Problem Statement for Network-Based Localized Mobility Management (NETLMM)
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 05 and is now closed.
(Jari Arkko) Yes
(Ross Callon) No Objection
(Brian Carpenter) (was Discuss) No Objection
(Lisa Dusseault) No Objection
(Lars Eggert) No Objection
(Bill Fenner) No Objection
(Ted Hardie) No Objection
(Sam Hartman) (was Discuss) No Objection
I agree with the claim in the security considerations section that the security requirements for signaling are the same as the security requirements for routing information. However I caution the netlmm working group that what we want out of routing information security is not at all what our current routing protocols deliver. It is probably not sufficient for a new working group such as netlmm to deliver the same security as older routing protocols such as OSPF, IS-IS and BGP. In particular, automated key management is probably necessary. I strongly recommend that netlmm start a discussion of what security is required today rather than assuming an answer that may lead to surprise later. This document does not discuss security implications when a mobile node moves from a link with one security configuration to a link with a different security configuration. For example if I move from a link that requires 802.11i to one that has no authentication , my available security changes. Of particular concern are situations where an attacker can make it appear that a node has moved to a link with significantly less security. It's fine that this document does not discuss that concern. Some document from netlmm needs to discuss that issue. You will either need to conclude the risk is acceptable or to provide appropriate mitigation.