Basic Transition Mechanisms for IPv6 Hosts and Routers
RFC 4213
Discuss
Yes
(David Kessens)
No Objection
(Alex Zinin)
(Allison Mankin)
(Bert Wijnen)
(Bill Fenner)
(Margaret Cullen)
(Russ Housley)
(Thomas Narten)
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 07 and is now closed.
Steven Bellovin Former IESG member
Discuss
Discuss
[Treat as non-blocking comment]
(2004-09-10)
Unknown
3.3: what is the benefit of using TTL 255 here? Please delete that. (I see that it's left over from a hint to use GSTM; I asked that that be deleted. But why leave the TTL suggestion in that case?) Frankly, I think the entire paragraph is useless, since the remaining text boils down to "do it the standard way".)
David Kessens Former IESG member
Yes
Yes
()
Unknown
Alex Zinin Former IESG member
(was Discuss)
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Allison Mankin Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Bert Wijnen Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Bill Fenner Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Harald Alvestrand Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2004-09-16)
Unknown
Reviewed by Joel Halpern, Gen-ART His review: This draft is ready for publication as a Proposed Standard RFC. Minor comment: The description of tunneling seems to say that it is only for use by routers. It does say that the decision about using tunnels should be based on routing information. It would be helpful if there were a short section on "method selection" which stated, for at least most common circumstances, which method should be used and why.
Jon Peterson Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2004-05-12)
Unknown
Given that this document addresses two mechanisms, dual-stacks and tunneling, I'm kind of surprised that the Security Considerations seems to talk exclusively about tunneling. Are there no security considerations in the use of a dual-stack host? Especially given the fact that some applications on a given host may be configured to use only one stack or another, as Section 2 suggests? I can imagine a number of cases in which different protocols may be used in concert by a host (say, SIP and RTP), where conceivably different protocols employing different stacks could be used by the same application. Surely there's some security implications of that.
Margaret Cullen Former IESG member
(was Discuss)
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Russ Housley Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Scott Hollenbeck Former IESG member
(was Discuss)
No Objection
No Objection
(2004-05-13)
Unknown
Section 7.2 should be titled "Informative References", not "Non-normative References".
Ted Hardie Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2004-05-11)
Unknown
Since mrw is already holding a discuss on 2.2, I've listed this is a comment, but it might be worth the authors' considering when they look at her discuss. I'm concerned both about this text: However, when a query locates an AAAA record holding an IPv6 address, and an A record holding an IPv4 address, the resolver library MAY filter or order the results returned to the application in order to influence the version of IP packets used to communicate with that node. and the general approach of describing the filtering mechanism available to the resolver as if it were the primary way of preferring AAAA to A or vice versa. The most obvious way to prefer one address family over the other is to query for one RR in preference to the other. You may still get other data back, of course, but this gives control earlier than filtering post-facto, and it deserves a mention here. To take a random example, if I dig for the AAAA record associated with ns-ext.isc.org, I get the A record in the additional section; that might be filtered, but the preference is already established. The case they seem to be focused on is the one like that in which a dig for the ns records for isc.org returns both A and AAAA records associated with hosts like ns-ext.isc.org. That's fine, and it should be included, but as part of the larger context. I suspect they simply thought the choice of RR was too obvious to list, but I'm guessing it is not for the intended audience of this document.
Thomas Narten Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown