that’s
within reason, e.g., every second?
- Section 5.1, first paragraph: It might be useful to point to Section 
6.1 wherein User Code
generation is discussed. Right now minimum entropy “requirements” 
are listed without further
details regarding viable mechanisms.
- Section 5.2, second paragraph: The text claims that an end user would 
end up “on the
authorization page of the wrong service.” Can you provide more details 
here? What stops
the malicious MITM from serving an authorization page that’s 
indistinguishable from the
legitimate service page?
- Section 5.3, first paragraph: How specifically does the authorization 
service prevent
devices from lying when providing “information about the device”? 
Or, alternatively, how
does the authorization service learn this information?
- Section 5.4: Would it be useful to suggest that clients SHOULD use a 
secure (encrypted
and authenticated) channel when communicating to the user device?

The remainder of my comments, listed below, are editorial in nature, 
aimed towards improving
readability of the document.

- Section 1, step (E): This is the first time client polling is 
mentioned without
discussion of timeouts or server-generated errors. The draft provides 
such details later
on, so it would be helpful to allude or point to them here.
- Section 3.3, second paragraph: Please cite TLS upon use (“… in a 
secure TLS-protected
session.”).
- Section 3.3, second paragraph: The text suggests that the server 
informs the user to
“return to their device.” Perhaps this should be prefaced with a 
MAY, as the client will
eventually learn that authorization is complete upon polling.
- Section 3.3.1, first paragraph: Should it be required that 
“verification_uri_complete”
is constructed in part from the “verification_uri” and 
“user_code”? I’m not sure this is
necessary, though the example given is constructed this way. If not 
required, this might be
worth noting.
- Section 3.5, first paragraph: s/token endpoint/authentication server?
- Section 5.1, third paragraph: This text is mostly redundant with the 
preceding paragraphs.
I would remove or merge it with the paragraphs above.

Please let me know if you’ve further questions, comments, or concerns. 
I hope this helps.

Best,
Chris