Last Call Review of draft-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-roaming-analysis-05
review-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-roaming-analysis-05-secdir-lc-salowey-2014-10-02-00
| Request | Review of | draft-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-roaming-analysis |
|---|---|---|
| Requested revision | No specific revision (document currently at 07) | |
| Type | Last Call Review | |
| Team | Security Area Directorate (secdir) | |
| Deadline | 2014-09-29 | |
| Requested | 2014-09-18 | |
| Authors | Gang Chen , DENG Hui , Dave Michaud , Jouni Korhonen , Mohamed Boucadair | |
| Draft last updated | 2014-10-02 | |
| Completed reviews |
Genart Last Call review of -05
by
Peter E. Yee
(diff)
Genart Telechat review of -05 by Peter E. Yee (diff) Secdir Last Call review of -05 by Joseph A. Salowey (diff) Opsdir Last Call review of -05 by Tim Chown (diff) |
|
| Assignment | Reviewer | Joseph A. Salowey |
| State | Completed | |
| Review |
review-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-roaming-analysis-05-secdir-lc-salowey-2014-10-02
|
|
| Reviewed revision | 05 (document currently at 07) | |
| Result | Ready | |
| Completed | 2014-10-02 |
review-ietf-v6ops-ipv6-roaming-analysis-05-secdir-lc-salowey-2014-10-02-00
I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments. In summary I believe the document is ready. It does make reference to security considerations IPV6-3GPP RFC 6459 which is appropriate. I have a few observations below. 1) There is a brief discussion of home routed an local breakout modes which determine how the user's traffic is routed. This could potentially have privacy implications, however I do not think this is the subject of the document so I don't think additional privacy considerations are needed. The one exception may be if an attacker can force the selection of one of these options. This did not appear to be the case from the document, but I did not follow all the 3GPP specifics. 2) Some of the failure modes consume more network resources. If these modes can be externally manipulated then it may be possible for a denial of service attack. This did not appear to be the case from the document, but I did not follow all the 3GPP specifics. Cheers, Joe