RADIUS Extension for Digest Authentication
RFC 5090
| Document | Type |
RFC - Proposed Standard
(February 2008; Errata)
Obsoletes RFC 4590
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Daniel Sadolevsky , David Williams , David Schwartz , Wolfgang Beck , Baruch Sterman | ||
| Last updated | 2020-01-21 | ||
| Stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | plain text html pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized with errata bibtex | ||
| Reviews | |||
| Stream | WG state | (None) | |
| Document shepherd | No shepherd assigned | ||
| IESG | IESG state | RFC 5090 (Proposed Standard) | |
| Action Holders |
(None)
|
||
| Consensus Boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | |||
| Responsible AD | Dan Romascanu | ||
| Send notices to | (None) | ||
Network Working Group B. Sterman
Request for Comments: 5090 Kayote Networks
Obsoletes: 4590 D. Sadolevsky
Category: Standards Track SecureOL, Inc.
D. Schwartz
Kayote Networks
D. Williams
Cisco Systems
W. Beck
Deutsche Telekom AG
February 2008
RADIUS Extension for Digest Authentication
Status of This Memo
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Abstract
This document defines an extension to the Remote Authentication
Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) protocol to enable support of Digest
Authentication, for use with HTTP-style protocols like the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP) and HTTP.
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................3
1.1. Motivation .................................................3
1.2. Terminology ................................................3
1.3. Overview ...................................................4
2. Detailed Description ............................................6
2.1. RADIUS Client Behavior .....................................6
2.2. RADIUS Server Behavior .....................................9
3. New RADIUS Attributes ..........................................12
3.1. Digest-Response Attribute .................................12
3.2. Digest-Realm Attribute ....................................13
3.3. Digest-Nonce Attribute ....................................13
3.4. Digest-Response-Auth Attribute ............................14
3.5. Digest-Nextnonce Attribute ................................14
3.6. Digest-Method Attribute ...................................15
3.7. Digest-URI Attribute ......................................15
3.8. Digest-Qop Attribute ......................................15
3.9. Digest-Algorithm Attribute ................................16
3.10. Digest-Entity-Body-Hash Attribute ........................16
3.11. Digest-CNonce Attribute ..................................17
3.12. Digest-Nonce-Count Attribute .............................17
3.13. Digest-Username Attribute ................................17
3.14. Digest-Opaque Attribute ..................................18
3.15. Digest-Auth-Param Attribute ..............................18
3.16. Digest-AKA-Auts Attribute ................................19
3.17. Digest-Domain Attribute ..................................19
3.18. Digest-Stale Attribute ...................................20
3.19. Digest-HA1 Attribute .....................................20
3.20. SIP-AOR Attribute ........................................21
4. Diameter Compatibility .........................................21
5. Table of Attributes ............................................21
6. Examples .......................................................23
7. IANA Considerations ............................................27
8. Security Considerations ........................................28
8.1. Denial of Service .........................................28
8.2. Confidentiality and Data Integrity ........................28
9. References .....................................................29
9.1. Normative References ......................................29
9.2. Informative References ....................................30
Appendix A - Changes from RFC 4590 ................................31
Acknowledgements ..................................................31
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 2]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
The HTTP Digest Authentication mechanism, defined in [RFC2617], was
subsequently adapted for use with SIP [RFC3261]. Due to the
limitations and weaknesses of Digest Authentication (see [RFC2617],
Section 4), additional authentication and encryption mechanisms are
defined in SIP [RFC3261], including Transport Layer Security (TLS)
[RFC4346] and Secure MIME (S/MIME) [RFC3851]. However, Digest
Authentication support is mandatory in SIP implementations, and
Digest Authentication is the preferred way for a SIP UA to
authenticate itself to a proxy server. Digest Authentication is used
in other protocols as well.
To simplify the provisioning of users, there is a need to support
this authentication mechanism within Authentication, Authorization,
and Accounting (AAA) protocols such as RADIUS [RFC2865] and Diameter
[RFC3588].
This document defines an extension to the RADIUS protocol to enable
support of Digest Authentication for use with SIP, HTTP, and other
HTTP-style protocols using this authentication method. Support for
Digest mechanisms such as Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA)
[RFC3310] is also supported. A companion document [RFC4740] defines
support for Digest Authentication within Diameter.
1.2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
The use of normative requirement key words in this document shall
apply only to RADIUS client and RADIUS server implementations that
include the features described in this document. This document
creates no normative requirements for existing implementations.
HTTP-style protocol
The term "HTTP-style" denotes any protocol that uses HTTP-like
headers and uses HTTP Digest Authentication as described in
[RFC2617]. Examples are HTTP and the Session Initiation Protocol
(SIP).
NAS (Network Access Server)
The RADIUS client.
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 3]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
nonce
An unpredictable value used to prevent replay attacks. The nonce
generator may use cryptographic mechanisms to produce nonces it
can recognize without maintaining state.
protection space
HTTP-style protocols differ in their definition of the protection
space. For HTTP, it is defined as the combination of the realm
and canonical root URL of the requested resource for which the use
is authorized by the RADIUS server. In the case of SIP, the realm
string alone defines the protection space.
SIP UA (SIP User Agent)
An Internet endpoint that uses the Session Initiation Protocol.
SIP UAS (SIP User Agent Server)
A logical entity that generates a response to a SIP (Session
Initiation Protocol) request.
1.3. Overview
HTTP Digest is a challenge-response protocol used to authenticate a
client's request to access some resource on a server. Figure 1 shows
a single HTTP Digest transaction.
HTTP/SIP..
+------------+ (1) +------------+
| |--------->| |
| HTTP-style | (2) | HTTP-style |
| client |<---------| server |
| | (3) | |
| |--------->| |
| | (4) | |
| |<---------| |
+------------+ +------------+
Figure 1: Digest Operation without RADIUS
If the client sends a request without any credentials (1), the server
will reply with an error response (2) containing a nonce. The client
creates a cryptographic digest from parts of the request, from the
nonce it received from the server, and from a shared secret. The
client retransmits the request (3) to the server, but now includes
the digest within the packet. The server does the same digest
calculation as the client and compares the result with the digest it
received in (3). If the digest values are identical, the server
grants access to the resource and sends a positive response to the
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 4]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
client (4). If the digest values differ, the server sends a negative
response to the client (4).
