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Last Call Review of draft-ietf-ospf-rfc6506bis-01
review-ietf-ospf-rfc6506bis-01-opsdir-lc-kuarsingh-2013-11-28-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-ospf-rfc6506bis
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 05)
Type Last Call Review
Team Ops Directorate (opsdir)
Deadline 2013-12-03
Requested 2013-11-11
Authors Manav Bhatia , Vishwas Manral , Acee Lindem
I-D last updated 2013-11-28
Completed reviews Genart Last Call review of -01 by Brian E. Carpenter (diff)
Genart Telechat review of -03 by Brian E. Carpenter (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -01 by Brian Weis (diff)
Opsdir Last Call review of -01 by Victor Kuarsingh (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Victor Kuarsingh
State Completed
Request Last Call review on draft-ietf-ospf-rfc6506bis by Ops Directorate Assigned
Reviewed revision 01 (document currently at 05)
Result Ready
Completed 2013-11-28
review-ietf-ospf-rfc6506bis-01-opsdir-lc-kuarsingh-2013-11-28-00
IESG, OPS-DIR and Authors,

I reviewed "Supporting Authentication Trailer for OSPFv3"
 (draft-ietf-ospf-rfc6506bis-02) for operational impact.

Intended Status: Standards Track

Current Draft Status: IESG Last Call

Summary:  This document defines an alternative mechanism to authenticate OSPFv3
protocol packets using an Authentication Trailer (versus using IPSec). The
document also outlines mechanism allowing implementations supporting this
authentication method to operate with older implementations not supporting this
authentication method.

This document is set to replace RFC6506 providing updates and includes Errata
items.

I do not see any operational impact with publication based on what is currently
specified in this draft.

Summary Feedback Points:

(1) The document addresses Errata items from RFC6506 and provides updated text
around invalid keys usage and backward compatibility

(2) The document does address, to a greater extent then RFC6506 backward
compatibility with older OSPFv3 implementations not supporting this newer
authentication method (outlined in section 5)

(3) Section 5 provides a well described list of behaviours necessary by routers
implementing the new authentication method to be backwards compatible with
older implementations that do not support the new functions (This is important
to operators as transitionary functionally is very important)

(4) If implemented as specified, this helps operators further secure their
environments while supporting transition often needed for network implementation

(5)  I do not see any issues from an operational perspective to publication

Additional Feedback:

(6) Given that implementations of this new authentication method can exist for
long periods of time in environments where at least one router may not support
the new methods, some additional text in the security section may be beneficial
to describe that exposure (this is not necessary since this point can be
gleaned by the reader who is operationally aware , but just an option)

Optional Text that can be added in security section (Section 6) if desired:

<text>

Deployments supporting a transitionary state which interoperate with routers
that do not support this authentication method may be exposed to
unauthenticated data during the transition period.

</text>

regards,

Victor Kuarsingh