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Requirements for Multi-Segment Pseudowire Emulation Edge-to-Edge (PWE3)
RFC 5254

Revision differences

Document history

Date Rev. By Action
2020-01-21
07 (System) Received changes through RFC Editor sync (added Verified Errata tag)
2017-05-16
07 (System) Changed document authors from "Matthew Bocci, Luca Martini" to "Matthew Bocci, Luca Martini, Nabil Bitar"
2015-10-14
07 (System) Notify list changed from pwe3-chairs@ietf.org, draft-ietf-pwe3-ms-pw-requirements@ietf.org, Dan Romascanu <dromasca@avaya.com>, hartmans-ietf@mit.edu to hartmans-ietf@mit.edu, Dan Romascanu <dromasca@avaya.com>
2012-08-22
07 (System) post-migration administrative database adjustment to the No Objection position for Pasi Eronen
2012-08-22
07 (System) post-migration administrative database adjustment to the No Objection position for Dan Romascanu
2012-08-22
07 (System) post-migration administrative database adjustment to the No Objection position for Lars Eggert
2012-08-22
07 (System) post-migration administrative database adjustment to the No Objection position for Russ Housley
2008-10-22
07 Amy Vezza State Changes to RFC Published from RFC Ed Queue by Amy Vezza
2008-10-22
07 Amy Vezza [Note]: 'RFC 5254' added by Amy Vezza
2008-10-21
07 (System) RFC published
2008-06-11
07 Amy Vezza State Changes to RFC Ed Queue from Approved-announcement sent by Amy Vezza
2008-06-10
07 (System) IANA Action state changed to No IC from In Progress
2008-06-10
07 (System) IANA Action state changed to In Progress
2008-06-10
07 Amy Vezza IESG state changed to Approved-announcement sent
2008-06-10
07 Amy Vezza IESG has approved the document
2008-06-10
07 Amy Vezza Closed "Approve" ballot
2008-06-10
07 Amy Vezza State Changes to Approved-announcement to be sent from IESG Evaluation::AD Followup by Amy Vezza
2008-06-10
07 Pasi Eronen [Ballot Position Update] Position for Pasi Eronen has been changed to No Objection from Discuss by Pasi Eronen
2008-06-09
07 (System) Sub state has been changed to AD Follow up from New Id Needed
2008-06-09
07 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-pwe3-ms-pw-requirements-07.txt
2008-04-17
07 Mark Townsley State Changes to IESG Evaluation::Revised ID Needed from IESG Evaluation::AD Followup by Mark Townsley
2008-04-17
07 Mark Townsley [Note]: 'Call with Pasi, Tim, authors/chairs and agreed on way forward.' added by Mark Townsley
2008-04-09
07 Pasi Eronen
[Ballot discuss]
[Taking Sam's discuss]

This document describes a significant new application and broadening
of the applicability of PWE3.

Especially in access/metro environments, there will …
[Ballot discuss]
[Taking Sam's discuss]

This document describes a significant new application and broadening
of the applicability of PWE3.

Especially in access/metro environments, there will be a lot more PE
devices involved, connected over less protected links.  It seems that
isolation is important, so that the compromise of one of the devices
(or links) does not lead to compromise of other customer data from a
completely unrelated PE. Some requirements relating to this need to be
stated, probably related both to data and control plane.

For data plane security services, RFC 4364 probably provides a
reasonable starting point. It won't necessarily involve crypto, but if
it doesn't, clear description of the applicability in environments
where PEs or links close to customers could be compromised.

About the inter-AS case: discussions with authors/WG chairs/ADs
clarified that in the inter-AS case, TEs are always on the same link
(and not communicating over arbitrary cloud). If this is indeed the
case, the inter-AS case might be even simpler than the intra-AS case
(concerning e.g. scalability of key management for control plane).
2008-04-09
07 Pasi Eronen [Ballot Position Update] New position, Discuss, has been recorded by Pasi Eronen
2008-03-06
07 Sam Hartman
[Ballot discuss]
Section 8.1:


The threat model for the environments described in this document seems
very similar to the Internet threat model.  So, I think …
[Ballot discuss]
Section 8.1:


The threat model for the environments described in this document seems
very similar to the Internet threat model.  So, I think BCP 61 applies
in full force.

What are the mandatory security services to provide for this threat
model?  It seems clear to me that isolation of one circuit's traffic
from another is clearly such a mandatory service.

