RPCSEC_GSS Version 2
RFC 5403
Revision differences
Document history
Date | Rev. | By | Action |
---|---|---|---|
2015-10-14
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06 | (System) | Notify list changed from nfsv4-chairs@ietf.org, draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpcsec-gss-v2@ietf.org to (None) |
2012-08-22
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06 | (System) | post-migration administrative database adjustment to the No Objection position for Pasi Eronen |
2012-08-22
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06 | (System) | post-migration administrative database adjustment to the No Objection position for Dan Romascanu |
2009-02-03
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06 | Cindy Morgan | State Changes to RFC Published from RFC Ed Queue by Cindy Morgan |
2009-02-03
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06 | Cindy Morgan | [Note]: 'RFC 5403 ' added by Cindy Morgan |
2009-02-02
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06 | (System) | RFC published |
2008-10-30
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06 | Cindy Morgan | State Changes to RFC Ed Queue from Approved-announcement sent by Cindy Morgan |
2008-10-30
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06 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to No IC from In Progress |
2008-10-30
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06 | (System) | IANA Action state changed to In Progress |
2008-10-30
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06 | Amy Vezza | IESG state changed to Approved-announcement sent |
2008-10-30
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06 | Amy Vezza | IESG has approved the document |
2008-10-30
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06 | Amy Vezza | Closed "Approve" ballot |
2008-10-30
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06 | Amy Vezza | State Changes to Approved-announcement to be sent from IESG Evaluation::AD Followup by Amy Vezza |
2008-10-30
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06 | Dan Romascanu | [Ballot Position Update] Position for Dan Romascanu has been changed to No Objection from Discuss by Dan Romascanu |
2008-10-10
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06 | Pasi Eronen | [Ballot Position Update] Position for Pasi Eronen has been changed to No Objection from Discuss by Pasi Eronen |
2008-10-09
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06 | (System) | New version available: draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpcsec-gss-v2-06.txt |
2008-09-26
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06 | (System) | Removed from agenda for telechat - 2008-09-25 |
2008-09-25
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06 | Amy Vezza | State Changes to IESG Evaluation::AD Followup from IESG Evaluation by Amy Vezza |
2008-09-25
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06 | Jari Arkko | [Ballot comment] Review by Chris Vogt: This document describes updates to the RPCSEC_GSS protocol that enable channel binding between the RPCSEC_GSS protocol and secure channels … [Ballot comment] Review by Chris Vogt: This document describes updates to the RPCSEC_GSS protocol that enable channel binding between the RPCSEC_GSS protocol and secure channels at lower layers. The document assumes that the reader is very familiar with implementation-specific details of the RPCSEC_GSS protocol. The document is not understandable to a reader without such detailed knowledge. The reason is that the document specifies protocol updates mostly in terms of pseudo-code fragments. The pseudo-code fragments may make sense to an RPCSEC_GSS protocol implementor, but they bear little information to a reader unfamiliar with the RPCSEC_GSS protocol's implementation specifics. Making the document plausible for the average reader would require major rewriting of this document. To avoid such rewriting but still ensure that the document is unambiguous for implementation purposes, I suggest to have the document reviewed by implementers who have worked with the RPCSEC_GSS protocol. Based on such a review, an informed decision could be made on whether or not to publish this document in its current form. |
2008-09-25
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06 | Chris Newman | [Ballot comment] Boilerplate: This is an IESG comment and should be treated in a similar fashion to an IETF last call comment from any IETF … [Ballot comment] Boilerplate: This is an IESG comment and should be treated in a similar fashion to an IETF last call comment from any IETF participant. This comment does not prevent advancement of your document through the IETF process. However, it may contain suggestions to improve the document, and it is polite to consider those suggestions. I support Pasi's Discuss. Section 3.3, second bullet: I suggest you also reference the IANA registry "Hash Function Textual Names" to help find new hash functions as they're defined. General Concern: A test vector or two would greatly improve this document. While I have an adequate understanding of XDR, hash functions, channel bindings, ASN.1 and Kerberos, I'm skeptical that I would correctly implement this protocol on the first try. There are a lot of important details in prose (such as hashing the channel bindings) that leave room for implementation errors. Protocols like this can gain a bad reputation from implementation errors unless there is a reference implementation or test vector that implementers can use for validation to catch errors before they're released in the wild. |
2008-09-25
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06 | David Ward | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by David Ward |
2008-09-25
