Last Call Review of draft-ietf-stir-certificates-15
review-ietf-stir-certificates-15-genart-lc-halpern-2017-11-16-00

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Document: draft-ietf-stir-certificates-15
Reviewer: Joel Halpern
Review Date: 2017-11-16
IETF LC End Date: 2017-11-30
IESG Telechat date: 2017-12-14

Summary:

Major issues:

Minor issues:
    Section 4 bullet 4 in naming the crypto algorithms refers quite clearly to
    2 algorithms.  It then references one of them as RS256.  I assume those
    versed in the field will know which one is meant.  But it would be better
    if the abbreviation RS256 appeared next to the first reference to whichever
    algorithm it means.

    The security considerations section points to RFC 5280 security
    considerations for most issues.  I presume that the intention is to use
    that section regarding trusting CAs.  However, it seems that there is an
    issue here much like that of classic web CAs.  The number of CAs that must
    be trusted seems to be on the order of the number of countries in the
    world.  That seems to leave a large window for false or misleading
    certifications, as I can see nothing which restricts what numbers for which
    those top level CAs can provide attestation.  I presume we do not want to
    go down the path of requiring an uber-CA for all national authorities.  I
    would expect some explicit recognition of this issue in this document.

Nits/editorial comments: