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Telechat Review of draft-ietf-opsec-lla-only-10
review-ietf-opsec-lla-only-10-genart-telechat-yee-2014-08-24-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-opsec-lla-only
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 11)
Type Telechat Review
Team General Area Review Team (Gen-ART) (genart)
Deadline 2014-08-19
Requested 2014-08-07
Authors Michael H. Behringer , Éric Vyncke
I-D last updated 2014-08-24
Completed reviews Genart Last Call review of -07 by Peter E. Yee (diff)
Genart Telechat review of -10 by Peter E. Yee (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -07 by Christopher Inacio (diff)
Opsdir Last Call review of -07 by Suzanne Woolf (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Peter E. Yee
State Completed
Request Telechat review on draft-ietf-opsec-lla-only by General Area Review Team (Gen-ART) Assigned
Reviewed revision 10 (document currently at 11)
Result Ready w/issues
Completed 2014-08-24
review-ietf-opsec-lla-only-10-genart-telechat-yee-2014-08-24-00
I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at
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Document: draft-ietf-opsec-lla-only-10
Reviewer: Peter Yee
Review Date: August-21-2014
IETF LC End Date: April-7-2014
IESG Telechat date: August-21-2014

Summary: This draft is basically ready for publication as an Informational
RFC, but has issues that should be fixed before publication. [Ready with
issues.]

This document discusses the (controversial) use of IPv6 link-local addresses
on router infrastructure links.  I don't find all of the (remaining)
arguments for use of link-local addresses to be terribly compelling, but I'm
not averse to the document's publication as a summary of some of the pros
and cons for those who desire to configure their routers in the manner
prescribed.  There may be other reasons that should be taken into
consideration, but I lack a network operator's experience to discuss them.

Minor:

Page 4, 5th paragraph, 2nd sentence: SSH brute force password attacks aren't
really reduced unless the reduction is simply not being able to attack a
single router over multiple interfaces in parallel.  A better scheme for
reducing SSH brute force password attacks might be to limit the rate of
responses to SSH login attempts in the face of repeated failures.  I'd still
consider dropping this marginal example.  The TCP SYN flood suffices to make
the point.

Page 6, 1st partial paragraph: the argument is made that "more work" is
required to discover all of an IXPs loopback interface addresses before a
generic attack can be mounted.  This wouldn't seem to be a lot of upfront
work and once it has been done, the advantage is negated.  I don't find the
argument particularly persuasive.  

Nits:

Page 4, 5th paragraph, 2nd sentence: delete the comma after "[RFC4987])" and
change the "or" to "and".

Page 6, 1st full paragraph, 1st sentence: replace "a" with "an" before "MPLS
LSP".

		-Peter Yee