An Extension to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for Request History Information
RFC 4244
Yes
(Allison Mankin)
No Objection
(Alex Zinin)
(Bert Wijnen)
(Bill Fenner)
(David Kessens)
(Jon Peterson)
(Margaret Cullen)
(Mark Townsley)
(Russ Housley)
(Sam Hartman)
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 06 and is now closed.
Allison Mankin Former IESG member
Yes
Yes
()
Unknown
Alex Zinin Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Bert Wijnen Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Bill Fenner Former IESG member
(was Discuss)
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Brian Carpenter Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2005-04-13)
Unknown
(from review by Michael Patton) I had two concerns, neither of which is strong enough to warrant delaying the document, although if they are easy to fix that would be worth it. I'm not sure I believe the "stronger security" claim at the end of Section 1. I see this as analogous to the BGP problem. Even though each link was secured, in the end you can't be sure of anything except the link closest to you. Now, this _may_ be stronger than basic SIP in some sense, but it's not really compelling to me. Possibly because I iniitally thought the per-hop securing of BGP was good enough until in an hour-long discussion with a security person, I was finally convinced that it only helped very marginally, if at all, and contributed mostly to a false sense of security. When I first started reading Section 2 I saw the "-req" notation as short for request but later realized it was probably intended to be short for requirement. Is that correct? I suggest that this potential confusion could lead to readers making errors and, unless it's following some established precedent, I'd recommend using something like "-rqmt" which is less likely to be confused. There were also a few typos I saw, which can just be fixed by RFC-Ed: --------------------------------------------------------------------- At the very end of 4.1 one of the entries in the BNF is indented an extra space. Section 4.5: "would try several some of the same places" either "several" or "some" should be removed, Appendix A: "UA 1sends" => "UA1 sends"
David Kessens Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Jon Peterson Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Margaret Cullen Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Mark Townsley Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Russ Housley Former IESG member
(was Discuss)
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Sam Hartman Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Scott Hollenbeck Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2005-04-12)
Unknown
It would be helpful to have the ballot write-up included when the ballot is issued.
Ted Hardie Former IESG member
(was Discuss)
No Objection
No Objection
(2005-04-21)
Unknown
Suggested text for 4.3.1 OLD: The UAC SHOULD include the "histinfo" option tag in the Supported header in any request not associated with an established dialog for which the UAC would like the History-Info header in the Response. In addition, the UAC SHOULD initiate the capturing of the History Information by adding a History-Info header, using the Request-URI of the request as the hi-targeted-to-uri and initializing the index to the RECOMMENDED value of 1 in the hi-entry. NEW: In 4.3.1, the draft says: The UAC SHOULD include the "histinfo" option tag in the Supported header in any request not associated with an established dialog for which the UAC would like the History-Info header in the Response. In addition, the UAC MAY initiate the capturing of the History Information by adding a History-Info header, using the Request-URI of the request as the hi-targeted-to-uri and initializing the index to the RECOMMENDED value of 1 in the hi-entry. By initiating the capturing of the History Information, the UAC ensures that in cases of retargeting without further population of the header, the end consumer can at minimum detect that its was not the original target URI.