Instead of maintaining a local user database, the server could use
RADIUS to access a centralized user database. However, RADIUS
[RFC2865] does not include support for HTTP Digest Authentication.
The RADIUS client cannot use the User-Password Attribute, since it
does not receive a password from the HTTP-style client. The CHAP-
Challenge and CHAP-Password attributes described in [RFC1994] are
also not suitable since the Challenge Handshake Authentication
Protocol (CHAP) algorithm is not compatible with HTTP Digest.
This document defines new attributes that enable the RADIUS server to
perform the digest calculation defined in [RFC2617], providing
support for Digest Authentication as a native authentication
mechanism within RADIUS.
The nonces required by the digest algorithm are generated by the
RADIUS server. Generating them in the RADIUS client would save a
round-trip, but introduce security and operational issues. Some
digest algorithms -- e.g., AKA [RFC3310] -- would not work.
Figure 2 depicts a scenario in which the HTTP-style server defers
authentication to a RADIUS server. Entities A and B communicate
using HTTP or SIP, while entities B and C communicate using RADIUS.
HTTP/SIP RADIUS
+-----+ (1) +-----+ +-----+
| |==========>| | (2) | |
| | | |---------->| |
| | | | (3) | |
| | (4) | |<----------| |
| |<==========| | | |
| | (5) | | | |
| |==========>| | | |
| A | | B | (6) | C |
| | | |---------->| |
| | | | (7) | |
| | | |<----------| |
| | (8) | | | |
| |<==========| | | |
+-----+ +-----+ +-----+
====> HTTP/SIP
----> RADIUS
Figure 2: HTTP Digest over RADIUS
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 5]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
The entities have the following roles:
A: HTTP client / SIP UA
B: {HTTP server / HTTP proxy server / SIP proxy server / SIP UAS}
acting also as a RADIUS NAS
C: RADIUS server
The following messages are sent in this scenario:
A sends B an HTTP/SIP request without an Authorization header (step
1). B sends an Access-Request packet with the newly defined Digest-
Method and Digest-URI attributes but without a Digest-Nonce Attribute
to the RADIUS server, C (step 2). C chooses a nonce and responds
with an Access-Challenge (step 3). This Access-Challenge contains
Digest attributes, from which B takes values to construct an HTTP/SIP
"(Proxy) Authorization required" response. B sends this response to
A (step 4). A resends its request with its credentials (step 5). B
sends an Access-Request to C (step 6). C checks the credentials and
replies with Access-Accept or Access-Reject (step 7). Depending on
C's result, B processes A's request or rejects it with a "(Proxy)
Authorization required" response (step 8).
2. Detailed Description
2.1. RADIUS Client Behavior
The attributes described in this document are sent in cleartext.
Therefore, were a RADIUS client to accept secure connections (HTTPS
or SIPS) from HTTP-style clients, this could result in information
intentionally protected by HTTP-style clients being sent in the clear
during RADIUS exchange.
2.1.1. Credential Selection
On reception of an HTTP-style request message, the RADIUS client
checks whether it is authorized to authenticate the request. Where
an HTTP-style request traverses several proxies, and each of the
proxies requests to authenticate the HTTP-style client, the request
at the HTTP-style server may contain multiple credential sets.
The RADIUS client can use the realm directive in HTTP to determine
which credentials are applicable. Where none of the realms are of
interest, the RADIUS client MUST behave as though no relevant
credentials were sent. In all situations, the RADIUS client MUST
send zero or exactly one credential to the RADIUS server. The RADIUS
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 6]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
client MUST choose the credential of the (Proxy-)Authorization header
if the realm directive matches its locally configured realm.
2.1.2. Constructing an Access-Request
If a matching (Proxy-)Authorization header is present and contains
HTTP Digest information, the RADIUS client checks the nonce
parameter.
If the RADIUS client recognizes the nonce, it takes the header
directives and puts them into a RADIUS Access-Request packet. It
puts the response directive into a Digest-Response Attribute and the
realm, nonce, digest-uri, qop, algorithm, cnonce, nc, username, and
opaque directives into the respective Digest-Realm, Digest-Nonce,
Digest-URI, Digest-Qop, Digest-Algorithm, Digest-CNonce, Digest-
Nonce-Count, Digest-Username, and Digest-Opaque attributes. The
RADIUS client puts the request method into the Digest-Method
Attribute.
Due to HTTP syntactic requirements, quoted strings found in HTTP
Digest directives may contain escaped quote and backslash characters.
When translating these directives into RADIUS attributes, the RADIUS
client only removes the leading and trailing quote characters which
surround the directive value, it does not unescape anything within
the string. See Section 3 for an example.
If the Quality of Protection (qop) directive's value is 'auth-int',
the RADIUS client calculates H(entity-body) as described in
[RFC2617], Section 3.2.1, and puts the result in a Digest-Entity-
Body-Hash Attribute.
The RADIUS client adds a Message-Authenticator Attribute, defined in
[RFC3579], and sends the Access-Request packet to the RADIUS server.
The RADIUS server processes the packet and responds with an Access-
Accept or an Access-Reject.
2.1.3. Constructing an Authentication-Info Header
After having received an Access-Accept from the RADIUS server, the
RADIUS client constructs an Authentication-Info header:
o If the Access-Accept packet contains a Digest-Response-Auth
Attribute, the RADIUS client checks the Digest-Qop Attribute:
* If the Digest-Qop Attribute's value is 'auth' or not specified,
the RADIUS client puts the Digest-Response-Auth Attribute's
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 7]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
content into the Authentication-Info header's rspauth directive
of the HTTP-style response.
* If the Digest-Qop Attribute's value is 'auth-int', the RADIUS
client ignores the Access-Accept packet and behaves as if it
had received an Access-Reject packet (Digest-Response-Auth
can't be correct as the RADIUS server does not know the
contents of the HTTP-style response's body).
o If the Access-Accept packet contains a Digest-HA1 Attribute, the
RADIUS client checks the qop and algorithm directives in the
Authorization header of the HTTP-style request it wants to
authorize:
* If the qop directive is missing or its value is 'auth', the
RADIUS client ignores the Digest-HA1 Attribute. It does not
include an Authentication-Info header in its HTTP-style
response.
* If the qop directive's value is 'auth-int' and at least one of
the following conditions is true, the RADIUS client calculates
the contents of the HTTP-style response's rspauth directive:
+ The algorithm directive's value is 'MD5-sess' or 'AKAv1-
MD5-sess'.
