Security Considerations for Signaling Transport (SIGTRAN) Protocols
RFC 3788
| Document | Type | RFC - Proposed Standard (June 2004) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Javier Pastor , Michael Tüxen , John A. Loughney | ||
| Last updated | 2015-10-14 | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | (None) | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | RFC 3788 (Proposed Standard) | |
| Action Holders |
(None)
|
||
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | Jon Peterson | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
RFC 3788
Network Working Group J. Loughney
Request for Comments: 3788 Nokia Research Center
Category: Standards Track M. Tuexen, Ed.
Univ. of Applied Sciences Muenster
J. Pastor-Balbas
Ericsson Espana S.A.
June 2004
Security Considerations for
Signaling Transport (SIGTRAN) Protocols
Status of this Memo
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).
Abstract
This document discusses how Transport Layer Security (TLS) and IPsec
can be used to secure communication for SIGTRAN protocols. The main
goal is to recommend the minimum security means that a SIGTRAN node
must implement in order to attain secured communication. The support
of IPsec is mandatory for all nodes running SIGTRAN protocols. TLS
support is optional.
Loughney, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 3788 SIGTRAN Security June 2004
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Security in Telephony Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Threats and Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. IPsec Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. TLS Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Support of IPsec and TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Peer-to-Peer Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
13. Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
14. Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction
1.1. Overview
The SIGTRAN protocols are designed to carry signaling messages for
telephony services. These protocols will be used between
o customer premise and service provider equipment in case of ISDN
Q.921 User Adaptation Layer (IUA) [9].
o service provider equipment only. This is the case for SS7 MTP2
User Adaptation Layer (M2UA) [12], SS7 MTP2 Peer-to-Peer User
Adaptation Layer (M2PA) [15], SS7 MTP3 User Adaptation Layer
(M3UA) [13] and SS7 SCCP User Adaptation Layer (SUA) [16]. The
carriers may be different and may use other transport network
providers.
The security requirements for these situations may be different.
SIGTRAN protocols involve the security needs of several parties, the
end-users of the services, the service providers and the applications
involved. Additional security requirements may come from local
regulation. While having some overlapping security needs, any
security solution should fulfill all of the different parties' needs.
The SIGTRAN protocols assume that messages are secured by using
either IPsec or TLS.
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1.2. Abbreviations
This document uses the following abbreviations:
ASP: Application Server Process
CA: Certification Authority
DOI: Domain Of Interpretation
ESP: Encapsulating Security Payload
FQDN: Full-Qualified Domain Names
IPsec: IP Security Protocol
IKE: Internet Key Exchange Protocol
ISDN: Integrated Services Digital Network
IUA: ISDN Q.921 User Adaptation Layer
M2PA: SS7 MTP2 Peer-to-Peer User Adaptation Layer
M2UA: SS7 MTP2 User Adaptation Layer
M3UA: SS7 MTP3 User Adaptation Layer
PKI: Public Key Infrastructure
SA: Security Association
SCTP: Stream Control Transmission Protocol
SS7: Signaling System No. 7
SUA: SS7 SCCP User Adaptation Layer
TLS: Transport Layer Security
2. Convention
The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD,
SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, NOT RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when
they appear in this document, are to be interpreted as described in
[1].
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3. Security in Telephony Networks
The security in telephony networks is mainly based on the closed
network principle. There are two main protocols used: Access
protocols (ISDN and others) are used for signaling in the access
network and the SS7 protocol stack in the core network.
As SS7 networks are often physically remote and/or inaccessible to
the user, it is assumed that they are protected from malicious users.
Equipment is often under lock and key. At network boundaries between
SS7 networks, packet filtering is sometimes used. End-users are not
directly connected to SS7 networks.
The access protocols are used for end-user signaling. End-user
signaling protocols are translated to SS7 based protocols by
telephone switches run by network operators.
Regulatory Authorities often require SS7 switches with connections to
different SS7 switches to be conformant to national and/or
international test specifications.
There are no standardized ways of using encryption technologies for
providing confidentiality or using technologies for authentication.
This description applies to telephony networks operated by a single
operator, and also to multiple telephony networks being connected and
operated by different operators.
4. Threats and Goals
The Internet threats can be divided into one of two main types. The
first one is called "passive attacks". It happens whenever the
attacker reads packets off the network but does not write them.
Examples of such attacks include confidentiality violations, password
sniffing and offline cryptographic attacks amongst others.
The second kind of threat is called "active attacks". In this case,
the attacker also writes data to the network. Examples for this
attack include replay attacks, message insertion, message deletion,
message modification or man-in-the-middle attacks, amongst others.