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06 | Lisa Dusseault | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Lisa Dusseault |
2008-09-25
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06 | Mark Townsley | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Mark Townsley |
2008-09-25
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06 | Cullen Jennings | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Cullen Jennings |
2008-09-25
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06 | Jari Arkko | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Jari Arkko |
2008-09-25
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06 | Tim Polk | [Ballot comment] I support Pasi's discuss. I have no other objections to the document. |
2008-09-25
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06 | Tim Polk | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Tim Polk |
2008-09-25
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06 | Pasi Eronen | [Ballot discuss] I have reviewed draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpcsec-gss-v2-05. Overall, the document looks good, but I have the following concerns that I'd like to discuss before recommending approval … [Ballot discuss] I have reviewed draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpcsec-gss-v2-05. Overall, the document looks good, but I have the following concerns that I'd like to discuss before recommending approval of the document: Since GSS-API already supports channel bindings (with some GSS-API mechanisms), it seems we end up with three different ways to do channel bindings in RPCSEC_GSS: either in the GSS-API layer, or outside it in RPCSEC_GSS layer, or both. The document probably should describe why the existing GSS-API layer channel bindings are not sufficient (i.e. why something new is needed), and give some guidance about their use (e.g. perhaps the intent is that GSS-API layer channel bindings MUST NOT be used with RPCSEC?). I think the document would also be improved by explicitly noting that a channel (e.g., IPsec or TLS) can have multiple channel bindings with different prefixes (e.g., for TLS we currently have two), and describing how the initiator picks which of them to use (and how this interacts with RGSS2_BIND_CHAN_PREF_NOTSUPP). |
2008-09-25
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06 | Pasi Eronen | [Ballot Position Update] Position for Pasi Eronen has been changed to Discuss from No Objection by Pasi Eronen |
2008-09-25
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06 | Pasi Eronen | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Pasi Eronen |
2008-09-24
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06 | Ross Callon | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Ross Callon |
2008-09-24
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06 | Ron Bonica | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Ron Bonica |
2008-09-24
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06 | Dan Romascanu | [Ballot comment] The acrnym GSS is never expanded in the document. I suggest to expand it at the first occurence in the Abstract or Introduction … [Ballot comment] The acrnym GSS is never expanded in the document. I suggest to expand it at the first occurence in the Abstract or Introduction section. |
2008-09-24
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06 | Dan Romascanu | [Ballot discuss] This DISCUSS is entered for clarification purposes. I will probably clear it during or after the meeting or even earlier with the proper … [Ballot discuss] This DISCUSS is entered for clarification purposes. I will probably clear it during or after the meeting or even earlier with the proper explanation or if necessary actions are agreed. I do not get a clear understanding from the document about the relation with RFC 2203. From what I get in section 4 the two versions of the protocol can coexist on the wire and a mechanism to negotiate the versions is in place. From the introductory sections I get that the reasons and advantages of using version 2 are limited to specific cases where low level hardware encryption is in place, or to avoid redundancy if encryption takes place at lower layer. What is the operational recommendation for deployment then - always upgrade or only in specific use cases? Should not the document header mention Update RFC2203 - when approved? |
2008-09-24
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06 | Dan Romascanu | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Discuss, has been recorded by Dan Romascanu |
2008-09-23
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06 | Magnus Westerlund | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Magnus Westerlund |
2008-09-23
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06 | Magnus Westerlund | [Ballot comment] There are no reference to XDR in the first occurrence in section 1. |
2008-09-22
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06 | Chris Newman | [Ballot comment] Boilerplate: This is an IESG comment and should be treated in a similar fashion to an IETF last call comment from any IETF … [Ballot comment] Boilerplate: This is an IESG comment and should be treated in a similar fashion to an IETF last call comment from any IETF participant. This comment does not prevent advancement of your document through the IETF process. However, it may contain suggestions to improve the document, and it is polite to consider those suggestions. Section 3.3, second bullet: I suggest you also reference the IANA registry "Hash Function Textual Names" to help find new hash functions as they're defined. General Concern: A test vector or two would greatly improve this document. While I have an adequate understanding of XDR, hash functions, channel bindings, ASN.1 and Kerberos, I'm skeptical that I would correctly implement this protocol on the first try. There are a lot of important details in prose (such as hashing the channel bindings) that leave room for implementation errors. Protocols like this can gain a bad reputation from implementation errors unless there is a reference implementation or test vector that implementers can use for validation to catch errors before they're released in the wild. |