+ IP Security (IPsec) is configured to protect traffic between
the RADIUS client and RADIUS server with IPsec (see Section
8).
The RADIUS client creates the HTTP-style response message and
calculates the hash of this message's body. It uses the result
and the Digest-URI Attribute's value of the corresponding
Access-Request packet to perform the H(A2) calculation. It
takes the Digest-Nonce, Digest-Nonce-Count, Digest-CNonce, and
Digest-Qop values of the corresponding Access-Request and the
Digest-HA1 Attribute's value to finish the computation of the
rspauth value.
o If the Access-Accept packet contains neither a Digest-Response-
Auth nor a Digest-HA1 Attribute, the RADIUS client will not create
an Authentication-Info header for its HTTP-style response.
When the RADIUS server provides a Digest-Nextnonce Attribute in the
Access-Accept packet, the RADIUS client puts the contents of this
attribute into a nextnonce directive. Now it can send an HTTP-style
response.
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 8]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
2.1.4. Failed Authentication
If the RADIUS client did receive an HTTP-style request without a
(Proxy-)Authorization header matching its locally configured realm
value, it obtains a new nonce and sends an error response (401 or
407) containing a (Proxy-)Authenticate header.
If the RADIUS client receives an Access-Challenge packet in response
to an Access-Request containing a Digest-Nonce Attribute, the RADIUS
server did not accept the nonce. If a Digest-Stale Attribute is
present in the Access-Challenge and has a value of 'true' (without
surrounding quotes), the RADIUS client sends an error response (401
or 407) containing a WWW-/Proxy-Authenticate header with the stale
directive set to 'true' and the digest directives derived from the
Digest-* attributes.
If the RADIUS client receives an Access-Reject from the RADIUS
server, it sends an error response to the HTTP-style request it has
received. If the RADIUS client does not receive a response, it
retransmits or fails over to another RADIUS server as described in
[RFC2865].
2.1.5. Obtaining Nonces
The RADIUS client has two ways to obtain nonces: it has received one
in a Digest-Nextnonce Attribute of a previously received Access-
Accept packet, or it asks the RADIUS server for one. To do the
latter, it sends an Access-Request containing a Digest-Method and a
Digest-URI Attribute, but without a Digest-Nonce Attribute. It adds
a Message-Authenticator (see [RFC3579]) Attribute to the Access-
Request packet. The RADIUS server chooses a nonce and responds with
an Access-Challenge containing a Digest-Nonce Attribute.
The RADIUS client constructs a (Proxy-)Authenticate header using the
received Digest-Nonce and Digest-Realm attributes to fill the nonce
and realm directives. The RADIUS server can send Digest-Qop,
Digest-Algorithm, Digest-Domain, and Digest-Opaque attributes in the
Access-Challenge carrying the nonce. If these attributes are
present, the client MUST use them.
2.2. RADIUS Server Behavior
If the RADIUS server receives an Access-Request packet with a
Digest-Method and a Digest-URI Attribute but without a Digest-Nonce
Attribute, it chooses a nonce. It puts the nonce into a Digest-Nonce
Attribute and sends it in an Access-Challenge packet to the RADIUS
client. The RADIUS server MUST add Digest-Realm, Message-
Authenticator (see [RFC3579]), SHOULD add Digest-Algorithm and one or
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 9]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
more Digest-Qop, and MAY add Digest-Domain or Digest-Opaque
attributes to the Access-Challenge packet.
2.2.1. General Attribute Checks
If the RADIUS server receives an Access-Request packet containing a
Digest-Response Attribute, it looks for the following attributes:
Digest-Realm, Digest-Nonce, Digest-Method, Digest-URI, Digest-Qop,
Digest-Algorithm, and Digest-Username. Depending on the content of
Digest-Algorithm and Digest-Qop, it looks for Digest-Entity-Body-
Hash, Digest-CNonce, and Digest-AKA-Auts, too. See [RFC2617] and
[RFC3310] for details. If the Digest-Algorithm Attribute is missing,
'MD5' is assumed. If the RADIUS server has issued a Digest-Opaque
Attribute along with the nonce, the Access-Request MUST have a
matching Digest-Opaque Attribute.
If mandatory attributes are missing, it MUST respond with an Access-
Reject packet.
The RADIUS server removes '\' characters that escape quote and '\'
characters from the text values it has received in the Digest-*
attributes.
If the mandatory attributes are present, the RADIUS server MUST check
if the RADIUS client is authorized to serve users of the realm
mentioned in the Digest-Realm Attribute. If the RADIUS client is not
authorized, the RADIUS server MUST send an Access-Reject. The RADIUS
server SHOULD log the event so as to notify the operator, and MAY
take additional action such as sending an Access-Reject in response
to all future requests from this client, until this behavior is reset
by management action.
The RADIUS server determines the age of the nonce in the Digest-Nonce
by using an embedded timestamp or by looking it up in a local table.
The RADIUS server MUST check the integrity of the nonce if it embeds
the timestamp in the nonce. Section 2.2.2 describes how the server
handles old nonces.
2.2.2. Authentication
If the Access-Request message passes the checks described above, the
RADIUS server calculates the digest response as described in
[RFC2617]. To look up the password, the RADIUS server uses the
RADIUS User-Name Attribute. The RADIUS server MUST check if the user
identified by the User-Name Attribute:
o is authorized to access the protection space and
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 10]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
o is authorized to use the URI included in the SIP-AOR Attribute, if
this attribute is present.
If any of those checks fails, the RADIUS server MUST send an Access-
Reject.
Correlation between User-Name and SIP-AOR AVP values is required just
to avoid any user from registering or misusing a SIP-AOR that has
been allocated to a different user.
All values required for the digest calculation are taken from the
Digest attributes described in this document. If the calculated
digest response equals the value received in the Digest-Response
Attribute, the authentication was successful.
If the response values match, but the RADIUS server considers the
nonce in the Digest-Nonce Attribute too old, it sends an Access-
Challenge packet containing a new nonce and a Digest-Stale Attribute
with a value of 'true' (without surrounding quotes).
If the response values don't match, the RADIUS server responds with
an Access-Reject.
