Last Call Review of draft-ietf-qresync-rfc5162bis-09
review-ietf-qresync-rfc5162bis-09-secdir-lc-hallam-baker-2014-02-19-00
Request | Review of | draft-ietf-qresync-rfc5162bis |
---|---|---|
Requested revision | No specific revision (document currently at 10) | |
Type | Last Call Review | |
Team | Security Area Directorate (secdir) | |
Deadline | 2014-02-18 | |
Requested | 2014-01-16 | |
Authors | Alexey Melnikov , Dave Cridland | |
I-D last updated | 2014-02-19 | |
Completed reviews |
Genart Last Call review of -09
by David L. Black
(diff)
Genart Telechat review of -10 by David L. Black Secdir Last Call review of -09 by Phillip Hallam-Baker (diff) |
|
Assignment | Reviewer | Phillip Hallam-Baker |
State | Completed | |
Request | Last Call review on draft-ietf-qresync-rfc5162bis by Security Area Directorate Assigned | |
Reviewed revision | 09 (document currently at 10) | |
Result | Has issues | |
Completed | 2014-02-19 |
review-ietf-qresync-rfc5162bis-09-secdir-lc-hallam-baker-2014-02-19-00
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments. We have a problem here, the security considerations in the draft are a back reference to the original protocol. This is the security references section of IMAP, a core Internet protocol in their entirety: 11 . Security Considerations IMAP4rev1 protocol transactions, including electronic mail data, are sent in the clear over the network unless protection from snooping is negotiated. This can be accomplished either by the use of STARTTLS, negotiated privacy protection in the AUTHENTICATE command, or some other protection mechanism. -- Website: http://hallambaker.com/