2008-09-22
|
06 | Chris Newman | [Ballot comment] Boilerplate: This is an IESG comment and should be treated in a similar fashion to an IETF last call comment from any IETF … [Ballot comment] Boilerplate: This is an IESG comment and should be treated in a similar fashion to an IETF last call comment from any IETF participant. While no action is necessary to advance the document through the IETF process, this may contain suggestions to improve the document, and it is polite to consider those suggestions. Section 3.3, second bullet: I suggest you also reference the IANA registry "Hash Function Textual Names" to help find new hash functions as they're defined. General Concern: A test vector or two would greatly improve this document. While I have an adequate understanding of XDR, hash functions, channel bindings, ASN.1 and Kerberos, I'm skeptical that I would correctly implement this protocol on the first try. There are a lot of important details in prose (such as hashing the channel bindings) that leave room for implementation errors. Protocols like this can gain a bad reputation from implementation errors unless there is a reference implementation or test vector that implementers can use for validation to catch errors before they're released in the wild. |
2008-09-22
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06 | Chris Newman | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Chris Newman |
2008-09-19
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06 | Russ Housley | [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Russ Housley |
2008-09-18
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06 | Lars Eggert | Placed on agenda for telechat - 2008-09-25 by Lars Eggert |
2008-09-18
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06 | Lars Eggert | [Ballot Position Update] New position, Yes, has been recorded for Lars Eggert |
2008-09-18
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06 | Lars Eggert | Ballot has been issued by Lars Eggert |
2008-09-18
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06 | Lars Eggert | Created "Approve" ballot |
2008-09-18
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06 | Lars Eggert | State Changes to IESG Evaluation from Waiting for AD Go-Ahead by Lars Eggert |
2008-09-02
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06 | (System) | State has been changed to Waiting for AD Go-Ahead from In Last Call by system |
2008-09-02
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06 | Amanda Baber | IANA Last Call comments: As described in the IANA Considerations section, we understand this document to have NO IANA Actions. |
2008-08-21
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06 | Samuel Weiler | Request for Last Call review by SECDIR is assigned to Glen Zorn |
2008-08-21
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06 | Samuel Weiler | Request for Last Call review by SECDIR is assigned to Glen Zorn |
2008-08-19
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06 | Cindy Morgan | Last call sent |
2008-08-19
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06 | Cindy Morgan | State Changes to In Last Call from Last Call Requested by Cindy Morgan |
2008-08-19
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06 | Lars Eggert | Last Call was requested by Lars Eggert |
2008-08-19
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06 | Lars Eggert | State Changes to Last Call Requested from AD Evaluation::AD Followup by Lars Eggert |
2008-08-19
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06 | (System) | Ballot writeup text was added |
2008-08-19
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06 | (System) | Last call text was added |
2008-08-19
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06 | (System) | Ballot approval text was added |
2008-08-18
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05 | (System) | New version available: draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpcsec-gss-v2-05.txt |
2008-08-18
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06 | (System) | Sub state has been changed to AD Follow up from New Id Needed |
2008-08-18
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04 | (System) | New version available: draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpcsec-gss-v2-04.txt |
2008-08-11
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06 | Lars Eggert | State Changes to AD Evaluation::Revised ID Needed from AD Evaluation by Lars Eggert |
2008-08-11
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06 | Lars Eggert | [Note]: 'Document Shepherd: Spencer Shepler (spencer.shepler@gmail.com) ' added by Lars Eggert |
2008-08-11
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06 | Lars Eggert | State Changes to AD Evaluation from Publication Requested by Lars Eggert |
2008-07-28
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06 | Cindy Morgan | State Changes to Publication Requested from AD is watching by Cindy Morgan |
2008-07-28