2.2.3. Constructing the Reply
If the authentication was successful, the RADIUS server adds an
attribute to the Access-Accept packet that can be used by the RADIUS
client to construct an Authentication-Info header:
o If the Digest-Qop Attribute's value is 'auth' or unspecified, the
RADIUS server SHOULD put a Digest-Response-Auth Attribute into the
Access-Accept packet.
o If the Digest-Qop Attribute's value is 'auth-int' and at least one
of the following conditions is true, the RADIUS server SHOULD put
a Digest-HA1 Attribute into the Access-Accept packet:
* The Digest-Algorithm Attribute's value is 'MD5-sess' or
'AKAv1-MD5-sess'.
* IPsec is configured to protect traffic between the RADIUS
client and RADIUS server with IPsec (see Section 8).
In all other cases, Digest-Response-Auth or Digest-HA1 MUST NOT be
sent.
RADIUS servers MAY construct a Digest-Nextnonce Attribute and add it
to the Access-Accept packet. This is useful to limit the lifetime of
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 11]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
a nonce and to save a round-trip in future requests (see nextnonce
discussion in [RFC2617], Section 3.2.3). The RADIUS server adds a
Message-Authenticator Attribute (see [RFC3579]) and sends the
Access-Accept packet to the RADIUS client.
If the RADIUS server does not accept the nonce received in an
Access-Request packet but authentication was successful, the RADIUS
server MUST send an Access-Challenge packet containing a Digest-Stale
Attribute set to 'true' (without surrounding quotes). The RADIUS
server MUST add Message-Authenticator (see [RFC3579]), Digest-Nonce,
Digest-Realm, SHOULD add Digest-Algorithm and one or more Digest-
Qops, and MAY add Digest-Domain or Digest-Opaque attributes to the
Access-Challenge packet.
3. New RADIUS Attributes
If not stated otherwise, the attributes have the following format:
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Text ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Quote and backslash characters in Digest-* attributes representing
HTTP-style directives with a quoted-string syntax are escaped. The
surrounding quotes are removed. They are syntactical delimiters that
are redundant in RADIUS. For example, the directive
realm="the \"example\" value"
is represented as follows:
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Digest-Realm | 23 | the \"example\" value |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
3.1. Digest-Response Attribute
Description
If this attribute is present in an Access-Request message, a
RADIUS server implementing this specification MUST treat the
Access-Request as a request for Digest Authentication. When a
RADIUS client receives a (Proxy-)Authorization header, it puts
the request-digest value into a Digest-Response Attribute.
This attribute (which enables the user to prove possession of
the password) MUST only be used in Access-Request packets.
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 12]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
Type
103 for Digest-Response.
Length
>= 3
Text
When using HTTP Digest, the text field is 32 octets long and
contains a hexadecimal representation of a 16-octet digest
value as it was calculated by the authenticated client. Other
digest algorithms MAY define different digest lengths. The
text field MUST be copied from request-digest of digest-
response [RFC2617] without surrounding quotes.
3.2. Digest-Realm Attribute
Description
This attribute describes a protection space component of the
RADIUS server. HTTP-style protocols differ in their definition
of the protection space. See [RFC2617], Section 1.2, for
details. It MUST only be used in Access-Request, Access-
Challenge, and Accounting-Request packets.
Type
104 for Digest-Realm
Length
>= 3
Text
In Access-Requests, the RADIUS client takes the value of the
realm directive (realm-value according to [RFC2617]) without
surrounding quotes from the HTTP-style request it wants to
authenticate. In Access-Challenge packets, the RADIUS server
puts the expected realm value into this attribute.
3.3. Digest-Nonce Attribute
Description
This attribute holds a nonce to be used in the HTTP Digest
calculation. If the Access-Request had a Digest-Method and a
Digest-URI but no Digest-Nonce Attribute, the RADIUS server
MUST put a Digest-Nonce Attribute into its Access-Challenge
packet. This attribute MUST only be used in Access-Request and
Access-Challenge packets.
Type
105 for Digest-Nonce
Length
>= 3
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 13]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
Text
In Access-Requests, the RADIUS client takes the value of the
nonce directive (nonce-value in [RFC2617]) without surrounding
quotes from the HTTP-style request it wants to authenticate.
In Access-Challenge packets, the attribute contains the nonce
selected by the RADIUS server.
3.4. Digest-Response-Auth Attribute
Description
This attribute enables the RADIUS server to prove possession of
the password. If the previously received Digest-Qop Attribute
was 'auth-int' (without surrounding quotes), the RADIUS server
MUST send a Digest-HA1 Attribute instead of a Digest-Response-
Auth Attribute. The Digest-Response-Auth Attribute MUST only
be used in Access-Accept packets. The RADIUS client puts the
attribute value without surrounding quotes into the rspauth
directive of the Authentication-Info header.
Type
106 for Digest-Response-Auth.
Length
>= 3
Text
The RADIUS server calculates a digest according to Section
3.2.3 of [RFC2617] and copies the result into this attribute.
Digest algorithms other than the one defined in [RFC2617] MAY
define digest lengths other than 32.
3.5. Digest-Nextnonce Attribute
This attribute holds a nonce to be used in the HTTP Digest
calculation.
Description
The RADIUS server MAY put a Digest-Nextnonce Attribute into an
Access-Accept packet. If this attribute is present, the RADIUS
client MUST put the contents of this attribute into the
nextnonce directive of an Authentication-Info header in its
HTTP-style response. This attribute MUST only be used in
Access-Accept packets.
Type
107 for Digest-Nextnonce
Length
>= 3
Text
It is recommended that this text be base64 or hexadecimal data.
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 14]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
3.6. Digest-Method Attribute
Description
This attribute holds the method value to be used in the HTTP
Digest calculation. This attribute MUST only be used in
Access-Request and Accounting-Request packets.
Type
108 for Digest-Method
Length
>= 3
Text
In Access-Requests, the RADIUS client takes the value of the
request method from the HTTP-style request it wants to
authenticate.
3.7. Digest-URI Attribute
Description
This attribute is used to transport the contents of the
digest-uri directive or the URI of the HTTP-style request. It
MUST only be used in Access-Request and Accounting-Request
packets.
Type
109 for Digest-URI
Length
>= 3
Text
If the HTTP-style request has an Authorization header, the
RADIUS client puts the value of the uri directive found in the
HTTP-style request Authorization header (known as "digest-uri-
value" in Section 3.2.2 of [RFC2617]) without surrounding
quotes into this attribute. If there is no Authorization
header, the RADIUS client takes the value of the request URI
from the HTTP-style request it wants to authenticate.
