Problem and Applicability Statement for Better-Than-Nothing Security (BTNS)
RFC 5387

Received changes through RFC Editor sync (changed abstract to 'The Internet network security protocol suite, IPsec, requires authentication, usually of network-layer entities, to enable access control and provide security services. This authentication can be based on mechanisms such as pre-shared symmetric keys, certificates with associated asymmetric keys, or the use of Kerberos (via Kerberized Internet Negotiation of Keys (KINK)). The need to deploy authentication information and its associated identities can be a significant obstacle to the use of IPsec.

This document explains the rationale for extending the Internet network security protocol suite to enable use of IPsec security services without authentication. These extensions are intended to protect communication, providing "better-than-nothing security" (BTNS). The extensions may be used on their own (this use is called Stand-Alone BTNS, or SAB) or may be used to provide network-layer security that can be authenticated by higher layers in the protocol stack (this use is called Channel-Bound BTNS, or CBB). The document also explains situations for which use of SAB and/or CBB extensions are applicable. This memo provides information for the Internet community.')

[Ballot discuss]
[This is a revised discuss.  I am picking Sam Hartman's procedural discuss
associated with Steve Kent's Last Call comments.]

Please respond to the last call comments from Steve Kent
I would not be surprised if the WG rejects some of his comments, but
they do need a response and consideration.

The document has structural problems: solutions are described
in the middle of the problem statement, and facets of the problem
statement are introduced in both the BTNS overview and the security
considerations section.

There are also conflicts - while the document generally proclaims that
"BTNS should only be used as a substitute for no security, rather than
a substitute for stronger security" it does make arguments for
substituting BTNS for authenticated IPsec where the application
also performs authentication.  While there are issues with multiple
authentication mechanisms, most applications will not be using strong
mechanisms that are not a comparable substitute for IPsec-based
authentication.

[Note: I am afraid that Steve's comments will result in substantial
churn, so I am not providing a complete list of the structural problems
at this time.  After Steve Kent's comments are addressed (resolved or
rejected), I would be happy to perform another review for remaining
structural issues.

[Ballot discuss]
Steve Kent sent significant Last Call comments; he sent them to the
  IETF mail list and the BTNS WG mail list.  They did not reveive any
  response that was visable on the IETF mail list.  I'm sure the WG
  will not agree with all of Steve's comments, but they cannot be
  silently discarded.

[Ballot discuss]
Please respond to the last call comments from Steve Kent

I would not be surprised if the WG rejects some of his comments, but
they do need a response and consideration.

[Ballot discuss]
This is a discuss discuss.  Depending on the discussion during the
call, I will either clear or replace this with an actionable discuss.

First, let me say that I believe there is a need for BTNS.  I would
like to see this document progress, along with the other wg deliverables.

However, this document has numerous problems.  If this was a
protocol specification I would definitely insist on modifications,
but I am conflicted since this is a problem and applicability
statement.  It will take a *lot* of effort to develop an actionable
discuss.  Given that there are no bits on the wire, I can't decide
whether to make the effort.

The document has structural problems: solutions are described
in the middle of the problem statement, and facets of the problem
statement are introduced in both the BTNS overview and the security
considerations section.

There are also conflicts - while the document generally proclaims that
"BTNS should only be used as a substitute for no security, rather than
a substitute for stronger security" it does make arguments for
substituting BTNS for authenticated IPsec where the application
also performs authentication.  While there are issues with multiple
authentication mechanisms, most applications will not be using strong
mechanisms that are not a comparable substitute for IPsec-based
authentication.

There are also a number of smaller, less urgent issues that should
be addressed if we are going to reopen this one.

So, how important are applicability statements anyway?  Is this a
publication by the working group for the working group, stating the
goals and path?  Or is it a document that other wgs will rely on to
determine if BTNS is an appropriate solution?  If it is the former,
I will clear.  If it is the latter, I have a lot of work to do.

[Ballot discuss]
This is a discuss discuss.  Depending on the discussion during the
call, I will either clear or replace this with an actionable discuss.

First, let me say that I believe there is a need for BTNS.  I would
like to see this document progress, along with the other wg deliverables.

However, this document has numerous problems.  If this was a
protocol specification I would definitely insist on modifications,
but I am conflicted since this is a problem and applicability
statement.  It will take a *lot* of effort to develop an actionable discuss.  Given that there are no bits on the wire, I can't decide
whether to make the effort.

The document has structural problems: solutions are described in the middle of the problem statement, and facets of the problem statement
are introduced in both the BTNS overview and the security
considerations section.

There are also conflicts - while the document generally proclaims that
"BTNS should only be used as a substitute for no security, rather than
a substitute for stronger security" it does make arguments for
substituting BTNS for authenticated IPsec where the application
also performs authentication.  While there are issues with multiple
authentication mechanisms, most applications will not be using strong
mechanisms that are not a comparable substitute for IPsec-based authentication.

There are also a number of smaller, less urgent issues that should
be addressed if we are going to reopen this one.

