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Last Call Review of draft-ietf-spring-segment-routing-msdc-03
review-ietf-spring-segment-routing-msdc-03-rtgdir-lc-hares-2017-03-06-00

Request Review of draft-ietf-spring-segment-routing-msdc
Requested revision No specific revision (document currently at 11)
Type Last Call Review
Team Routing Area Directorate (rtgdir)
Deadline 2017-03-07
Requested 2017-02-22
Requested by Bruno Decraene
Authors Clarence Filsfils , Stefano Previdi , Gaurav Dawra , Ebben Aries , Petr Lapukhov
I-D last updated 2017-03-06
Completed reviews Rtgdir Last Call review of -03 by Susan Hares (diff)
Opsdir Last Call review of -08 by Tina Tsou (Ting ZOU) (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -06 by Takeshi Takahashi (diff)
Tsvart Telechat review of -08 by Martin Stiemerling (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Susan Hares
State Completed
Request Last Call review on draft-ietf-spring-segment-routing-msdc by Routing Area Directorate Assigned
Reviewed revision 03 (document currently at 11)
Result Has issues
Completed 2017-03-06
review-ietf-spring-segment-routing-msdc-03-rtgdir-lc-hares-2017-03-06-00
The RTG-DIR has the categories:  minor concerns or major concerns regarding
"issues", I wil differentiate my issues by this quality. I also have editorial
nits regardign under specified text.

Major concerns:
1) The security section is not sufficient for any review by the Security area

This draft depends on IDR WG draft (ietf-idr-bgp-prefix-sid) that defines the
BGP Segment attribute.  If this attribute is used with IPv6, this simply gives
more infromation about a link to a next.  However, the combination of this
information with the information passed using
draft-ietf-idr-bgpls-segment-routing-epe-09 that utilizes BGP to pass BGP
topologies in BGP - requires a better security section.  BGP-LS was described
to be an "information gathering" function handled by a few routers on the edge
of the network to obtain link-state topology information.  The BGP peers would
carry this information in a separate informational stream.  With this
constraint, it was approved by the IESG.   
draft-ietf-idr-bgpls-segment-routing-epe  expands the initial concept of BGP-LS
from "information gathering" to a full-routing scheme of BGP within BGP for
data centers and for data center interconnection to the network.   This
extension takes it out of the approved range of the BGP-LS.  Therefore, the
security sections in both the IDR WG drafts and this draft need to describe the
new threat scenarios and describe threat mitigation strategies for deployments.

In addition, the information by BGP-LS
(draft-ietf-idr-bgpls-segment-routing-epe) or in draft-ietf-bgp-sid may have
privacy issues - so these need to be described the security section.

2) through-out the text you use words such as "ebgp3107" or BGP 3107 updates"

This phrase is inaccurate.  The base RFC3107 support will not provide
BGP-Prefix support (as supported in bgp-idr-bgp-prefix.   Some texts goes on to
clarify the addition of the BGP SID Prefix attribute.  It would be better to
invent a new phrase or term.

In section 8.1, the authors state:
"The Prefix Segement is a lightweight extension to the BGP Labelled Unicast". 
As noted in my #1 major concern, this "hand-waving" description either needs to
be refined to be accurate.  If the MPLS usage only uses the BGP-Prefix label
and does not extend to the Egress, it is simplier.  However, it is not clear
that is what section 8.1 is about.   If 8.1 includes the
draft-ietf-idr-bgpls-segment-routing-epe, then BGP-LS addition does have a
number of prefixes and rules.   The trade-off between BGP-LS + BGP-LS SID
(draft-ietf-idr-bgp-sid) handling + BGP LS egress peer engineering draft
(draft-ietf-idr-bgp-segment-routing-epe) and a signalling protocol is more
complex than the hand-wave.  It may be the right choice based on current
implementations and management issues, but these need to be laid specifically.

3) Why are you defining 2-byte Private Use AS when there are plenty of 4-Byte
Private Use AS (p. 5).

This usage increases the confusion regarding 2-byte/4-byte ASN.  IDR
specifically worked on 4 byte ASN.

Minor concerns
1) It is not clear what happens in section 4.2.2 and figure 3-5

What happens if the traffic goes to node 3 instead of node 4 on the ECMP path?
What happens if the traffic goes to node 8 instead of node 7 on the ECMP Path?

Is there something missing in the stroy?

2) section 4.3 - IBGP Labeled Unicast.

The phrase "iBGP3107 reflection with nhop-self" needs to be explicitly spelled
out as IBGP Route-Reflection with next-hop self.  If that is not what the
authors mean, then it needs to be further spelled out.  It is unclear where the
central IBGP nodes are that share fully the information learned from the three
clusters. (nodes:5-8 cluster 1, nodes 3-4 cluster 2, nodes 9-10 cluster 3).

This section has hints of a solution, but it is miss a great deal.  Please
upgrade to specific solution.  A diagram might help.

3) Load Sharing hints (Section 7.1)

Elephant flow and mice flows are good descriptions.  Flowlets and VL2 should
either warrant a 1 sentence explanation that actually describes these features
in a 22 page draft, or be removed.

4)  The lack of a manageability or operations section (TBD in version -02) -
concerns me.  The operational issues may be well known to the data centers and
devices manufacturers who have implement this specification, but this is an
interoperability specification for IETF.  Some manageabilty comments should be
included or a BCP pointed to.

Editorial issues:

#1 - The following 4 abbrevitions need to be initially expanded when first
used:  CLOs (p.3),  SRGB(p.6), flowlets (p. 14), and VL2 (p. 14).

#2 - page 7, section 4.2 last paragraph
Old/: assuming the IP Addresses, AS and label-index allocation previously
described, the" New/: assuming the IP address with the AS and label-index
allocation previously described, the" [Comma is optional]

#3 - page 14, section 7.1 paragraph 4,  /(e.g. spine switch Node1)/  - by the
diagram it should be node 5-8 or an error.  Please check the number

#4 - page 17, section 8.2 paragraph 2.

Old/
This is easily accomplished by encapsulating the trafffic either
directly at the host or the source ToR node by pushing the BGP-
Prefix-SID of the destination ToR for intra-DC traffic, or border
node for inter-DC or DC-to-outside-world traffic./

New/
This is easily accomplished by encapsulating the trafffic either
directly at the host or the source ToR node  by pushing  the BGP-
Prefix-SID of the destination ToR for intra-DC traffic, or
the BGP-Prefix-SID for the the border node for inter-DC or DC-to-outside-world
traffic./

If this is not the correct logic, then you can reword this further.
I read it 4 or 5 times.

#5 - Adding a diagram to section 4.3 might help your description.