Problem Statement for Network-Based Localized Mobility Management (NETLMM)
RFC 4830

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 05 and is now closed.

(Jari Arkko) Yes

(Ross Callon) No Objection

(Brian Carpenter) (was Discuss) No Objection

(Lisa Dusseault) No Objection

(Lars Eggert) No Objection

(Bill Fenner) No Objection

(Ted Hardie) No Objection

(Sam Hartman) (was Discuss) No Objection

Comment (2006-07-05)
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I agree with the claim in the security considerations section that the
security requirements for signaling are the same as the security
requirements for routing information.  However I caution the netlmm
working group that what we want out of routing information security is
not at all what our current routing protocols deliver.  It is probably
not sufficient for a new working group such as netlmm to deliver the
same security as older routing protocols such as OSPF, IS-IS and BGP.
In particular, automated key management is probably necessary.  I
strongly recommend that netlmm start a discussion of what security is
required today rather than assuming an answer that may lead to
surprise later.

This document does not discuss security implications when a mobile
node moves from a link with one security configuration to a link with
a different security configuration.  For example if I move from a link
that requires 802.11i to one that has no authentication , my available
security changes.  Of particular concern are situations where an
attacker can make it appear that a node has moved to a link with
significantly less security.  It's fine that this document does not
discuss that concern.  Some document from netlmm needs to discuss that
issue.  You will either need to conclude the risk is acceptable or to
provide appropriate mitigation.

(Cullen Jennings) No Objection

(David Kessens) No Objection

(Dan Romascanu) (was Discuss) No Objection

(Mark Townsley) No Objection

Magnus Westerlund No Objection