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Last Call Review of draft-ietf-opsec-probe-attribution-06

Request Review of draft-ietf-opsec-probe-attribution
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 09)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2023-06-08
Requested 2023-05-25
Authors Éric Vyncke , Benoit Donnet , Justin Iurman
I-D last updated 2023-06-22
Completed reviews Genart Last Call review of -05 by Peter E. Yee (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -06 by Tirumaleswar Reddy.K (diff)
Tsvart Last Call review of -05 by Magnus Westerlund (diff)
Opsdir Last Call review of -05 by Linda Dunbar (diff)
Opsdir Telechat review of -08 by Linda Dunbar (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Tirumaleswar Reddy.K
State Completed
Request Last Call review on draft-ietf-opsec-probe-attribution by Security Area Directorate Assigned
Posted at
Reviewed revision 06 (document currently at 09)
Result Has issues
Completed 2023-06-20
Reviewer: Tirumaleswar Reddy
Review result:  Ready with issues

I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat
these comments just like any other last call comments.

The summary of the review is Ready with issues.

      else (or in addition), the Probe Description URI is
      "https://[2001:db8::dead]/.well-known/probing.txt".  In this case,
      there might be a certificate verification issue.

Comment> It is possible to get a certificate with IP address from a public


You may want to consider referring to,
It discusses HBH option processing by intermediate nodes and
recommendations to process new HBH options.

I suggest discussing the privacy implications that an eavesdropper will be
able to view the PII data in the Probe.

   As a consequence, the recipient of this information cannot trust it
   without confirmation. If a recipient cannot confirm the information
   or does not wish to do so, it should treat the flows as if there were
   no probe attribution.

Comment> How can the recipient of the probe information validate it is
authentic for confirmation ?