Last Call Review of draft-ietf-rtgwg-ipfrr-notvia-addresses-10
review-ietf-rtgwg-ipfrr-notvia-addresses-10-secdir-lc-sheffer-2013-02-07-00

I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.
These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security
area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat these
comments just like any other last call comments.



This document describes a method to protect a network from router/link 


failures by encapsulating packets in an envelope that denotes what nodes 


it should *not* be routed through. This is not a protocol definition 


(despite a few stray MUSTs), it is only an informational summary of 


design issues and a framework.




Summary

The document is good to go. In fact, a SecDir review is not applicable.

Details



The document does contain a Security Considerations section that goes 


through 3 potential security issues. But since the document in general 


is a high-level discussion, it is impossible to analyze whether all 


pertinent security issues are covered. If the not-via mechanism is ever 


specified as a protocol, the security analysis will need to be done from 


scratch.




Thanks,
     Yaron