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Extensible Authentication Protocol - Generalized Pre-Shared Key (EAP-GPSK) Method
RFC 5433

Revision differences

Document history

Date Rev. By Action
2017-05-16
17 (System) Changed document authors from "Hannes Tschofenig" to "Hannes Tschofenig, Charles Clancy"
2015-10-14
17 (System) Notify list changed from emu-chairs@ietf.org, draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk@ietf.org to (None)
2012-08-22
17 (System) post-migration administrative database adjustment to the Yes position for Pasi Eronen
2009-02-25
17 Cindy Morgan State Changes to RFC Published from RFC Ed Queue by Cindy Morgan
2009-02-25
17 Cindy Morgan [Note]: 'RFC 5433' added by Cindy Morgan
2009-02-25
17 (System) RFC published
2008-12-22
17 (System) IANA Action state changed to RFC-Ed-Ack from Waiting on RFC Editor
2008-12-22
17 (System) IANA Action state changed to Waiting on RFC Editor from In Progress
2008-12-22
17 (System) IANA Action state changed to In Progress from Waiting on Authors
2008-12-19
17 (System) IANA Action state changed to Waiting on Authors from In Progress
2008-12-09
17 (System) IANA Action state changed to In Progress
2008-12-08
17 Cindy Morgan State Changes to RFC Ed Queue from Approved-announcement sent by Cindy Morgan
2008-12-08
17 Cindy Morgan IESG state changed to Approved-announcement sent
2008-12-08
17 Cindy Morgan IESG has approved the document
2008-12-08
17 Cindy Morgan Closed "Approve" ballot
2008-12-08
17 Pasi Eronen [Ballot Position Update] Position for Pasi Eronen has been changed to Yes from No Objection by Pasi Eronen
2008-12-08
17 Pasi Eronen [Ballot Position Update] Position for Pasi Eronen has been changed to No Objection from Discuss by Pasi Eronen
2008-12-08
17 Pasi Eronen [Ballot comment]
2008-12-08
17 Pasi Eronen
I haven't received a reply from IANA to Charles's email on
2008-11-21, but I reviewed version -17 myself, and it seems
IANA's questions are addressed …
I haven't received a reply from IANA to Charles's email on
2008-11-21, but I reviewed version -17 myself, and it seems
IANA's questions are addressed in this version.
2008-11-19
17 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-17.txt
2008-11-11
17 Samuel Weiler Request for Last Call review by SECDIR Completed. Reviewer: Joseph Salowey.
2008-11-07
17 (System) Removed from agenda for telechat - 2008-11-06
2008-11-06
17 Amy Vezza State Changes to IESG Evaluation::AD Followup from IESG Evaluation by Amy Vezza
2008-11-06
17 David Ward [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by David Ward
2008-11-06
17 Ross Callon [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Ross Callon
2008-11-06
17 Jon Peterson [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Jon Peterson
2008-11-05
17 Jari Arkko
[Ballot comment]
Good work, guys! The specification is in very good shape, and is
going to be useful for the EAP community.

I did find …
[Ballot comment]
Good work, guys! The specification is in very good shape, and is
going to be useful for the EAP community.

I did find two minor sources of confusion, and if you can fix these
it would be nice:

> [A..B]  extracts the string of octets starting with octet A finishing
> with octet B from the output of the KDF function.

Presumably counting starts from 0?

> EAP-GPSK provides protection against reflection attacks in case of an
> extended authentication because the messages are constructed in a
> different fashion.

What is meant by "extended authentication" in this case?
(Also, a reference to the definition of a reflection attack
would be nice.)

(Note: I am listed as a contributor in the document, but I chose to
ballot for the document anyway, given that my contribution in the
design team was more about starting the team than actual technical
work.)
2008-11-05
17 Jari Arkko [Ballot Position Update] New position, Yes, has been recorded by Jari Arkko
2008-11-05
17 Jari Arkko
[Ballot comment]
> [A..B]  extracts the string of octets starting with octet A finishing
> with octet B from the output of the KDF function. …
[Ballot comment]
> [A..B]  extracts the string of octets starting with octet A finishing
> with octet B from the output of the KDF function.

