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Last Call Review of draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-reqs-11
review-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-reqs-11-secdir-lc-montville-2014-07-03-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-reqs
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 12)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2014-07-03
Requested 2014-06-26
Authors Steven Bellovin , Randy Bush , David Ward
I-D last updated 2014-07-03
Completed reviews Genart Last Call review of -11 by Francis Dupont (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -11 by Adam W. Montville (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Adam W. Montville
State Completed
Request Last Call review on draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-reqs by Security Area Directorate Assigned
Reviewed revision 11 (document currently at 12)
Result Has nits
Completed 2014-07-03
review-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-reqs-11-secdir-lc-montville-2014-07-03-00
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing
effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.  These
comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors.
 Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other
last call comments.

This document is ready with (potential) nits.  When reading this requirements
draft I tried to keep an eye on measurability: When implementing drafts are
created, how will they be objectively measured to meet the requirements?

Potential Nits:

1. Requirements 3.1 and 3.2 indicate that a “strong level of certainty” is
needed, but does not define what that means in context.  This may be common
knowledge within the community, however.

2. Requirement 3.13 indicates that BGPsec “MUST provide backward
compatibility”, but we are left to assume that downgrade prevention is enabled.
 We might assume that it is, but it’s probably better not to.  Perhaps adding a
statement to the effect of “MUST provide backward compatibility…. but also
allow for strict BGPsec adherence” or something similar.  I also recognize that
there may be obviating circumstances behind this requirement (i.e. it’s not
practical to *not* allow strict adherence), which I might also assume as a
reader.

3. Requirement 3.18 uses the phrase “necessary degree of assurance” regarding
validity of certain data, and I don’t know what that is really saying.  Is this
really a statement of integrity and authenticity or something else?  What is
the gradient of assurance and how do we know when we’ve reached that “necessary
degree”?

4. In the Security Considerations section (6) it seems that more explanation
pertaining to the following sentence might be warranted: “The data plane might
not follow the control plane.”  This might be readily apparent to anyone
in-the-know, but it’s not so apparent to those not-in-the-know.

Regards,

Adam

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