Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Authenticated-Enveloped-Data Content Type
RFC 5083
Yes
No Objection
Recuse
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 06 and is now closed.
Lars Eggert No Objection
Boilerplate text on IPR is missing?
(Jari Arkko; former steering group member) (was Discuss) Yes
(Sam Hartman; former steering group member) Yes
I still believe the paragraph about generic pre-computation attacks in the security considerations section is misleading and the document would be approved by citing the specific attacks David mentioned in his mail. This is a really minor issue and I understand if you disagree. Having read the text, I definitely think Jari's concern about the ASN.1 is valid. I suggest replacing explicit set of tag with "the universal tag for the set of type".
(Tim Polk; former steering group member) Yes
(Chris Newman; former steering group member) (was Discuss) No Objection
Here's a rough attempt to describe the threat and mitigation: A significant security threat to messaging environments today involves various forms of unsolicited messages (spam and phishing). Present mitigation strategies for this threat involve analysis of message plaintext by fingerprint engines that typically require access to proprietary infrastructure on the Internet or intranet. CMS recipients that accept unsolicited encrypted messages are vulnerable to such attacks and CMS defeats many common mitigation strategies. Software that receives encrypted CMS messages MUST provide a mechanism to counter the threat of unsolicted messages. One approach is to reject or discard encrypted messages unless they meet some reasonable definition of solicited (for example, if the validated originator is present in the recipient's personal or corporate addressbook). An alternative approch would provide a client mechanism to call out to a server-based service that filters for such inappropriate content. Thankfully, CMS clients are not widely deployed enough (or easy enough to use) for this threat to manifest yet. But if continued work to improve CMS support changes that situation we need to be prepared for the most likely attack on the system. IMHO, an in depth discussion of the _many_ approaches to mitigation is out-of-scope for this document and for IETF standards.
(Cullen Jennings; former steering group member) No Objection
A helpful addition to this draft would be an appendix with one example messages.
(Dan Romascanu; former steering group member) No Objection
(David Ward; former steering group member) No Objection
(Jon Peterson; former steering group member) No Objection
(Lisa Dusseault; former steering group member) No Objection
(Magnus Westerlund; former steering group member) No Objection
(Mark Townsley; former steering group member) No Objection
(Ron Bonica; former steering group member) No Objection
(Ross Callon; former steering group member) No Objection
(Russ Housley; former steering group member) Recuse