In general, Internet protocols have the following security
objectives:
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RFC 3788 SIGTRAN Security June 2004
o Communication Security:
* Authentication of peers
* Integrity of user data transport
* Confidentiality of user data
* Replay protection
o Non-repudiation
o System Security, avoidance of:
* Unauthorized use
* Inappropriate use
* Denial of Service
Communication security is mandatory in some network scenarios to
prevent malicious attacks. The main goal of this document is to
recommend the minimum security means that a SIGTRAN node must
implement in order to attain secured communication. To achieve this
goal, we will explore the different existing security options
regarding communication.
All SIGTRAN protocols use the Stream Control Transmission Protocol
(SCTP) defined in [8] and [11] as its transport protocol. SCTP
provides certain transport related security features, such as
resistance against:
o Blind Denial of Service Attacks such as:
* Flooding.
* Masquerade.
* Improper Monopolization of Services.
There is no quick fix, one-size-fits-all solution for security.
When a network using SIGTRAN protocols involves more than one party,
it may not be reasonable to expect that all parties have implemented
security in a sufficient manner. End-to-end security should be the
goal; therefore, it is recommended that IPsec or TLS be used to
ensure confidentiality of user payload. Consult [3] for more
information on configuring IPsec services.
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5. IPsec Usage
This section is only relevant for SIGTRAN nodes using IPsec to secure
communication between SIGTRAN nodes.
All SIGTRAN nodes using IPsec MUST implement IPsec ESP [4] in
transport mode with non-null encryption and authentication algorithms
to provide per-packet authentication, integrity protection and
confidentiality, and MUST implement the replay protection mechanisms
of IPsec. In those scenarios where IP layer protection is needed,
ESP in tunnel mode SHOULD be used. Non-null encryption should be
used when using IPSec ESP.
All SIGTRAN nodes MUST support IKE for peer authentication,
negotiation of security associations, and key management, using the
IPsec DOI [5]. The IPsec implementations MUST support peer
authentication using a pre-shared key, and MAY support certificate-
based peer authentication using digital signatures. Peer
authentication using the public key encryption methods outlined in
IKE's sections 5.2 and 5.3 [6] SHOULD NOT be used.
Conformant implementations MUST support IKEs Main Mode and Aggressive
Mode. For transport mode, when pre-shared keys are used for
authentication, IKE Aggressive Mode SHOULD be used, and IKE Main Mode
SHOULD NOT be used. When digital signatures are used for
authentication, either IKE Main Mode or IKE Aggressive Mode MAY be
used. When using ESP tunnel mode, IKE Main Mode MAY be used to
create an ISAKMP association with identity protection during Phase 1.
When digital signatures are used to achieve authentication, an IKE
negotiator SHOULD use IKE Certificate Request Payload(s) to specify
the certification authority (or authorities) that is trusted in
accordance with its local policy. IKE negotiators SHOULD use
pertinent certificate revocation checks before accepting a PKI
certificate for use in IKE's authentication procedures. See [10] for
certificate revocation and [7] for online-checking.
The Phase 2 Quick Mode exchanges used to negotiate protection for
SIGTRAN sessions MUST explicitly carry the Identity Payload fields
(IDci and IDcr). The DOI provides for several types of
identification data. However, when used in conformant
implementations, each ID Payload MUST carry a single IP address and a
single non-zero port number, and MUST NOT use the IP Subnet or IP
Address Range formats. This allows the Phase 2 security association
to correspond to specific TCP and SCTP connections.
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Since IPsec acceleration hardware may only be able to handle a
limited number of active IKE Phase 2 SAs, Phase 2 delete messages may
be sent for idle SAs as a means of keeping the number of active Phase
2 SAs to a minimum. The receipt of an IKE Phase 2 delete message
SHOULD NOT be interpreted as a reason for tearing down a SIGTRAN
session. Rather, it is preferable to leave the connection up,
whereby another IKE Phase 2 SA will be brought up to protect it if
additional traffic is sent. This avoids the potential of continually
bringing connections up and down.
It should be noted that SCTP supports multi-homed hosts and this
results in the need for having multiple security associations for one
SCTP association. This disadvantage of IPsec has been addressed by
[17]. So IPsec implementations used by SIGTRAN nodes SHOULD support
the IPsec feature described in [17].
6. TLS Usage
This section is only relevant for SIGTRAN nodes using TLS to secure
the communication between SIGTRAN nodes.