Please provide an argument about what security is expected and about
how the expected data plane security guarantees are met by mandatory
to implement mechanisms.

Section 8.2

>  For a greater degree of security, an authentication mechanism that is
>  suitable to the associated protocol MUST be available. Furthermore
>  authentication using a signature for each individual MS-PW setup
>  messages MUST be available, in addition to an overall control
>  protocol session authentication , and message validation.


Why do you need signatures  of PWE3 setup messages?
If you're going down that road, I think you may need a lot more description of what security services you are trying to provide and what you are protecting against.

This document describes a significant new application and broadening
of the applicability of PWE3 As such it is necessary to make sure the
solution meets the latest IETF security requirements.  In particular,
take a look at RFC 4107 and perform that analysis.  I expect you to
find that MS-PWE3 protocols must provide mandatory to implement
automated key management.
If so, this needs to be stated as a requirement.



General:

the access metro environment seems to have significant security
requirements.  In particular there will be a lot more PE devices
involved.  It seems that isolation is important in this environment so
that the compromise of one of these devices does not lead to
compromise of other customer data from a completely unrelated PE.
Surely requirements relating to this need to be stated.
2008-02-28
07 Dan Romascanu [Ballot Position Update] Position for Dan Romascanu has been changed to No Objection from Discuss by Dan Romascanu
2007-12-21
07 Mark Townsley [Note]: 'New version does not address Sam''s discuss. Need to check with Dan about his.' added by Mark Townsley
2007-12-21
07 Mark Townsley


-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: New Version Notification - draft-ietf-pwe3-ms-pw-requirements-06.txt
Date: Thu, 20 Dec 2007 08:46:54 -0500
From: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
To: …


-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: New Version Notification - draft-ietf-pwe3-ms-pw-requirements-06.txt
Date: Thu, 20 Dec 2007 08:46:54 -0500
From: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
To: pwe3-chairs@tools.ietf.org, townsley@cisco.com, housley@vigilsec.com, dromasca@avaya.com, lars.eggert@nokia.com
References: <E1J4MMf-0007m7-Ht@stiedprstage1.ietf.org>


I don't see any attempt to respond to my comments in the new draft, so
my discuss still stands.
2007-12-21
07 Mark Townsley State Change Notice email list have been change to pwe3-chairs@tools.ietf.org, draft-ietf-pwe3-ms-pw-requirements@tools.ietf.org, Dan Romascanu <dromasca@avaya.com>, hartmans-ietf@mit.edu from pwe3-chairs@tools.ietf.org
2007-12-18
07 Lars Eggert [Ballot Position Update] Position for Lars Eggert has been changed to No Objection from Discuss by Lars Eggert
2007-12-17
07 Russ Housley [Ballot Position Update] Position for Russ Housley has been changed to No Objection from Discuss by Russ Housley
2007-12-17
07 (System) Sub state has been changed to AD Follow up from New Id Needed
2007-12-17
06 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-pwe3-ms-pw-requirements-06.txt
2007-10-25
07 Mark Townsley [Note]: 'Discussions ongoing with Dan and Lars. Need response from Dan.' added by Mark Townsley
2007-10-25
07 Mark Townsley Status date has been changed to 2007-11-14 from
2007-06-03
07 Russ Housley
[Ballot discuss]
Based on the SecDir Review by Steve Hanna:

  PWE3 traffic may often come from legacy applications that were
  designed with an …
[Ballot discuss]
Based on the SecDir Review by Steve Hanna:

  PWE3 traffic may often come from legacy applications that were
  designed with an assumption that the underlying network provides
  some security.  Therefore, I recommend that the document authors
  consider carefully whether the protections specified in this
  document are adequate for the intended purpose.  If adequate, then
  please make an explicit statement in the security considerations
  of this document.  Please include a statement of the minimal
  security protection that is provided for data plane traffic, and
  state that if additional protection is needed it must be provided
  by higher-layer protocols.

  The control plane security requirements described in this document
  are probably adequate. However, I think it would be better to say
  that the unspecified additional authentication mechanism must be
  strong and mandatory-to-implement (but not mandatory-to-deploy).

  ****

  I agreed to these changes to resolve this DISCUSS position...

