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Key Management Considerations for the TCP MD5 Signature Option
RFC 3562

Revision differences

Document history

Date Rev. By Action
2015-10-14
00 (System) Notify list changed from <skh@nexthop.com>, <yakov@juniper.net> to <yakov@juniper.net>
2003-08-02
00 (System) IESG has approved the document
2003-07-07
00 (System) Ballot writeup text was added
2003-07-07
00 (System) Last call text was added
2003-07-07
00 (System) Ballot approval text was added
2003-07-07
00 Bill Fenner Published as RFC 3562
2003-07-07
00 Bill Fenner State Changes to RFC Published from RFC Ed Queue by Fenner, Bill
2003-07-07
00 (System) RFC published
2003-06-30
00 Bill Fenner
In author's 48 hours:

From: RFC Editor <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>
Subject: authors 48 hours: RFC 3563 <draft-ietf-idr-md5-keys-00.txt>
        NOW AVAILABLE …
In author's 48 hours:

From: RFC Editor <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>
Subject: authors 48 hours: RFC 3563 <draft-ietf-idr-md5-keys-00.txt>
        NOW AVAILABLE
Date: Mon, 30 Jun 2003 15:02:30 -0700
To: mleech@nortelnetworks.com
Cc: RFC Editor <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org>, Bill Fenner
    <fenner@research.att.com>, Alex Zinin <zinin@psg.com>,
    skh@nexthop.com, yakov@juniper.net
2003-05-29
00 Natalia Syracuse State Changes to RFC Ed Queue from Approved-announcement sent by Syracuse, Natalia
2003-05-21
00 Dinara Suleymanova State Changes to Approved-announcement sent from Approved-announcement to be sent by Suleymanova, Dinara
2003-04-20
00 Bill Fenner
RFC EDITOR:

Please change the title to "Key Management Considerations for the
TCP MD5 Signature Option".

Please change the following:

In section 3, the first …
RFC EDITOR:

Please change the title to "Key Management Considerations for the
TCP MD5 Signature Option".

Please change the following:

In section 3, the first bullet:
OLD:
      o Key lengths SHOULD be between 12 and 24 bytes, with larger keys
        having effectively zero cost when compared to shorter keys.

NEW:
      o Key lengths SHOULD be between 12 and 24 bytes, with larger keys
        having effectively zero additional computational cost when
                            ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
        compared to shorter keys.

In section 5, first paragraph:

OLD:
  this option may have lifetimes on the order of months.  It would seem
  prudent, then, to choose a *minimum* key length that guarantees that
  key-guessing runtimes are some reasonable [3-5??] multiple of the
  key-change interval under best-case (for the attacker) practical

NEW:
  this option may have lifetimes on the order of months.  It would seem
  prudent, then, to choose a minimum key length that guarantees that
                              ^^^^^^^ (remove emphasis)
  key-guessing runtimes are some small multiple of the key-change
                                  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
  interval under best-case (for the attacker) practical

In section 6, first paragraph:

OLD:
  that the reasonable upper-bound for software-based attack performance
  is 1.0e13 MD5 operations per second, then the *minimum* required key
  entropy is approximately 68 bits.  It is reasonable to round this

NEW:
  that the reasonable upper-bound for software-based attack performance
  is 1.0e13 MD5 operations per second, then the minimum required key
                                                ^^^^^^^ (remove emphasis)
  entropy is approximately 68 bits.  It is reasonable to round this
2003-04-20
00 Bill Fenner State Changes to Approved-announcement to be sent from IESG Evaluation by Fenner, Bill
2003-04-18
00 Alex Zinin AZ: The author indicated he's fine with the proposed note.
2003-04-11
00 Bill Fenner
Proposed RFC-Editor note follows.  I've sent this to the author for a quick check.

RFC EDITOR:

Please change the title to "Key Management Considerations for …
Proposed RFC-Editor note follows.  I've sent this to the author for a quick check.

RFC EDITOR:

Please change the title to "Key Management Considerations for the
TCP MD5 Signature Option".

Please change the following:

In section 3, the first bullet:
OLD:
      o Key lengths SHOULD be between 12 and 24 bytes, with larger keys
        having effectively zero cost when compared to shorter keys.

NEW:
      o Key lengths SHOULD be between 12 and 24 bytes, with larger keys
        having effectively zero additional computational cost when
                            ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
        compared to shorter keys.

In section 5, first paragraph:

OLD:
  this option may have lifetimes on the order of months.  It would seem
  prudent, then, to choose a *minimum* key length that guarantees that
  key-guessing runtimes are some reasonable [3-5??] multiple of the
  key-change interval under best-case (for the attacker) practical

NEW:
  this option may have lifetimes on the order of months.  It would seem
  prudent, then, to choose a minimum key length that guarantees that
                              ^^^^^^^ (remove emphasis)
  key-guessing runtimes are some small multiple of the key-change
                                  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
  interval under best-case (for the attacker) practical

In section 6, first paragraph:

OLD:
  that the reasonable upper-bound for software-based attack performance
  is 1.0e13 MD5 operations per second, then the *minimum* required key
  entropy is approximately 68 bits.  It is reasonable to round this

NEW:
  that the reasonable upper-bound for software-based attack performance
  is 1.0e13 MD5 operations per second, then the minimum required key
                                                ^^^^^^^ (remove emphasis)
  entropy is approximately 68 bits.  It is reasonable to round this
2003-04-10
00 Bill Fenner Bill to combine Russ's minor edits and a better title into an RFC-Editor note, pass by the author, then this is approved.
2003-04-10
00 Bill Fenner State Changes to IESG Evaluation  :: AD Followup from IESG Evaluation by Fenner, Bill
2003-03-25
00 Bill Fenner Status date has been changed to 2003-04-03 from
2003-03-25
00 Bill Fenner We need to make progress on this, so I am putting it back on the telechat agenda.
2003-03-25
00 Bill Fenner State Changes to IESG Evaluation from Dead by Fenner, Bill
2002-08-22
00 Stephen Coya Per the August 8 telechat, this has been removed from IESG consideration.<br><br>
2002-08-22
00 Stephen Coya A new comment added<br>by scoya
2002-08-22
00 Stephen Coya State Changes to Dead from Reading List by scoya
2002-08-09
00 Stephen Coya Withdrawn 8/8/2002
2002-08-09
00 Stephen Coya A new comment added<br>by scoya
2002-08-05
00 Stephen Coya Due date has been changed to 08/05/2002 from 08/08/2002<br>by scoya
2002-08-05
00 Bill Fenner Intended Status has been changed to Informational from None
2002-08-05
00 Bill Fenner
State Changes to Reading List                                      from Pre …
State Changes to Reading List                                      from Pre AD Evaluation                                by fenner
2002-05-29
00 Bill Fenner Passed IDR WG Last Call 5/28/2002
2002-05-29
00 Bill Fenner Draft Added by fenner
2002-05-13
00 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-idr-md5-keys-00.txt