A SIGTRAN node that initiates a SCTP association to another SIGTRAN
node acts as a TLS client according to [2], and a SIGTRAN node that
accepts a connection acts as a TLS server. SIGTRAN peers
implementing TLS for security MUST mutually authenticate as part of
TLS session establishment. In order to ensure mutual authentication,
the SIGTRAN node acting as TLS server must request a certificate from
the SIGTRAN node acting as TLS client, and the SIGTRAN node acting as
TLS client MUST be prepared to supply a certificate on request.
[14] requires the support of the cipher suite
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA. SIGTRAN nodes MAY negotiate other TLS
cipher suites.
TLS MUST be used on all bi-directional streams. Other uni-
directional streams MUST NOT be used.
It should also be noted that a SCTP implementation used for TLS over
SCTP MUST support fragmentation of user data and might also need to
support the partial delivery API. This holds even if all SIGTRAN
messages are small. Furthermore, the 'unordered delivery' feature of
SCTP can not be used in conjunction with TLS. See [14] for more
details.
Because TLS only protects the payload, the SCTP header and all
control chunks are not protected. This can be used for DoS attacks.
This is a general problem with security provided at the transport
layer.
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The SIGTRAN protocols use the same SCTP port number and payload
protocol identifier when run over TLS. A session upgrade procedure
has to be used to initiate the TLS based communication.
The session upgrade procedure should be as follows:
o If an ASP has been configured to use TLS, it sends a STARTTLS
message on stream 0 and starts a timer T_TLS. This is the first
message sent and the ASP sends no other adaptation layer messages
until the TLS based communication has been established.
o If the peer does not support TLS, it sends back an ERROR message
indicating an unsupported message type. In this case, the SCTP
association is terminated and it is reported to the management
layer that the peer does not support TLS.
o If the peer does support TLS, it sends back a STARTTLS_ACK
message. The client then starts TLS based communication.
o If T_TLS expires without getting any of the above answers, the
association is terminated and the failure is reported to the
management layer.
All SIGTRAN adaptation layers share a common message format. The
STARTTLS message consists of a common header only using the message
class 10 and message type 1. The STARTTLS_ACK message uses the same
message class 10 and the message type 2. Neither messages contain
any parameters.
Using this procedure, it is possible for a man-in-the-middle to do a
denial of service attack by indicating that the peer does not support
TLS. But this kind of attack is always possible for a man-in-the-
middle.
7. Support of IPsec and TLS
If content of SIGTRAN protocol messages is to be protected, either
IPsec ESP or TLS can be used. In both IPsec ESP Transport Mode and
TLS cases, the IP header information is neither encrypted nor
protected. If IPsec ESP is chosen, the SCTP control information is
encrypted and protected whereas in the TLS based solution, the SCTP
control information is not encrypted and only protected by SCTP
procedures.
In general, both IPsec and TLS have enough mechanisms to secure the
SIGTRAN communications.
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Therefore, in order to have a secured model working as soon as
possible, the following recommendation is made: A SIGTRAN node MUST
support IPsec and MAY support TLS.
8. Peer-to-Peer Considerations
M2PA, M3UA and SUA support the peer-to-peer model as a generalization
to the client-server model which is supported by IUA and M2UA. A
SIGTRAN node running M2PA, M3UA or SUA and operating in the peer-to-
peer mode is called a SIGTRAN peer.
As with any peer-to-peer protocol, proper configuration of the trust
model within a peer is essential to security. When certificates are
used, it is necessary to configure the trust anchors trusted by the
peer. These trust anchors are likely to be unique to SIGTRAN usage
and distinct from the trust anchors that might be trusted for other
purposes such as Web browsing. In general, it is expected that those
trust anchors will be configured so as to reflect the business
relationships between the organization hosting the peer and other
organizations. As a result, a peer will not typically be configured
to allow connectivity with any arbitrary peer. When certificate
authentication peers may not be known beforehand, peer discovery may
be required.
Note that IPsec is considerably less flexible than TLS when it comes
to configuring trust anchors. Since use of Port identifiers is
prohibited within IKE Phase 1, it is not possible to uniquely
configure trusted trust anchors for each application individually
within IPsec; the same policy must be used for all applications.
This implies, for example, that a trust anchor trusted for use with a
SIGTRAN protocol must also be trusted to protect other protocols (for
example SNMP). These restrictions are awkward at best.
When pre-shared key authentication is used with IPsec to protect
SIGTRAN based communication, unique pre-shared keys are configured
with peers that are identified by their IP address (Main Mode), or
possibly their FQDN (AggressivenMode). As a result, it is necessary
for the set of peers to be known beforehand. Therefore, peer
discovery is typically not necessary.
The following is intended to provide some guidance on the issue.
