Early Review of draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-tls13-07
review-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-tls13-07-secdir-early-housley-2024-04-25-00
| Request | Review of | draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-tls13 |
|---|---|---|
| Requested revision | No specific revision (document currently at 24) | |
| Type | Early Review | |
| Team | Security Area Directorate (secdir) | |
| Deadline | 2024-05-03 | |
| Requested | 2024-04-19 | |
| Requested by | Joe Clarke | |
| Authors | Thorsten Dahm , John Heasley , dcmgash@cisco.com , Andrej Ota | |
| I-D last updated | 2025-12-09 (Latest revision 2025-07-09) | |
| Completed reviews |
Secdir Early review of -07
by Russ Housley
(diff)
Tsvart Early review of -07 by Colin Perkins (diff) Secdir IETF Last Call review of -10 by Russ Housley (diff) Opsdir Early review of -10 by Yingzhen Qu (diff) Opsdir IETF Last Call review of -18 by Qin Wu (diff) Secdir IETF Last Call review of -18 by Russ Housley (diff) Secdir IETF Last Call review of -19 by Russ Housley (diff) Genart IETF Last Call review of -20 by Russ Housley (diff) Artart IETF Last Call review of -20 by Rich Salz (diff) |
|
| Comments |
We'd like to get some more security eyes on this given some of the comments we've had from the WG. Additionally, getting a focused OPS review to see if there are other operational considerations for this given the ubiquity of T+ would be beneficial. |
|
| Assignment | Reviewer | Russ Housley |
| State | Completed | |
| Request | Early review on draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-tls13 by Security Area Directorate Assigned | |
| Posted at | https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/CmEzB7O8blCgEoFvzE9jdtJ5F1Q | |
| Reviewed revision | 07 (document currently at 24) | |
| Result | Not ready | |
| Completed | 2024-04-25 |
review-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-tls13-07-secdir-early-housley-2024-04-25-00
I reviewed this document as part of the Security Directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the Security Area Directors. Document authors, document editors, and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other IETF Last Call comments. Document: draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-tls13-07 Reviewer: Russ Housley Review Date: 2024-04-25 IETF LC End Date: Unknown IESG Telechat date: Unknown Summary: Has Issues Major Concerns: Section 3.2.2 says: Implementations MUST support certificate-based TLS authentication and certificate revocation bi-directionally for authentication, identity verification and policy purposes. Certificate path verification as described in Section 3.2.2.1 MUST be supported. I do not understand this paragraph. I suggest that you handle four topics in separate sentences: (1) certificate for the server (for server authentication), (2) revocation checking of the server certificate by the client, (3) certificate for the client (for client authentication), (4) revocation checking of the client certificate by the server. Section 3.2.2 says: "Pre-Shared Keys (PSKs) [RFC4279] ...". RFC 4279 is not appropriate for use with TLS 1.3, so it should not be cited here. Section 5.1.2 says: "... servers MAY abruptly disconnect clients that do." I think this ought to make a stronger recommendation about 0-RTT. Other profiles for the use of TLS with specific protocols (like draft-ietf-netconf-over-tls13) completely forbid 0-RTT. Section 5.1.4 talks about loading certificate chains. It might also talk about loading the information needed to perform revocation checks or the use of OCSP stapling. Section 5.1.4 says: "Certificate fingerprints are another option." More explanation or a reference is needed here, Minor Concerns: The draft uses RFC 2119 terms, but it lacks a reference to RFC 2119 and the usual RFC 2119 boilerplate. Nits: Section 3: Please add a reference for FIPS 140. Section 3.2.2.1: s/Certificate Authority (CA)/Certification Authority (CA)/ Section 3.3: s/Certificate Provisioning/Certificate provisioning/ Section 5.1.3: s/abandoned/abandoned./ Section 5.1.4: s/Certificate Authority (CA)/Certification Authority (CA)/ IDnits complaints about: == The 'Updates: ' line in the draft header should list only the numbers of the RFCs which will be updated by this document (if approved); it should not include the word 'RFC' in the list.