3.8. Digest-Qop Attribute
Description
This attribute holds the Quality of Protection parameter that
influences the HTTP Digest calculation. This attribute MUST
only be used in Access-Request, Access-Challenge, and
Accounting-Request packets. A RADIUS client SHOULD insert one
of the Digest-Qop attributes it has received in a previous
Access-Challenge packet. RADIUS servers SHOULD insert at least
one Digest-Qop Attribute in an Access-Challenge packet.
Digest-Qop is optional in order to preserve backward
compatibility with a minimal implementation of [RFC2069].
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 15]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
Type
110 for Digest-Qop
Length
>= 3
Text
In Access-Requests, the RADIUS client takes the value of the
qop directive (qop-value as described in [RFC2617]) from the
HTTP-style request it wants to authenticate. In Access-
Challenge packets, the RADIUS server puts a desired qop-value
into this attribute. If the RADIUS server supports more than
one "quality of protection" value, it puts each qop-value into
a separate Digest-Qop Attribute.
3.9. Digest-Algorithm Attribute
Description
This attribute holds the algorithm parameter that influences
the HTTP Digest calculation. It MUST only be used in Access-
Request, Access-Challenge and Accounting-Request packets. If
this attribute is missing, MD5 is assumed.
Type
111 for Digest-Algorithm
Length
>= 3
Text
In Access-Requests, the RADIUS client takes the value of the
algorithm directive (as described in [RFC2617], Section 3.2.1)
from the HTTP-style request it wants to authenticate. In
Access-Challenge packets, the RADIUS server SHOULD put the
desired algorithm into this attribute.
3.10. Digest-Entity-Body-Hash Attribute
Description
When using the qop-value 'auth-int', a hash of the HTTP-style
message body's contents is required for digest calculation.
Instead of sending the complete body of the message, only its
hash value is sent. This hash value can be used directly in
the digest calculation.
The clarifications described in section 22.4 of [RFC3261] about
the hash of empty entity bodies apply to the Digest-Entity-
Body-Hash Attribute. This attribute MUST only be sent in
Access-Request packets.
Type
112 for Digest-Entity-Body-Hash
Length
>= 3
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 16]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
Text
The attribute holds the hexadecimal representation of
H(entity-body). This hash is required by certain
authentication mechanisms, such as HTTP Digest with quality of
protection set to 'auth-int'. RADIUS clients MUST use this
attribute to transport the hash of the entity body when HTTP
Digest is the authentication mechanism and the RADIUS server
requires that the integrity of the entity body (e.g., qop
parameter set to 'auth-int') be verified. Extensions to this
document may define support for authentication mechanisms other
than HTTP Digest.
3.11. Digest-CNonce Attribute
Description
This attribute holds the client nonce parameter that is used in
the HTTP Digest calculation. It MUST only be used in Access-
Request packets.
Type
113 for Digest-CNonce
Length
>= 3
Text
This attribute includes the value of the cnonce-value [RFC2617]
without surrounding quotes, taken from the HTTP-style request.
3.12. Digest-Nonce-Count Attribute
Description
This attribute includes the nonce count parameter that is used
to detect replay attacks. The attribute MUST only be used in
Access-Request packets.
Type
114 for Digest-Nonce-Count
Length
10
Text
In Access-Requests, the RADIUS client takes the value of the nc
directive (nc-value according to [RFC2617]) without surrounding
quotes from the HTTP-style request it wants to authenticate.
3.13. Digest-Username Attribute
Description
This attribute holds the user name used in the HTTP Digest
calculation. The RADIUS server MUST use this attribute only
for the purposes of calculating the digest. In order to
determine the appropriate user credentials, the RADIUS server
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 17]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
MUST use the User-Name (1) Attribute, and MUST NOT use the
Digest-Username Attribute. This attribute MUST only be used in
Access-Request and Accounting-Request packets.
Type
115 for Digest-Username
Length
>= 3
Text
In Access-Requests, the RADIUS client takes the value of the
username directive (username-value according to [RFC2617])
without surrounding quotes from the HTTP-style request it wants
to authenticate.
3.14. Digest-Opaque Attribute
Description
This attribute holds the opaque parameter that is passed to the
HTTP-style client. The HTTP-style client will pass this value
back to the server (i.e., the RADIUS client) without
modification. This attribute MUST only be used in Access-
Request and Access-Challenge packets.
Type
116 for Digest-Opaque
Length
>= 3
Text
In Access-Requests, the RADIUS client takes the value of the
opaque directive (opaque-value according to [RFC2617]) without
surrounding quotes from the HTTP-style request it wants to
authenticate and puts it into this attribute. In Access-
Challenge packets, the RADIUS server MAY include this
attribute.
3.15. Digest-Auth-Param Attribute
Description
This attribute is a placeholder for future extensions and
corresponds to the auth-param parameter defined in Section
3.2.1 of [RFC2617]. The Digest-Auth-Param is the mechanism
whereby the RADIUS client and RADIUS server can exchange auth-
param extension parameters contained within Digest headers that
are not understood by the RADIUS client and for which there are
no corresponding stand-alone attributes.
Unlike the previously listed Digest-* attributes, the Digest-
Auth-Param contains not only the value but also the parameter
name, since the parameter name is unknown to the RADIUS client.
If the Digest header contains several unknown parameters, then
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 18]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
the RADIUS implementation MUST repeat this attribute, and each
instance MUST contain one different unknown Digest
parameter/value combination. This attribute MUST ONLY be used
in Access-Request, Access-Challenge, Access-Accept, and
Accounting-Request packets.
Type
117 for Digest-Auth-Param
Length
>= 3
Text
The text consists of the whole parameter, including its name,
the equal sign ('='), and quotes.
3.16. Digest-AKA-Auts Attribute
Description
This attribute holds the auts parameter that is used in the
Digest AKA [RFC3310] calculation. It is only used if the
algorithm of the digest-response denotes a version of AKA
Digest [RFC3310]. This attribute MUST only be used in Access-
Request packets.
Type
118 for Digest-AKA-Auts
Length
>= 3
Text
In Access-Requests, the RADIUS client takes the value of the
auts directive (auts-param according to Section 3.4 of
[RFC3310]) without surrounding quotes from the HTTP-style
request it wants to authenticate.
