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Last Call Review of draft-ietf-pce-stateful-pce-auto-bandwidth-10
review-ietf-pce-stateful-pce-auto-bandwidth-10-secdir-lc-franke-2019-08-28-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-pce-stateful-pce-auto-bandwidth
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 12)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2019-08-28
Requested 2019-08-14
Authors Dhruv Dhody , Rakesh Gandhi , Udayasree Palle , Ravi Singh , Luyuan Fang
Draft last updated 2019-08-28
Completed reviews Rtgdir Last Call review of -09 by Jonathan Hardwick (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -10 by Daniel Fox Franke (diff)
Genart Last Call review of -10 by Erik Kline (diff)
Tsvart Last Call review of -10 by David L. Black (diff)
Opsdir Last Call review of -10 by Joe Clarke (diff)
Tsvart Telechat review of -11 by David L. Black (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Daniel Fox Franke
State Completed
Review review-ietf-pce-stateful-pce-auto-bandwidth-10-secdir-lc-franke-2019-08-28
Posted at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/6i5DkY_hFxjXAjVfv_Y7DRIclwU
Reviewed revision 10 (document currently at 12)
Result Ready
Completed 2019-08-28
review-ietf-pce-stateful-pce-auto-bandwidth-10-secdir-lc-franke-2019-08-28-00
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's  ongoing
effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments
were written primarily for the benefit of the  security area directors.
Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other
last call comments.

The protocol that this draft extends is one intended to be run over TLS and
conducted between two endpoints controlled by the same administrative
authority. The Security Considerations section duly makes this explicit and
references another RFC which thoroughly discusses what can occur when these
assumptions are violated. When the protocol is run as intended, there is no
communication across trust boundaries and therefore the potential security
concerns are minimal.