Last Call Review of draft-ietf-straw-b2bua-loop-detection-04
review-ietf-straw-b2bua-loop-detection-04-secdir-lc-lonvick-2014-04-24-00
Request | Review of | draft-ietf-straw-b2bua-loop-detection |
---|---|---|
Requested revision | No specific revision (document currently at 04) | |
Type | Last Call Review | |
Team | Security Area Directorate (secdir) | |
Deadline | 2014-04-25 | |
Requested | 2014-04-17 | |
Authors | Hadriel Kaplan , Victor Pascual | |
I-D last updated | 2014-04-24 | |
Completed reviews |
Genart Last Call review of -04
by Wassim Haddad
Secdir Last Call review of -04 by Chris M. Lonvick Opsdir Last Call review of -04 by Warren "Ace" Kumari |
|
Assignment | Reviewer | Chris M. Lonvick |
State | Completed | |
Request | Last Call review on draft-ietf-straw-b2bua-loop-detection by Security Area Directorate Assigned | |
Reviewed revision | 04 | |
Result | Has nits | |
Completed | 2014-04-24 |
review-ietf-straw-b2bua-loop-detection-04-secdir-lc-lonvick-2014-04-24-00
Hi, I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments. The document is well written and I agree that the Security Considerations section of RFC 5393 pretty much covers everything in this document. I don't feel strongly about this\, but the authors may wish to describe what could happen if one B2BUA adheres to the specifications described in this document (adds appropriate header information when it finds none) and an old B2BUA that has not implemented these specifications (may strip out Via header information) causing a loop to encourage everyone to implement the recommendations in this specification. Regards, Chris