  This is a requirement document.  Such a statement needs to be in the
  particular MS-PW solution document.  However the following is to added:

  "Some types pf PWs make assumptions about the security of the underling
  PSN. The minimal security provided by an MPLS PSN might not be
  sufficient to meet the security requirements expected by the
  applications using the MS-PW. This document does not place any
  requirements on protecting the privacy of a MS-PW PDU via encryption.
  However, encryption is required at a higher layer in the protocol
  stack, based on the application or network requirements."

  Changed the control plane text as follows:

  "An incoming MS-PW request/reply MUST NOT be accepted unless its IP
  source address is known to be the source of an "eligible" peer. If a
  peering adjacency has to be established prior to exchanging setup
  requests/responses, peering MUST only be done with eligible peers. The
  set of eligible peers could be pre-configured (either as a list of IP
  addresses, or as a list of address/mask combinations) or automatically
  generated from the local PW configuration information. Furthermore, the
  restriction of peering sessions to specific interfaces MUST also be
  provided. The S-PE and T-PE MUST drop the unaccepted signaling messages
  in the data path to avoid a DoS attack on the control plane.

  Even if a connection request appears to come from an eligible peer, its
  source address may have been spoofed. So some means of preventing source
  address spoofing must be in place. For example, if eligible peers are
  in the same network, source address filtering at the border routers of
  that network could eliminate the possibility of source address spoofing.

  The configuration and maintenance protocol MUST provide a strong
  authentication and control protocol data protection mechanism. This
  option MUST be implemented , but it should be deployed according to the
  specific PSN environment requirements. Furthermore authentication using
  a signature for each individual MS-PW setup messages MUST be available,
  in addition to an overall control protocol session authentication, and
  message validation."
2007-05-25
07 Samuel Weiler Request for Last Call review by SECDIR Completed. Reviewer: Steve Hanna.
2007-05-25
07 (System) Removed from agenda for telechat - 2007-05-24
2007-05-24
07 Amy Vezza State Changes to IESG Evaluation::Revised ID Needed from IESG Evaluation by Amy Vezza
2007-05-24
07 Tim Polk [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Tim Polk
2007-05-24
07 Lars Eggert
[Ballot discuss]
Section 3.1., paragraph 2:
>    This document specifies additional requirements that apply to MS-PWs.
>    These requirements do not apply to …
[Ballot discuss]
Section 3.1., paragraph 2:
>    This document specifies additional requirements that apply to MS-PWs.
>    These requirements do not apply to PSNs that only support SS-PWs.

  DISCUSS: Please add a statement saying that this document does not
  invalidate any parts of RFC3985. (I'm mostly thinking about the
  congestion control requirements, but I think this would be true in
  general.)


Section 6.1.3., paragraph 0:
>  6.1.3. Quality Of Service

  DISCUSS: Running PWs inside traffic-engineered PSN tunnels isn't only
  needed to protect the service quality that PWs receive. It's also
  essential to fulfill the congestion control requirements in RFC3985
  Section 6.5, which requires the existence of a mechanism that controls
  the bandwidth use of PWs in a way that prevents congestion collapse
  and is sort-of fair to concurrent congestion-controlled flows over
  reasonable timescales.

  There currently isn't such a mechanism defined for PWs, although
  draft-ietf-pwe3-ms-pw-requirements has promising initial requirements.
  Consequently, existing PW encapsulation specifications - especially
  for TDM PWs, but also for packet-based PWs that can carry
  non-congestion-controlled traffic - have contained text that basically
  said "the PW MUST be run over a path that has been provisioned for the
  PW either through a bandwidth reservation or through a degree of
  over-provisioning that prevents the bandwidth use of the PW to have
  significant impact on concurrent traffic."

  This document should discuss that aspect of path provisioning as well.
  Essentially, path provisioning is REQUIRED to fulfill the congestion
  control requirements for all PW encapsulations that don't have their
  own congestion control mechanism (none of the published ones do). I'm
  stressing this here, because when MS-PW traffic crosses over into the
  network of another operator, there is the potential to cause harm
  (congestion) to others, whereas with the currently-defined SS-PWs,
  harm was restricted to the home operator's network.
2007-05-24
07 Lars Eggert [Ballot Position Update] New position, Discuss, has been recorded by Lars Eggert
2007-05-24
07 Jari Arkko [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Jari Arkko
2007-05-24
07 Jari Arkko [Ballot comment]
> domains that PSN Tunnel 1 and PSN Tunnel 2 traverse could beIGP areas

s/beIGP/be IGP/
2007-05-24
07 Magnus Westerlund
[Ballot comment]
I was very close to make this a discuss. But as my issue seems to be a result of an already existing requriement …
[Ballot comment]
I was very close to make this a discuss. But as my issue seems to be a result of an already existing requriement I don't see a need to block the document.

