Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Ciphersuites with NULL Encryption for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
RFC 4785
Document | Type | RFC - Proposed Standard (January 2007; No errata) | |
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Authors | Uri Blumenthal , Purushottam Goel | ||
Last updated | 2015-10-14 | ||
Stream | IETF | ||
Formats | plain text html pdf htmlized bibtex | ||
Reviews | |||
Stream | WG state | (None) | |
Document shepherd | No shepherd assigned | ||
IESG | IESG state | RFC 4785 (Proposed Standard) | |
Action Holders |
(None)
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Consensus Boilerplate | Unknown | ||
Telechat date | |||
Responsible AD | Russ Housley | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
Network Working Group U. Blumenthal Request for Comments: 4785 P. Goel Category: Standards Track Intel Corporation January 2007 Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Ciphersuites with NULL Encryption for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Status of This Memo This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). Abstract This document specifies authentication-only ciphersuites (with no encryption) for the Pre-Shared Key (PSK) based Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. These ciphersuites are useful when authentication and integrity protection is desired, but confidentiality is not needed or not permitted. Table of Contents 1. Introduction ....................................................2 1.1. Applicability Statement ....................................2 2. Conventions Used in This Document ...............................2 3. Cipher Usage ....................................................3 4. Security Considerations .........................................3 5. IANA Considerations .............................................3 6. Acknowledgments .................................................3 7. References ......................................................4 7.1. Normative References .......................................4 7.2. Informative References .....................................4 Blumenthal & Goel Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 4785 PSK NULL Encryption Ciphersuites for TLS January 2007 1. Introduction The RFC for Pre-Shared Key (PSK) based Transport Layer Security (TLS) [TLS-PSK] specifies ciphersuites for supporting TLS using pre-shared symmetric keys. However, all the ciphersuites defined in [TLS-PSK] require encryption. However there are cases when only authentication and integrity protection is required, and confidentiality is not needed. There are also cases when confidentiality is not permitted - e.g., for implementations that must meet import restrictions in some countries. Even though no encryption is used, these ciphersuites support authentication of the client and server to each other, and message integrity. This document augments [TLS-PSK] by adding three more ciphersuites (PSK, DHE_PSK, RSA_PSK) with authentication and integrity only - no encryption. The reader is expected to become familiar with [TLS-PSK] standards prior to studying this document. 1.1. Applicability Statement The ciphersuites defined in this document are intended for a rather limited set of applications, usually involving only a very small number of clients and servers. Even in such environments, other alternatives may be more appropriate. If the main goal is to avoid Public-key Infrastructures (PKIs), another possibility worth considering is using self-signed certificates with public key fingerprints. Instead of manually configuring a shared secret in, for instance, some configuration file, a fingerprint (hash) of the other party's public key (or certificate) could be placed there instead. It is also possible to use the Secure Remote Password (SRP) ciphersuites for shared secret authentication [SRP]. SRP was designed to be used with passwords, and it incorporates protection against dictionary attacks. However, it is computationally more expensive than the PSK ciphersuites in [TLS-PSK]. 2. Conventions Used in This Document The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. Blumenthal & Goel Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 4785 PSK NULL Encryption Ciphersuites for TLS January 2007 3. Cipher Usage The three new ciphersuites proposed here match the three cipher suites defined in [TLS-PSK], except that we define suites with null encryption. The ciphersuites defined here use the following options for key exchange and hash part of the protocol: CipherSuite Key Exchange Cipher Hash TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA PSK NULL SHA TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA DHE_PSK NULL SHA TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA RSA_PSK NULL SHA For the meaning of the terms PSK, please refer to section 1 in [TLS-Show full document text