It is recommended that SIGTRAN peers use the same security mechanism
(IPsec or TLS) across all its sessions with other SIGTRAN peers.
Inconsistent use of security mechanisms can result in redundant
security mechanisms being used (e.g., TLS over IPsec) or worse,
potential security vulnerabilities. When IPsec is used with a
SIGTRAN protocol, a typical security policy for outbound traffic is
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"Initiate IPsec, from me to any, destination port P"; for inbound
traffic, the policy would be "Require IPsec, from any to me,
destination port P". Here, P denotes one of the registered port
numbers for a SIGTRAN protocol.
This policy causes IPsec to be used whenever a SIGTRAN peer initiates
a session to another SIGTRAN peer, and to be required whenever an
inbound SIGTRAN session occurs. This policy is attractive, since it
does not require policy to be set for each peer or dynamically
modified each time a new SIGTRAN session is created; an IPsec SA is
automatically created based on a simple static policy. Since IPsec
extensions are typically not available to the sockets API on most
platforms, and IPsec policy functionality is implementation
dependent, use of a simple static policy is the often the simplest
route to IPsec-enabling a SIGTRAN peer.
If IPsec is used to secure a SIGTRAN peer-to-peer session, IPsec
policy SHOULD be set so as to require IPsec protection for inbound
connections, and to initiate IPsec protection for outbound
connections. This can be accomplished via use of inbound and
outbound filter policy.
9. Security Considerations
This document discusses the usage of IPsec and TLS for securing
SIGTRAN traffic.
10. IANA Considerations
The message class 12 has been reserved in the Signaling User Adaption
Layer Assignments Registry. For this message class, message type 1
has been reserved for the STARTTLS message, and message type 2 for
the STARTTLS_ACK message.
11. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank B. Aboba, K. Morneault and many
others for their invaluable comments and suggestions.
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12. References
12.1. Normative References
[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
12.2. Informative References
[2] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC
2246, January 1999.
[3] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.
[4] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security Payload
(ESP)", RFC 2406, November 1998.
[5] Piper, D., "The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation
for ISAKMP", RFC 2407, November 1998.
[6] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)",
RFC 2409, November 1998.
[7] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S. and C. Adams,
"X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate
Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560, June 1999.
[8] Stewart, R., Xie, Q., Morneault, K., Sharp, C., Schwarzbauer,
H., Taylor, T., Rytina, I., Kalla, M., Zhang, L. and V. Paxson,
"Stream Control Transmission Protocol", RFC 2960, October 2000.
[9] Morneault, K., Rengasami, S., Kalla, M. and G. Sidebottom,
"ISDN Q.921-User Adaptation Layer", RFC 3057, February 2001.
[10] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W. and D. Solo, "Internet X.509
Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, April 2002.
[11] Stone, J., Stewart, R. and D. Otis, "Stream Control
Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Checksum Change", RFC 3309,
September 2002.
[12] Morneault, K., Dantu, R., Sidebottom, G., Bidulock, B. and J.
Heitz, "Signaling System 7 (SS7) Message Transfer Part 2 (MTP2)
- User Adaptation Layer", RFC 3331, September 2002.
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[13] Sidebottom, G., Ed., Morneault, K., Ed. and J. Pastor-Balbas,
Ed., "Signaling System 7 (SS7) Message Transfer Part 3 (MTP3) -
User Adaptation Layer (M3UA)", RFC 3332, September 2002.
[14] Jungmaier, A., Rescorla, E. and M. Tuexen, "Transport Layer
Security over Stream Control Transmission Protocol", RFC 3436,
December 2002.
[15] George, T., "SS7 MTP2-User Peer-to-Peer Adaptation Layer", Work
in Progress, February 2004.
[16] Loughney, J., "Signalling Connection Control Part User
Adaptation Layer (SUA)", Work in Progress, December 2003.
[17] Bellovin, S., Ioannidis, J., Keromytis, A. and R. Stewart, "On
the Use of Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) with
IPsec", RFC 3554, July 2003.
13. Authors' Addresses
John Loughney
Nokia Research Center
PO Box 407
FIN-00045 Nokia Group
Finland
EMail: john.loughney@nokia.com
Michael Tuexen (editor)
Univ. of Applied Sciences Muenster
Stegerwaldstr. 39
48565 Steinfurt
Germany
EMail: tuexen@fh-muenster.de
Javier Pastor-Balbas
Ericsson Espana S.A.
Via de los Poblados, 13
28033 Madrid
Spain
EMail: j.javier.pastor@ericsson.com
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14. Full Copyright Statement
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
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Acknowledgement
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
Internet Society.
Loughney, et al. Standards Track [Page 13]