In section 6.1.3 there is a strong requirment on congestion control and the possibility to signal information about its occurance to other segments. However for Section 6.3.4 there seem to me to be a lack of clarification what that implies for this type of MS-PWs. To me it seems that the static configured ones are the ones that will have most problems with the congestion control. This due to the issues of trying to move a PW when there are no altarnative paths, and the only course of action may be to shutdown or downgrade the capacity of the PW. I wished there was a bit more discussion on this issue and the requirement it introduces as I see it.
2007-05-24
07 Magnus Westerlund [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Magnus Westerlund
2007-05-23
07 Ross Callon [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Ross Callon
2007-05-23
07 Russ Housley
[Ballot discuss]
Based on the SecDir Review by Steve Hanna:

  PWE3 traffic may often come from legacy applications that were
  designed with an …
[Ballot discuss]
Based on the SecDir Review by Steve Hanna:

  PWE3 traffic may often come from legacy applications that were
  designed with an assumption that the underlying network provides
  some security.  Therefore, I recommend that the document authors
  consider carefully whether the protections specified in this
  document are adequate for the intended purpose.  If adequate, then
  please make an explicit statement in the security considerations
  of this document.  Please include a statement of the minimal
  security protection that is provided for data plane traffic, and
  state that if additional protection is needed it must be provided
  by higher-layer protocols.

  The control plane security requirements described in this document
  are probably adequate. However, I think it would be better to say
  that the unspecified additional authentication mechanism must be
  strong and mandatory-to-implement (but not mandatory-to-deploy).
2007-05-23
07 Russ Housley [Ballot Position Update] New position, Discuss, has been recorded by Russ Housley
2007-05-23
07 Ron Bonica [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Ron Bonica
2007-05-23
07 Sam Hartman
[Ballot comment]
I'd like to show strong support for Dan's comments.  I think that more
thought needs to be given to what management interfaces are …
[Ballot comment]
I'd like to show strong support for Dan's comments.  I think that more
thought needs to be given to what management interfaces are required.
There are a lot of configuration settings especially in the static
cases.  For these to be easily managed, care needs to be given to
management requirements.
2007-05-23
07 Sam Hartman
[Ballot discuss]
Section 8.1:

PWE3 has been marketed as having as good of security as the perceived
technologies that it is replacinig.

The threat model …
[Ballot discuss]
Section 8.1:

PWE3 has been marketed as having as good of security as the perceived
technologies that it is replacinig.

The threat model for the environments described in this document seems
very similar to the Internet threat model.  So, I think BCP 61 applies
in full force.

What are the mandatory security services to provide for this threat
model?  It seems clear to me that isolation of one circuit's traffic
from another is clearly such a mandatory service.

Please provide an argument about what security is expected and about
how the expected data plane security guarantees are met by mandatory
to implement mechanisms.

Section 8.2

>  For a greater degree of security, an authentication mechanism that is
>  suitable to the associated protocol MUST be available. Furthermore
>  authentication using a signature for each individual MS-PW setup
>  messages MUST be available, in addition to an overall control
>  protocol session authentication , and message validation.


Why do you need signatures  of PWE3 setup messages?
If you're going down that road, I think you may need a lot more description of what security services you are trying to provide and what you are protecting against.

This document describes a significant new application and broadening
of the applicability of PWE3 As such it is necessary to make sure the
solution meets the latest IETF security requirements.  In particular,
take a look at RFC 4107 and perform that analysis.  I expect you to
find that MS-PWE3 protocols must provide mandatory to implement
automated key management.
If so, this needs to be stated as a requirement.