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06 | Cindy Morgan | The NFSv4 Working Group is requesting of the IESG that this document be published as a standards track RFC. The following, as per RFC4858, … The NFSv4 Working Group is requesting of the IESG that this document be published as a standards track RFC. The following, as per RFC4858, provides the detail of shepherding the documents forward. ------------------------------------------------------------------ (1.a) Who is the Document Shepherd For this document? Has the Document Shepherd personally reviewed this version of the document and, in particular, does he or she believe this version is ready for forwarding to the IESG for publication? The document shepherd is Spencer Shepler. Spencer has reviewed the documents and believes they are ready for publication. (1.b) Has the document had adequate review both from key members of the interested community and others? Does the Document Shepherd have any concerns about the depth or breadth of the reviews that have been performed? The document has been reviewed via working group last call and all comments/concerns raised have been addressed in this version of the internet draft. There are no remaining concerns related to depth or breadth of the reviews that have occurred. (1.c) Does the Document Shepherd have concerns that the document needs more review from a particular or broader perspective, e.g., security, operational complexity, someone familiar with AAA, internationalization or XML? No concerns exist. (1.d) Does the Document Shepherd have any specific concerns or issues with this document that the Responsible Area Director and/or the IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he or she is uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or has concerns whether there really is a need for it. In any event, if the interested community has discussed those issues and has indicated that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those concerns here. No such concerns exist. (1.e) How solid is the consensus of the interested community behind this document? Does it represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others being silent, or does the interested community as a whole understand and agree with it? There is broad consensus within the NFS and RPC communities in this work. (1.f) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in separate email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is entered into the ID Tracker.) No. (1.g) Has the Document Shepherd personally verified that the document satisfies all ID nits? (See http://www.ietf.org/ID-Checklist.html and http://tools.ietf.org/tools/idnits/). Boilerplate checks are not enough; this check needs to be thorough. Has the document met all formal review criteria it needs to, such as the MIB Doctor, media type and URI type reviews? Yes. (1.h) Has the document split its references into normative and informative? Are there normative references to documents that are not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state? If such normative references exist, what is the strategy for their completion? Are there normative references that are downward references, as described in [RFC3967]? If so, list these downward references to support the Area Director in the Last Call procedure for them [RFC3967]. Yes. (1.i) Has the Document Shepherd verified that the document IANA consideration section exists and is consistent with the body of the document? Yes. If the document specifies protocol extensions, are reservations requested in appropriate IANA registries? Are the IANA registries clearly identified? If the document creates a new registry, does it define the proposed initial contents of the registry and an allocation procedure for future registrations? Does it suggested a reasonable name for the new registry? See [I-D.narten-iana-considerations-rfc2434bis]. If the document describes an Expert Review process has Shepherd conferred with the Responsible Area Director so that the IESG can appoint the needed Expert during the IESG Evaluation? N/A (1.j) Has the Document Shepherd verified that sections of the document that are written in a formal language, such as XML code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc., validate correctly in an automated checker? Yes. (1.k) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document Announcement Write-Up. Technical Summary RPCSEC_GSS version 2 (RPCSEC_GSSv2) is the same as RPCSEC_GSS version 1 (RPCSEC_GSSv1) except that support for channel bindings has been added. The primary motivation for channel bindings is to securely take advantage of hardware assisted encryption that might exist at lower levels of the networking protocol stack, such as at the Internet Protocol (IP) layer in the form of IPsec. The secondary motivation is that even if lower levels are not any more efficient at encryption than the RPCSEC_GSS layer, if encryption is occurring at the lower level, it can be redundant at the RPCSEC_GSS level. Working Group Summary The working group development and review of this work was straightforward. The motivation is well understood and agreed upon and no major issues were identified or impeded progress during document review. Document Quality No existing implementations yet exist but given the author and reviewers are knowledgeable about more than one implemetation of the current RPCSEC_GSS protocol, it is believed that the quality of this work is to be considered "high". |
2008-05-23
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03 | (System) | New version available: draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpcsec-gss-v2-03.txt |
2008-04-30
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06 | Lars Eggert | Draft Added by Lars Eggert in state AD is watching |
2008-02-24
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02 | (System) | New version available: draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpcsec-gss-v2-02.txt |
2008-02-20
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01 | (System) | New version available: draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpcsec-gss-v2-01.txt |
2008-02-19
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00 | (System) | New version available: draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpcsec-gss-v2-00.txt |