Last Call Review of draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-14
review-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-14-secdir-lc-kelly-2017-03-15-00
Request | Review of | draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis |
---|---|---|
Requested revision | No specific revision (document currently at 17) | |
Type | Last Call Review | |
Team | Security Area Directorate (secdir) | |
Deadline | 2017-03-03 | |
Requested | 2017-02-17 | |
Authors | Yoav Nir , Simon Josefsson , Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard | |
I-D last updated | 2017-03-15 | |
Completed reviews |
Opsdir Last Call review of -14
by Bert Wijnen
(diff)
Secdir Last Call review of -14 by Scott G. Kelly (diff) |
|
Assignment | Reviewer | Scott G. Kelly |
State | Completed | |
Request | Last Call review on draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis by Security Area Directorate Assigned | |
Reviewed revision | 14 (document currently at 17) | |
Result | Ready | |
Completed | 2017-03-15 |
review-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-14-secdir-lc-kelly-2017-03-15-00
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments. This review is roughly a week late, I hope it is still useful. I think the abstract is quite clear: This document describes key exchange algorithms based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. In particular, it specifies the use of Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE) key agreement in a TLS handshake and the use of Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) and Edwards Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) as authentication mechanisms. I currently have little expertise in ECC, so please view my comments accordingly. Security considerations are described throughout the document, and there is also a thorough security considerations section. Yoav and Simon are well known to the IETF security community, and have been actively involved in ECC-related security discussions in cfrg, so with the qualification that I am not expert in this area, I don't see any issues with this document. --Scott