Last Call Review of draft-ietf-siprec-architecture-08
review-ietf-siprec-architecture-08-secdir-lc-atkins-2013-10-03-00
| Request | Review of | draft-ietf-siprec-architecture |
|---|---|---|
| Requested revision | No specific revision (document currently at 12) | |
| Type | IETF Last Call Review | |
| Team | Security Area Directorate (secdir) | |
| Deadline | 2013-10-01 | |
| Requested | 2013-09-19 | |
| Authors | Andrew Hutton , Leon Portman , Rajnish Jain , Ken Rehor | |
| I-D last updated | 2015-10-14 (Latest revision 2014-02-27) | |
| Completed reviews |
Genart IETF Last Call review of -08
by Russ Housley
(diff)
Genart Telechat review of -11 by Russ Housley (diff) Secdir IETF Last Call review of -08 by Derek Atkins (diff) |
|
| Assignment | Reviewer | Derek Atkins |
| State | Completed | |
| Request | IETF Last Call review on draft-ietf-siprec-architecture by Security Area Directorate Assigned | |
| Reviewed revision | 08 (document currently at 12) | |
| Result | Has issues | |
| Completed | 2013-10-03 |
review-ietf-siprec-architecture-08-secdir-lc-atkins-2013-10-03-00
Hi,
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat
these comments just like any other last call comments.
Session recording is a critical requirement in many communications
environments such as call centers and financial trading. In some of
these environments, all calls must be recorded for regulatory,
compliance, and consumer protection reasons. Recording of a session
is typically performed by sending a copy of a media stream to a
recording device. This document describes architectures for
deploying session recording solutions in an environment which is
based on the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP).
Retrieving recorded media is a potential Key Management problem which
this document completely ignores (and even claims is out of scope).
The key used to encrypt the recorded media (whether or not the media
is re-encrypted) must be stored and retrieved as part of the media
retrieval. How this important data is stored and retrieved is left
out, leaving an implementation with no guidance on how to protect that
valuable asset. In fact the document completely elides the question
of how a retriever obtains the data encryption key. Even if it's just
additional guidance the Security Considerations should at least
explain the problem even if it doesn't provide a solution.
-derek
--
Derek Atkins 617-623-3745
derek at ihtfp.com www.ihtfp.com
Computer and Internet Security Consultant