Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for Shared-secret Authentication and Key Establishment (EAP-SAKE)
RFC 4763
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RFC - Informational
(November 2006; Errata)
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2015-10-14
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ISE
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plain text
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(None)
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Unknown
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No shepherd assigned
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RFC 4763 (Informational)
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Responsible AD |
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Jari Arkko
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Send notices to |
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H.Soliman@Flarion.com
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Network Working Group M. Vanderveen
Request for Comments: 4763 H. Soliman
Category: Informational Qualcomm Flarion Technologies
November 2006
Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for
Shared-secret Authentication and Key Establishment (EAP-SAKE)
Status of This Memo
This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2006).
IESG Note
This RFC is not a candidate for any level of Internet Standard. The
IETF disclaims any knowledge of the fitness of this RFC for any
purpose and in particular notes that the decision to publish is not
based on IETF review for such things as security, congestion control,
or inappropriate interaction with deployed protocols. The RFC Editor
has chosen to publish this document at its discretion. Readers of
this document should exercise caution in evaluating its value for
implementation and deployment. See RFC 3932 for more information.
Abstract
This document specifies an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
mechanism for Shared-secret Authentication and Key Establishment
(SAKE). This RFC is published as documentation for the IANA
assignment of an EAP Type for a vendor's EAP method per RFC 3748.
The specification has passed Designated Expert review for this IANA
assignment.
Vanderveen & Soliman Informational [Page 1]
RFC 4763 EAP-SAKE November 2006
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................3
2. Terminology .....................................................3
3. Protocol Description ............................................4
3.1. Overview and Motivation of EAP-SAKE ........................4
3.2. Protocol Operation .........................................5
3.2.1. Successful Exchange .................................5
3.2.2. Authentication Failure ..............................7
3.2.3. Identity Management ................................11
3.2.4. Obtaining Peer Identity ............................11
3.2.5. Key Hierarchy ......................................13
3.2.6. Key Derivation .....................................15
3.2.7. Ciphersuite Negotiation ............................17
3.2.8. Message Integrity and Encryption ...................17
3.2.9. Fragmentation ......................................21
3.2.10. Error Cases .......................................21
3.3. Message Formats ...........................................22
3.3.1. Message Format Summary .............................22
3.3.2. Attribute Format ...................................23
3.3.3. Use of AT_ENCR_DATA Attribute ......................25
3.3.4. EAP.Request/SAKE/Challenge Format ..................26
3.3.5. EAP.Response/SAKE/Challenge Format .................28
3.3.6. EAP.Request/SAKE/Confirm Format ....................30
3.3.7. EAP.Response/SAKE/Confirm Format ...................32
3.3.8. EAP.Response/SAKE/Auth-Reject Format ...............33
3.3.9. EAP.Request/SAKE/Identity Format ...................34
3.3.10. EAP.Response/SAKE/Identity Format .................36
3.3.11. Other EAP Messages Formats ........................37
4. IANA Considerations ............................................37
5. Security Considerations ........................................38
5.1. Denial-of-Service Attacks .................................38
5.2. Root Secret Considerations ................................38
5.3. Mutual Authentication .....................................39
5.4. Integrity Protection ......................................39
5.5. Replay Protection .........................................39
5.6. Confidentiality ...........................................40
5.7. Key Derivation, Strength ..................................40
5.8. Dictionary Attacks ........................................41
5.9. Man-in-the-Middle Attacks .................................41
5.10. Result Indication Protection .............................41
5.11. Cryptographic Separation of Keys .........................41
5.12. Session Independence .....................................41
5.13. Identity Protection ......................................42
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