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IETF Last Call Review of draft-ietf-opsawg-ipfix-on-path-telemetry-19
review-ietf-opsawg-ipfix-on-path-telemetry-19-secdir-lc-dunbar-2025-07-18-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-opsawg-ipfix-on-path-telemetry
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 23)
Type IETF Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2025-07-17
Requested 2025-07-03
Authors Thomas Graf , Benoît Claise , Alex Huang Feng
I-D last updated 2025-10-24 (Latest revision 2025-09-30)
Completed reviews Opsdir IETF Last Call review of -14 by Menachem Dodge (diff)
Tsvart IETF Last Call review of -14 by Martin Duke (diff)
Genart Early review of -17 by Behcet Sarikaya (diff)
Perfmetrdir IETF Last Call review of -17 by Qin Wu (diff)
Secdir IETF Last Call review of -19 by Linda Dunbar (diff)
Intdir Telechat review of -20 by Tim Wicinski (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Linda Dunbar
State Completed
Request IETF Last Call review on draft-ietf-opsawg-ipfix-on-path-telemetry by Security Area Directorate Assigned
Posted at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/xxVx0pFrxwumenDjxOTHqMdAhzs
Reviewed revision 19 (document currently at 23)
Result Has nits
Completed 2025-07-18
review-ietf-opsawg-ipfix-on-path-telemetry-19-secdir-lc-dunbar-2025-07-18-00
I have reviewed this document as part of the SEC area directorate's ongoing
effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These
comments were written primarily for the benefit of the Security area directors.
Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other
last-call comments.

Summary: This document is well-written and nearly ready for publication.

One issue:
The Security Considerations section does not explicitly mention the risk of
accepting spoofed IPFIX messages from unauthenticated exporters. Since IPFIX
collectors may receive telemetry data from multiple sources, there is a risk
that a malicious or misconfigured node could inject false or misleading data.

It would be useful to add something like: Collectors MUST ensure that telemetry
originates from trusted sources. Accepting IPFIX messages from unauthenticated
sources could lead to data spoofing, policy misapplication, or denial of
service.

Best Regards,
Linda Dunbar