Last Call Review of draft-melnikov-smtp-priority-tunneling-
I have reviewed this document
as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review
all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments
were written primarily for the benefit of the security area
directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these
comments just like any other last call comments.
This experimental draft describes a SMTP tunneling method to
support priority message values for Mail Transfer Agents (MTA)
that don't understand the MT-PRIORITY
The security consideration section does exist and is quite
detailed in listing the various attack scenarios and mitigating
against these attacks. It goes on to provide exceptions of when
MT-Priority header values are not required to be stripped.
These have consequences such as breaking DKIM signatures,
assuming subsequent MTAs are compliant with the new tunneling,
or rejecting the messaging. The document may clarify on when it
is acceptable to break DKIM signatures and/or describe the
environment. On the other hand, if the MSA/MTA decides to alter
the message and needs to resign the message then is there any
ambiguity of what the message/fields would be when resigned?
Thanks for providing the before and after examples as this was
helpful in my understanding of the protocol.
s/Example of such/Examples of such/