So, how important are applicability statements anyway?  Is this a
publication by the working group for the working group, stating the
goals and path?  Or is it a document that other wgs will rely on to
determine if BTNS is an appropriate solution?  If it is the former,
I will clear.  If it is the latter, I have a lot of work to do.

PROTO Write-up

(1.a) Who is the Document Shepherd for this document? Has the
Document Shepherd personally reviewed this version of the
document and, in particular, does he or she believe this
version is ready for forwarding to the IESG for publication?

The Document Shepherd for this document is Julien Laganier, BTNS co-chair, who
reviewed this version of the document and believes this version is ready for
forwarding to the IESG.

(1.b) Has the document had adequate review both from key WG members
and from key non-WG members? Does the Document Shepherd have
any concerns about the depth or breadth of the reviews that
have been performed?

Yes, the document had review from both inside and outside the WG.

(1.c) Does the Document Shepherd have concerns that the document
needs more review from a particular or broader perspective,
e.g., security, operational complexity, someone familiar with
AAA, internationalization or XML?

No.

(1.d) Does the Document Shepherd have any specific concerns or
issues with this document that the Responsible Area Director
and/or the IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he
or she is uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or
has concerns whether there really is a need for it. In any
event, if the WG has discussed those issues and has indicated
that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those
concerns here. Has an IPR disclosure related to this document
been filed? If so, please include a reference to the
disclosure and summarize the WG discussion and conclusion on
this issue.

No.

(1.e) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it
represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with
others being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and
agree with it?

The WG is behind this document.

(1.f) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in
separate email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It
should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is
entered into the ID Tracker.)

No.

(1.g) Has the Document Shepherd personally verified that the
document satisfies all ID nits? (See
http://www.ietf.org/ID-Checklist.html and
http://tools.ietf.org/tools/idnits/). Boilerplate checks are
not enough; this check needs to be thorough. Has the document
met all formal review criteria it needs to, such as the MIB
Doctor, media type and URI type reviews?

Yes.

(1.h) Has the document split its references into normative and
informative? Are there normative references to documents that
are not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear
state? If such normative references exist, what is the
strategy for their completion? Are there normative references
that are downward references, as described in [RFC3967]? If
so, list these downward references to support the Area
Director in the Last Call procedure for them [RFC3967].

Yes (The document has no normative references).

(1.i) Has the Document Shepherd verified that the document IANA
consideration section exists and is consistent with the body
of the document? If the document specifies protocol
extensions, are reservations requested in appropriate IANA
registries? Are the IANA registries clearly identified? If
the document creates a new registry, does it define the
proposed initial contents of the registry and an allocation
procedure for future registrations? Does it suggest a
reasonable name for the new registry? See [RFC2434]. If the
document describes an Expert Review process has Shepherd
conferred with the Responsible Area Director so that the IESG
can appoint the needed Expert during the IESG Evaluation?

Yes (The document has no IANA considerations).

(1.j) Has the Document Shepherd verified that sections of the
document that are written in a formal language, such as XML
code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc., validate correctly in
an automated checker?

Yes (The document does not contain formal language).

(1.k) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document
Announcement Write-Up. Please provide such a Document
Announcement Write-Up? Recent examples can be found in the
"Action" announcements for approved documents. The approval
announcement contains the following sections:

Technical Summary
Relevant content can frequently be found in the abstract
and/or introduction of the document. If not, this may be
an indication that there are deficiencies in the abstract
or introduction.

The Internet network security protocol suite, IPsec, consisting of
IKE, ESP, and AH, generally requires authentication of network layer
entities to bootstrap security. This authentication can be based on
mechanisms such as pre-shared symmetric keys, certificates and
associated asymmetric keys, or the use of Kerberos. The need to
deploy authentication information and its associated identities to
network layer entities can be a significant obstacle to use of
network security. This document explains the rationale for extending
the Internet network security suite to enable use of IPsec security
mechanisms without authentication. These extensions are intended to
protect communication in a "better than nothing" (BTNS) fashion. The
extensions may be used on their own (Stand Alone BTNS, or SAB), or
may be useful in providing network layer security that can be
authenticated by higher layers in the protocol stack, called Channel
Bound BTNS (CBB). This document also explains situations in which use
of SAB and CBB extensions are appropriate.

Working Group Summary
Was there anything in WG process that is worth noting? For
example, was there controversy about particular points or
were there decisions where the consensus was particularly
rough?

This document is a product of the Better Than Nothing Security (BTNS) working
group.

Document Quality
Are there existing implementations of the protocol? Have a
significant number of vendors indicated their plan to
implement the specification? Are there any reviewers that
merit special mention as having done a thorough review,
e.g., one that resulted in important changes or a
conclusion that the document had no substantive issues? If
there was a MIB Doctor, Media Type or other expert review,
what was its course (briefly)? In the case of a Media Type
review, on what date was the request posted?

No.

Personnel
Who is the Document Shepherd for this document? Who is the
Responsible Area Director?

The Document Shepherd for this document is Julien Laganier (BTNS co-chair)
and the Responsible Area Director is Sam Hartman.