Remote Direct Memory Access (RDMA) over IP Problem Statement
RFC 4297
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 05 and is now closed.
(Allison Mankin) Yes
(Thomas Narten) Yes
(Jon Peterson) Yes
(Harald Alvestrand) (was Discuss) No Objection
Comment (2004-10-27)
No email
send info
send info
Reviewed by John Loughney, Gen-ART
(Steven Bellovin) No Objection
(Margaret Cullen) No Objection
(Bill Fenner) No Objection
(Ned Freed) No Objection
(Ted Hardie) No Objection
(Russ Housley) No Objection
Comment (2004-02-04 for -)
No email
send info
send info
The Introduction provides a clear description of the situation. However, I find the Abstract very confusing. I believe that some wordsmithing will greatly improve the Abstract. The use of IPsec, TLS, or any other protocol that provides authentication will not fit well into the proposed architecture. The integrity check cannot be performed until the entire packet (or record in the case of TLS) is available in memory. So, the data must be copied from the I/O interface to memory, which may involve some reassembly, before the integrity check can be performed. This issue should be discussed in the second paragraph of the security considerations. The security considerations section talks about 'threats.' The use does not align with the definitions in RFC 2828. I suggest some rewording. I think the authors ought to look review the definition of 'vulnerability' in RFC 2828. s/IPSec/IPsec/ s/privacy/confidentiality/