Last Call Review of draft-ietf-sidrops-rov-no-rr-03
review-ietf-sidrops-rov-no-rr-03-secdir-lc-vucinic-2022-08-03-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-sidrops-rov-no-rr
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 08)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2022-08-02
Requested 2022-07-12
Authors Randy Bush , Keyur Patel , Dr. Philip F. Smith , Mark Tinka
I-D last updated 2022-08-03
Completed reviews Rtgdir Last Call review of -03 by John Drake (diff)
Genart Last Call review of -03 by Paul Kyzivat (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -03 by Mališa Vučinić (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Mališa Vučinić
State Completed
Request Last Call review on draft-ietf-sidrops-rov-no-rr by Security Area Directorate Assigned
Posted at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/o9NoRostRTcBC3UR8BBkz8K-2ag
Reviewed revision 03 (document currently at 08)
Result Ready
Completed 2022-08-03
review-ietf-sidrops-rov-no-rr-03-secdir-lc-vucinic-2022-08-03-00
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing
effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the  IESG.  These
comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors.
Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other
last call comments.

This is a short, well-written document which describes a mechanism to avoid
Route Refresh due to new RPKI data being available at BGP speakers. The idea is
that the BGP speakers preserve the partial routing data (Adj-RIB-In) in case
Route Origin Validation fails, in order to be able to check it back once the
RPKI data is available. The mechanism improves the previous situation where
some implementations would trigger the Route Refresh upon receiving new RPKI
data.

The Security Considerations section refers to the document references for
considerations. While I am not an expert on BGP, I do not perceive new security
issues with this proposal.