General:

the access metro environment seems to have significant security
requirements.  In particular there will be a lot more PE devices
involved.  It seems that isolation is important in this environment so
that the compromise of one of these devices does not lead to
compromise of other customer data from a completely unrelated PE.
Surely requirements relating to this need to be stated.
2007-05-23
07 Sam Hartman [Ballot Position Update] New position, Discuss, has been recorded by Sam Hartman
2007-05-23
07 Tim Polk
[Ballot comment]
For completeness, a statement that the data plane security considerations for SS-PWs
specified in RFC 3985 apply to MS-PWs should be included in …
[Ballot comment]
For completeness, a statement that the data plane security considerations for SS-PWs
specified in RFC 3985 apply to MS-PWs should be included in this specification's security
considerations section.
2007-05-21
07 Dan Romascanu
[Ballot discuss]
I like Section 7 which defines the requirements for OAM. Howevwe, as management of pseudo-wires involves more than the definition of the OAM …
[Ballot discuss]
I like Section 7 which defines the requirements for OAM. Howevwe, as management of pseudo-wires involves more than the definition of the OAM protocols this information needs to be completed with manageability requirements. At a minimum there should be a requirement indicating what type of management interfaces are PWE3 entities required to provide (CLI at minimum, SNMP and MIB interface REQUIRED or RECOMMENDED), and how is a management solution required to be deployed (remote access over multiple domanis?).
2007-05-21
07 Dan Romascanu [Ballot Position Update] New position, Discuss, has been recorded by Dan Romascanu
2007-05-21
07 Dan Romascanu
[Ballot comment]
1. Add ITU-T I.610 specification http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-I.610-199902-I/en as an informative reference

2. Section 7 of this document is using the expansion of the OAM …
[Ballot comment]
1. Add ITU-T I.610 specification http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-I.610-199902-I/en as an informative reference

2. Section 7 of this document is using the expansion of the OAM acronyms as 'Operations and Maintenance' (OAM) as per the ITU-T documents. Unfortunately in the industry there are different ways of expanding these, and the IETF has also at least adopted two different ones (see RFC 4377 which in its title expands OAM as 'Operations and Management'). I would suggest that section 7 makes the usage of OAM in this document clear by adding a note that says:

'Note that this document uses the term OAM as Operations and Management as per ITU-T I.610.'
2007-05-17
07 David Ward [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by David Ward
2007-05-14
07 Mark Townsley State Changes to IESG Evaluation from Waiting for Writeup by Mark Townsley
2007-05-14
07 Mark Townsley Placed on agenda for telechat - 2007-05-24 by Mark Townsley
2007-05-14
07 Mark Townsley [Ballot Position Update] New position, Yes, has been recorded for Mark Townsley
2007-05-14
07 Mark Townsley Ballot has been issued by Mark Townsley
2007-05-14
07 Mark Townsley Created "Approve" ballot
2007-05-11
07 (System) State has been changed to Waiting for Writeup from In Last Call by system
2007-05-06
07 Yoshiko Fong IANA Last Call Comments:

As described in the IANA Considerations section, we understand
this document to have NO IANA Actions.
2007-05-03
07 Samuel Weiler Request for Last Call review by SECDIR is assigned to Steve Hanna
2007-05-03
07 Samuel Weiler Request for Last Call review by SECDIR is assigned to Steve Hanna
2007-04-27
07 Amy Vezza Last call sent
2007-04-27
07 Amy Vezza State Changes to In Last Call from Last Call Requested by Amy Vezza
2007-04-27
07 Mark Townsley Last Call was requested by Mark Townsley
2007-04-27
07 (System) Ballot writeup text was added
2007-04-27
07 (System) Last call text was added
2007-04-27
07 (System) Ballot approval text was added
2007-04-27
07 Mark Townsley State Changes to Last Call Requested from AD Evaluation by Mark Townsley
2007-04-12
07 Mark Townsley State Changes to AD Evaluation from Publication Requested by Mark Townsley
2007-04-02
07 Dinara Suleymanova
PROTO Write-up

(1.a) Who is the Document Shepherd for this document? Has the
Document Shepherd personally reviewed this version of the
document and, in particular, …
PROTO Write-up

(1.a) Who is the Document Shepherd for this document? Has the
Document Shepherd personally reviewed this version of the
document and, in particular, does he or she believe this
version is ready for forwarding to the IESG for publication?

Stewart Bryant (stbryant@cisco.com) PWE3 co-chair.
The chairs have read this version of the document and it is
now ready for consideration by the IESG.

(1.b) Has the document had adequate review both from key WG members
and from key non-WG members? Does the Document Shepherd have
any concerns about the depth or breadth of the reviews that
have been performed?

The document has been thoroughly reviewed by the PWE3 WG.

(1.c) Does the Document Shepherd have concerns that the document
needs more review from a particular or broader perspective,
e.g., security, operational complexity, someone familiar with
AAA, internationalization or XML?

