Last Call Review of draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-tls13-18
review-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-tls13-18-secdir-lc-housley-2025-03-08-00

I reviewed this document as part of the Security Directorate's ongoing
effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These
comments were written primarily for the benefit of the Security Area
Directors.  Document authors, document editors, and WG chairs should
treat these comments just like any other IETF Last Call comments.

Document: draft-ietf-opsawg-tacacs-tls13-18
Reviewer: Russ Housley
Review Date: 2025-03-08
IETF LC End Date: 2025-03-27
IESG Telechat date: Unknown

Summary: Not Ready


Major Concerns:

Section 3.3: The text requires support for "mutual authentication". I
assume that this means that it MUST be supported, but it does not have
to be used.  However, the next section say: "Each peer MUST validate
the certificate path of the remote peer, ...".  This seems to be in
conflict.  It requires the use of both server certificates and client
certificates.

Section 3.3: The text says: "... full certificate-based TLS
authentication ...".  I do not know what that means.  Please clarify.

Section 3.3: With the removal of the reference to [RFC8773], how is
the requirement for certificates accomplished while also using external
PSKs?  I am unaware of any other way to do so.  Further, Section 3.5
describes PSK authentication as an alternative to certificate-based
authentication.  These sections are in conflict.
   
Section 3.3: The text allows the use of [RFC7250] must be used in
the context of [RFC8446].  How is the requirement for certificates
accomplished with raw public keys?  I am unaware of any way to do so.


Minor Concerns:  None


Nits:

Section 3.3: s/Certificate based mutual/certificate-based mutual/