Last Call Review of draft-ietf-stir-certificates-10

Request Review of draft-ietf-stir-certificates
Requested rev. no specific revision (document currently at 18)
Type Last Call Review
Team Security Area Directorate (secdir)
Deadline 2016-11-01
Requested 2016-10-20
Authors Jon Peterson, Sean Turner
Draft last updated 2016-10-27
Completed reviews Genart Last Call review of -10 by Ralph Droms (diff)
Genart Last Call review of -15 by Joel Halpern (diff)
Opsdir Last Call review of -15 by Sheng Jiang (diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -10 by Klaas Wierenga (diff)
Assignment Reviewer Klaas Wierenga 
State Completed
Review review-ietf-stir-certificates-10-secdir-lc-wierenga-2016-10-27
Reviewed rev. 10 (document currently at 18)
Review result Has Nits
Review completed: 2016-10-27



I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's 
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the 
IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the 
security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat 
these comments just like any other last call comments.

draft-ietf-stir-certificates-10.txt describes the use of certificates to assert authority over phone numbers. 

The document is clear and I believe addresses the security concerns surrounding the use of certificates in this context. I consider this document:

ready with nits

I have a few questions though, probably to do with my lack of understanding of the use case, so I hope you will indulge me:

- pardon my ignorance, but would ENUM/E.146+DNSSEC be an alternative too? It seems to me that DNS works better than lengthy certificate chains….

- section 5.2: doesn’t using 1 certificate with millions of numbers defeat the purpose of this work? Could one of those million numbers spoof another of those numbers?

- section 10.2: "The requirement to consult OCSP in real time results in a network
   round-trip time of day,” I don’t understand that sentence.