3.17. Digest-Domain Attribute
Description
When a RADIUS client has asked for a nonce, the RADIUS server
MAY send one or more Digest-Domain attributes in its Access-
Challenge packet. The RADIUS client puts them into the quoted,
space-separated list of URIs of the domain directive of a WWW-
Authenticate header. Together with Digest-Realm, the URIs in
the list define the protection space (see [RFC2617], Section
3.2.1) for some HTTP-style protocols. This attribute MUST only
be used in Access-Challenge and Accounting-Request packets.
Type
119 for Digest-Domain
Length
3
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 19]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
Text
This attribute consists of a single URI that defines a
protection space component.
3.18. Digest-Stale Attribute
Description
This attribute is sent by a RADIUS server in order to notify
the RADIUS client whether it has accepted a nonce. If the
nonce presented by the RADIUS client was stale, the value is
'true' and is 'false' otherwise. The RADIUS client puts the
content of this attribute into a stale directive of the WWW-
Authenticate header in the HTTP-style response to the request
it wants to authenticate. The attribute MUST only be used in
Access-Challenge packets.
Type
120 for Digest-Stale
Length
3
Text
The attribute has either the value 'true' or 'false' (both
values without surrounding quotes).
3.19. Digest-HA1 Attribute
Description
This attribute is used to allow the generation of an
Authentication-Info header, even if the HTTP-style response's
body is required for the calculation of the rspauth value. It
SHOULD be used in Access-Accept packets if the required quality
of protection (qop) is 'auth-int'.
This attribute MUST NOT be sent if the qop parameter was not
specified or has a value of 'auth' (in this case, use Digest-
Response-Auth instead).
The Digest-HA1 Attribute MUST only be sent by the RADIUS server
or processed by the RADIUS client if at least one of the
following conditions is true:
+ The Digest-Algorithm Attribute's value is 'MD5-sess' or
'AKAv1-MD5-sess'.
+ IPsec is configured to protect traffic between the RADIUS
client and RADIUS server with IPsec (see Section 8).
This attribute MUST only be used in Access-Accept packets.
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 20]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
Type
121 for Digest-HA1
Length
>= 3
Text
This attribute contains the hexadecimal representation of H(A1)
as described in [RFC2617], Sections 3.1.3, 3.2.1, and 3.2.2.2.
3.20. SIP-AOR Attribute
Description
This attribute is used for the authorization of SIP messages.
The SIP-AOR Attribute identifies the URI, the use of which must
be authenticated and authorized. The RADIUS server uses this
attribute to authorize the processing of the SIP request. The
SIP-AOR can be derived from, for example, the To header field
in a SIP REGISTER request (user under registration), or the
From header field in other SIP requests. However, the exact
mapping of this attribute to SIP can change due to new
developments in the protocol. This attribute MUST only be used
when the RADIUS client wants to authorize SIP users and MUST
only be used in Access-Request packets.
Type
122 for SIP-AOR
Length
>= 3
Text
The syntax of this attribute corresponds either to a SIP URI
(with the format defined in [RFC3261] or a tel URI (with the
format defined in [RFC3966]).
The SIP-AOR Attribute holds the complete URI, including
parameters and other parts. It is up to the RADIUS server as
to which components of the URI are regarded in the
authorization decision.
4. Diameter Compatibility
This document defines support for Digest Authentication in RADIUS. A
companion document "Diameter Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
Application" [RFC4740] defines support for Digest Authentication in
Diameter, and addresses compatibility issues between RADIUS and
Diameter.
5. Table of Attributes
The following table provides a guide to which attributes may be found
in which kinds of packets, and in what quantity.
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 21]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
Access- Access- Access- Access- Acct-
Request Accept Reject Challenge Req # Attribute
0-1 0 0 0 0-1 1 User-Name
0-1 0 0 1 0 24 State [4]
1 1 1 1 0-1 80 Message-Authenticator
0-1 0 0 0 0 103 Digest-Response
0-1 0 0 1 0-1 104 Digest-Realm
0-1 0 0 1 0 105 Digest-Nonce
0 0-1 0 0 0 106 Digest-Response-Auth [1][2]
0 0-1 0 0 0 107 Digest-Nextnonce
1 0 0 0 0-1 108 Digest-Method
0-1 0 0 0 0-1 109 Digest-URI
0-1 0 0 0+ 0-1 110 Digest-Qop
0-1 0 0 0-1 0-1 111 Digest-Algorithm [3]
0-1 0 0 0 0 112 Digest-Entity-Body-Hash
0-1 0 0 0 0 113 Digest-CNonce
0-1 0 0 0 0 114 Digest-Nonce-Count
0-1 0 0 0 0-1 115 Digest-Username
0-1 0 0 0-1 0 116 Digest-Opaque
0+ 0+ 0 0+ 0+ 117 Digest-Auth-Param
0-1 0 0 0 0 118 Digest-AKA-Auts
0 0 0 0+ 0+ 119 Digest-Domain
0 0 0 0-1 0 120 Digest-Stale
0 0-1 0 0 0 121 Digest-HA1 [1][2]
0-1 0 0 0 0 122 SIP-AOR
The following table defines the meaning of the above table entries.
0 This attribute MUST NOT be present in the packet.
0+ Zero or more instances of this attribute MAY be
present in the packet.
0-1 Zero or one instance of this attribute MAY be
present in the packet.
[Note 1] Digest-HA1 MUST be used instead of Digest-Response-Auth if
Digest-Qop is 'auth-int'.
[Note 2] Digest-Response-Auth MUST be used instead of Digest-HA1 if
Digest-Qop is 'auth'.
[Note 3] If Digest-Algorithm is missing, 'MD5' is assumed.
[Note 4] An Access-Challenge MUST contain a State attribute, which is
copied to the subsequent Access-Request. A server receiving
an Access-Request that contains a State attribute MUST
respond with either an Access-Accept or an Access-Reject;
the server MUST NOT respond with an Access-Challenge.
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 22]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
6. Examples
This is an example selected from the traffic between a softphone (A),
a Proxy Server (B), and an example.com RADIUS server (C). The
communication between the Proxy Server and a SIP Public Switched
Telephone Network (PSTN) gateway is omitted for brevity. The SIP
messages are not shown completely.
The password of user '12345678' is 'secret'. The shared secret
between the RADIUS client and server is 'secret'. To ease testing,
only the last byte of the RADIUS authenticator changes between
requests. In a real implementation, this would be a serious flaw.