I have no concerns.

(1.d) Does the Document Shepherd have any specific concerns or
issues with this document that the Responsible Area Director
and/or the IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he
or she is uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or
has concerns whether there really is a need for it. In any
event, if the WG has discussed those issues and has indicated
that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those
concerns here.

There are no issues that the chairs are aware of.

Has an IPR disclosure related to this document
been filed? If so, please include a reference to the
disclosure and summarize the WG discussion and conclusion on
this issue.

https://datatracker.ietf.org/public/ipr_detail_show.cgi?&ipr_id=621

This was filed nearly two years on a solution draft rather this
requirements draft and no one has commented on it.



(1.e) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it
represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with
others being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and
agree with it?

There is strong consensus for the document.

(1.f) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in
separate email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It
should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is
entered into the ID Tracker.)

No one has threatened to appeal.

(1.g) Has the Document Shepherd personally verified that the
document satisfies all ID nits?

Yes - there is one minor issue with an out of date ref, but nothing
to prevent the draft going forward.

http://www.ietf.org/ID-Checklist.html and
http://tools.ietf.org/tools/idnits/). Boilerplate checks are
not enough; this check needs to be thorough. Has the document
met all formal review criteria it needs to, such as the MIB
Doctor, media type and URI type reviews?

Yes

(1.h) Has the document split its references into normative and
informative?

Yes.

Are there normative references to documents that
are not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear
state? If such normative references exist, what is the
strategy for their completion? Are there normative references
that are downward references, as described in [RFC3967]? If
so, list these downward references to support the Area
Director in the Last Call procedure for them [RFC3967].

There are no pending normative references

(1.i) Has the Document Shepherd verified that the document IANA
consideration section exists and is consistent with the body
of the document?

Yes

If the document specifies protocol
extensions, are reservations requested in appropriate IANA
registries?

Not applicable

Are the IANA registries clearly identified? If
the document creates a new registry, does it define the
proposed initial contents of the registry and an allocation
procedure for future registrations? Does it suggest a
reasonable name for the new registry? See [RFC2434]. If the
document describes an Expert Review process has Shepherd
conferred with the Responsible Area Director so that the IESG
can appoint the needed Expert during the IESG Evaluation?

Not applicable

(1.j) Has the Document Shepherd verified that sections of the
document that are written in a formal language, such as XML
code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc., validate correctly in
an automated checker?

Not applicable

(1.k) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document
Announcement Write-Up. Please provide such a Document
Announcement Write-Up? Recent examples can be found in the
"Action" announcements for approved documents. The approval
announcement contains the following sections:

Technical Summary

This document describes the necessary requirements to allow a service
provider to extend the reach of pseudowires across multiple domains.
These domains can be autonomous systems under one provider
administrative control, IGP areas in one autonomous system, different
autonimous systems under the autonomous systems under the administrative
control of two or more service providers, or administratevly established
pseudowire domains.


Working Group Summary

This document has been reviewed by the experts in the PWE3 WG
and there are no outstanding issues.

Document Quality
Are there existing implementations of the protocol?

A number of vendor have MS PWs, but the exact design is a matter for
the protocol drafts that follow.

Have a significant number of vendors indicated their plan to
implement the specification?

Yes

Are there any reviewers that
merit special mention as having done a thorough review,
e.g., one that resulted in important changes or a
conclusion that the document had no substantive issues? If
there was a MIB Doctor, Media Type or other expert review,
what was its course (briefly)? In the case of a Media Type
review, on what date was the request posted?

Not applicable.

Personnel

Who is the Document Shepherd for this document?

Stewart Bryant (stbryant@cisco.com)

Who is the Responsible Area Director?

Mark Townsley (townsley@cisco.com)

Is an IANA expert needed?
2007-04-02
07 Dinara Suleymanova Draft Added by Dinara Suleymanova in state Publication Requested
2007-03-28
05 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-pwe3-ms-pw-requirements-05.txt
2007-01-15
04 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-pwe3-ms-pw-requirements-04.txt
2006-10-11
03 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-pwe3-ms-pw-requirements-03.txt
2006-05-16
02 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-pwe3-ms-pw-requirements-02.txt
2005-10-26
01 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-pwe3-ms-pw-requirements-01.txt
2005-06-16
00 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-pwe3-ms-pw-requirements-00.txt