A->B
INVITE sip:97226491335@example.com SIP/2.0
From: <sip:12345678@example.com>
To: <sip:97226491335@example.com>
B->A
SIP/2.0 100 Trying
B->C
Code = Access-Request (1)
Packet identifier = 0x7c (124)
Length = 97
Authenticator = F5E55840E324AA49D216D9DBD069807C
NAS-IP-Address = 192.0.2.38
NAS-Port = 5
User-Name = 12345678
Digest-Method = INVITE
Digest-URI = sip:97226491335@example.com
Message-Authenticator = 7600D5B0BDC33987A60D5C6167B28B3B
C->B
Code = Access-challenge (11)
Packet identifier = 0x7c (124)
Length = 72
Authenticator = EBE20199C26EFEAD69BF8AB0E786CA4D
Digest-Nonce = 3bada1a0
Digest-Realm = example.com
Digest-Qop = auth
Digest-Algorithm = MD5
Message-Authenticator = 5DA18ED3BBC9513DCBDE0A37F51B7DE3
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 23]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
B->A
SIP/2.0 407 Proxy Authentication Required
Proxy-Authenticate: Digest realm="example.com"
,nonce="3bada1a0",qop=auth,algorithm=MD5
Content-Length: 0
A->B
ACK sip:97226491335@example.com SIP/2.0
A->B
INVITE sip:97226491335@example.com SIP/2.0
Proxy-Authorization: Digest nonce="3bada1a0"
,realm="example.com"
,response="756933f735fcd93f90a4bbdd5467f263"
,uri="sip:97226491335@example.com",username="12345678"
,qop=auth,algorithm=MD5
,cnonce="56593a80,nc="00000001"
From: <sip:12345678@example.com>
To: <sip:97226491335@example.com>
B->C
Code = Access-Request (1)
Packet identifier = 0x7d (125)
Length = 221
Authenticator = F5E55840E324AA49D216D9DBD069807D
NAS-IP-Address = 192.0.2.38
NAS-Port = 5
User-Name = 12345678
Digest-Method = INVITE
Digest-URI = sip:97226491335@example.com
Digest-Realm = example.com
Digest-Qop = auth
Digest-Algorithm = MD5
Digest-CNonce = 56593a80
Digest-Nonce = 3bada1a0
Digest-Nonce-Count = 00000001
Digest-Response = 756933f735fcd93f90a4bbdd5467f263
Digest-Username = 12345678
SIP-AOR = sip:12345678@example.com
Message-Authenticator = B6C7F7F8D11EF261A26933D234561A60
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 24]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
C->B
Code = Access-Accept (2)
Packet identifier = 0x7d (125)
Length = 72
Authenticator = FFDD74D6470D21CB6FC4D6056BE245D2
Digest-Response-Auth = f847de948d12285f8f4199e366f1af21
Message-Authenticator = 7B76E2F10A7067AF601938BF13B0A62E
B->A
SIP/2.0 180 Ringing
B->A
SIP/2.0 200 OK
A->B
ACK sip:97226491335@example.com SIP/2.0
A second example shows the traffic between a web browser (A), a web
server (B), and a RADIUS server (C).
A->B
GET /index.html HTTP/1.1
B->C
Code = Access-Request (1)
Packet identifier = 0x7e (126)
Length = 68
Authenticator = F5E55840E324AA49D216D9DBD069807E
NAS-IP-Address = 192.0.2.38
NAS-Port = 5
Digest-Method = GET
Digest-URI = /index.html
Message-Authenticator = 690BFC95E88DF3B185F15CD78E469992
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 25]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
C->B
Code = Access-challenge (11)
Packet identifier = 0x7e (126)
Length = 72
Authenticator = 2EE5EB01C02C773B6C6EC8515F565E8E
Digest-Nonce = a3086ac8
Digest-Realm = example.com
Digest-Qop = auth
Digest-Algorithm = MD5
Message-Authenticator = 646DB2B0AF9E72FFF2CF7FEB33C4952A
B->A
HTTP/1.1 401 Authentication Required
WWW-Authenticate: Digest realm="example.com",
nonce="a3086ac8",qop=auth,algorithm=MD5
Content-Length: 0
A->B
GET /index.html HTTP/1.1
Authorization: Digest = algorithm=MD5,qop=auth,nonce="a3086ac8"
,nc="00000001",cnonce="56593a80"
,realm="example.com"
,response="a4fac45c27a30f4f244c54a2e99fa117"
,uri="/index.html",username="12345678"
B->C
Code = Access-Request (1)
Packet identifier = 0x7f (127)
Length = 176
Authenticator = F5E55840E324AA49D216D9DBD069807F
NAS-IP-Address = 192.0.2.38
NAS-Port = 5
User-Name = 12345678
Digest-Method = GET
Digest-URI = /index.html
Digest-Realm = example.com
Digest-Qop = auth
Digest-Algorithm = MD5
Digest-CNonce = 56593a80
Digest-Nonce = a3086ac8
Digest-Nonce-Count = 00000001
Digest-Response = a4fac45c27a30f4f244c54a2e99fa117
Digest-Username = 12345678
Message-Authenticator = 237D85C1478C70C67EEAF22A9C456821
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 26]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
C->B
Code = Access-Accept (2)
Packet identifier = 0x7f (127)
Length = 72
Authenticator = 6364FA6ED66012847C05A0895607C694
Digest-Response-Auth = 08c4e942d1d0a191de8b3aa98cd35147
Message-Authenticator = 43795A3166492AD2A890AD57D5F97D56
B->A
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
...
<html>
...
7. IANA Considerations
The following values from the RADIUS Attribute Types number space
were assigned in [RFC4590]. This document requests that the values
in the table below be entered within the existing registry.
Attribute #
--------------- ----
Digest-Response 103
Digest-Realm 104
Digest-Nonce 105
Digest-Response-Auth 106
Digest-Nextnonce 107
Digest-Method 108
Digest-URI 109
Digest-Qop 110
Digest-Algorithm 111
Digest-Entity-Body-Hash 112
Digest-CNonce 113
Digest-Nonce-Count 114
Digest-Username 115
Digest-Opaque 116
Digest-Auth-Param 117
Digest-AKA-Auts 118
Digest-Domain 119
Digest-Stale 120
Digest-HA1 121
SIP-AOR 122
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 27]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
8. Security Considerations
The RADIUS extensions described in this document enable RADIUS to
transport the data that is required to perform a digest calculation.
As a result, RADIUS inherits the vulnerabilities of HTTP Digest (see
[RFC2617], Section 4) in addition to RADIUS security vulnerabilities
described in [RFC2865], Section 8, and [RFC3579], Section 4.
An attacker compromising a RADIUS client or proxy can carry out man-
in-the-middle attacks even if the paths between A, B and B, C (Figure
2) have been secured with TLS or IPsec.
The RADIUS server MUST check the Digest-Realm Attribute it has
received from a client. If the RADIUS client is not authorized to
serve HTTP-style clients of that realm, it might be compromised.
8.1. Denial of Service
RADIUS clients implementing the extension described in this document
may authenticate HTTP-style requests received over the Internet. As
compared with the use of RADIUS to authenticate link-layer network
access, attackers may find it easier to cover their tracks in such a
scenario.
An attacker can attempt a denial-of-service attack on one or more
RADIUS servers by sending a large number of HTTP-style requests. To
make simple denial-of-service attacks more difficult, the RADIUS
server MUST check whether it has generated the nonce received from an
HTTP-style client. This SHOULD be done statelessly. For example, a
nonce could consist of a cryptographically random part and some kind
of signature provided by the RADIUS client, as described in
[RFC2617], Section 3.2.1.
8.2. Confidentiality and Data Integrity
The attributes described in this document are sent in cleartext.
RADIUS servers SHOULD include Digest-Qop and Digest-Algorithm
attributes in Access-Challenge messages. A man in the middle can
modify or remove those attributes in a bidding down attack, causing
the RADIUS client to use a weaker authentication scheme than
intended.
The Message-Authenticator Attribute, described in [RFC3579], Section
3.2 MUST be included in Access-Request, Access-Challenge, Access-
Reject, and Access-Accept messages that contain attributes described
in this specification.
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 28]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
The Digest-HA1 Attribute contains no random components if the
algorithm is 'MD5' or 'AKAv1-MD5'. This makes offline dictionary
attacks easier and enables replay attacks.
Some parameter combinations require the protection of RADIUS packets
against eavesdropping and tampering. Implementations SHOULD try to
determine automatically whether IPsec is configured to protect
traffic between the RADIUS client and the RADIUS server. If this is
not possible, the implementation checks a configuration parameter
telling it whether IPsec will protect RADIUS traffic. The default
value of this configuration parameter tells the implementation that
RADIUS packets will not be protected.
HTTP-style clients can use TLS with server-side certificates together
with HTTP-Digest Authentication. Instead of TLS, IPsec can be used,
too. TLS or IPsec secure the connection while Digest Authentication
authenticates the user. The RADIUS transaction can be regarded as
one leg on the path between the HTTP-style client and the HTTP-style
server. To prevent RADIUS from representing the weak link, a RADIUS
client receiving an HTTP-style request via TLS or IPsec could use an
equally secure connection to the RADIUS server. There are several
ways to achieve this, for example:
o The RADIUS client may reject HTTP-style requests received over TLS
or IPsec.
o The RADIUS client may require that traffic be sent and received
over IPsec.
RADIUS over IPsec, if used, MUST conform to the requirements
described in [RFC3579], Section 4.2.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
RFC 2617, June 1999.
[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
"Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC
2865, June 2000.
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 29]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler,
"SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002.
[RFC3579] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication
Dial In User Service) Support For Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579, September 2003.
[RFC3966] Schulzrinne, H., "The tel URI for Telephone Numbers", RFC
3966, December 2004.
9.2. Informative References
[RFC1994] Simpson, W., "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication
Protocol (CHAP)", RFC 1994, August 1996.
[RFC2069] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Leach, P.,
Luotonen, A., Sink, E., and L. Stewart, "An Extension to
HTTP : Digest Access Authentication", RFC 2069, January
1997.
[RFC3310] Niemi, A., Arkko, J., and V. Torvinen, "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP) Digest Authentication Using Authentication
and Key Agreement (AKA)", RFC 3310, September 2002.
[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J.
Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.
[RFC3851] Ramsdell, B., Ed., "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.1 Message Specification", RFC
3851, July 2004.
[RFC4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April 2006.
[RFC4590] Sterman, B., Sadolevsky, D., Schwartz, D., Williams, D.,
and W. Beck, "RADIUS Extension for Digest Authentication",
RFC 4590, July 2006.
[RFC4740] Garcia-Martin, M., Ed., Belinchon, M., Pallares-Lopez, M.,
Canales-Valenzuela, C., and K. Tammi, "Diameter Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP) Application", RFC 4740, November
2006.
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 30]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
Appendix A - Changes from RFC 4590
This Appendix lists the major changes between [RFC4590] and this
document. Minor changes, including style, grammar, spelling, and
editorial changes are not mentioned here.
o The Table of Attributes (Section 5) now indicates that the
Digest-Method Attribute is required within an Access-Request.
Also, an entry has been added for the State attribute. The table
also includes entries for Accounting-Request messages. As noted
in the examples, the User-Name Attribute is not necessary when
requesting a nonce.
o Two errors in attribute assignment have been corrected within the
IANA Considerations (Section 7). Digest-Response-Auth is assigned
attribute 106, and Digest-Nextnonce is assigned attribute 107.
o Several errors in the examples section have been corrected.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Mike McCauley for his help in working
through the details of the examples.
We would like to acknowledge Kevin McDermott (Cisco Systems) for
providing comments and experimental implementation.
Many thanks to all reviewers, especially to Miguel Garcia, Jari
Arkko, Avi Lior, and Jun Wang.
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 31]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
Authors' Addresses
Baruch Sterman
Kayote Networks
P.O. Box 1373
Efrat 90435
Israel
EMail: baruch@kayote.com
Daniel Sadolevsky
SecureOL, Inc.
Jerusalem Technology Park
P.O. Box 16120
Jerusalem 91160
Israel
EMail: dscreat@dscreat.com
David Schwartz
Kayote Networks
P.O. Box 1373
Efrat 90435
Israel
EMail: david@kayote.com
David Williams
Cisco Systems
7025 Kit Creek Road
P.O. Box 14987
Research Triangle Park NC 27709
USA
EMail: dwilli@cisco.com
Wolfgang Beck
Deutsche Telekom AG
Deutsche Telekom Allee 7
Darmstadt 64295
Germany
EMail: beckw@t-systems.com
Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 32]
RFC 5090 RADIUS Extension Digest Authentication February 2008
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Sterman, et al. Standards Track [Page 33]