Presumably counting starts from 0?

> EAP-GPSK provides protection against reflection attacks in case of an
> extended authentication because the messages are constructed in a
> different fashion.

What is meant by "extended authentication" in this case?
(Also, a reference to the definition of a reflection attack
would be nice.)
2008-11-05
17 Jari Arkko
[Ballot comment]
> [A..B]  extracts the string of octets starting with octet A finishing
> with octet B from the output of the KDF function. …
[Ballot comment]
> [A..B]  extracts the string of octets starting with octet A finishing
> with octet B from the output of the KDF function.

Presumably counting starts from 0?
2008-11-05
17 Lisa Dusseault [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Lisa Dusseault
2008-11-05
17 Mark Townsley [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Mark Townsley
2008-11-05
17 Chris Newman
[Ballot comment]
It would be helpful to me if there was a discussion of how EAP-GPSK relates
to EAP-TLS+TLS-PSK.  Presumably the former is a bit …
[Ballot comment]
It would be helpful to me if there was a discussion of how EAP-GPSK relates
to EAP-TLS+TLS-PSK.  Presumably the former is a bit lighter weight, while
the latter provides optional privacy, is likely to have more code review
and is more likely to permit storage of the key in a PKCS#11 module.

Can general advice be given?  Perhaps EAP-GPSK is preferred by default?
Or perhaps EAP-TLS explicitly requires certificates and thus a new
EAP code would be needed to use EAP-TLS-PSK?
2008-11-05
17 Chris Newman [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Chris Newman
2008-11-05
17 Lars Eggert [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Lars Eggert
2008-11-05
17 Magnus Westerlund [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Magnus Westerlund
2008-11-04
17 Russ Housley [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Russ Housley
2008-11-04
17 Tim Polk
[Ballot comment]
(1)
The notation KDF_X(Y) is defined in Section 2 but is never used.
KDF-X(Y,Z) [A..B] is defined in Section 4, and is used …
[Ballot comment]
(1)
The notation KDF_X(Y) is defined in Section 2 but is never used.
KDF-X(Y,Z) [A..B] is defined in Section 4, and is used extensively.

This is a bit confusing, since the differences are minor, so please
delete the definition of KDF_X(Y) in Section 2.

(2)
The definition for MK is given as "Master Key between the peer and the
EAP server" which sounds very similar to the PSK.  Consider expanding
this definition to indicate that the MK is derived from the PSK, and is
session specific.  Perhaps something like

MK: A session specific Master Key derived from the PSK by the peer and
EAP server ...

(3)
In Section 3, third paragraph from the end of the section describes
the processing of GPSK-2 by the server as follows:
"The EAP server verifies the received Message Authentication Code"

This is necessary but not sufficient.  In addition to the MAC, the EAP
server needs to verify that the parameters it included in GPSK-1 were
correctly repeated in GPSK-2. (Otherwise, there is no value in repeating
them!)  This would be consistent with the packet processing rules in
section 10.

Similar requirements (to verify the server and selected ciphersuite)
extends to processing GPSK-3 by the peer and should be specified in
the following paragraph.

(4)
Section 10:

When processing GPSK-3, the processing rules do not involve ID_Server.
Shouldn't the peer verify the ID_Server is the same as in GPSK-1 and GPSK-2?
And if ID_Server does not match, what are the processing rules?
2008-11-04
17 Tim Polk
[Ballot comment]
(1)
The notation KDF_X(Y) is defined in Section 2 but is never used.
KDF-X(Y,Z) [A..B] is defined in Section 4, and is used …
[Ballot comment]
(1)
The notation KDF_X(Y) is defined in Section 2 but is never used.
KDF-X(Y,Z) [A..B] is defined in Section 4, and is used extensively.

This is a bit confusing, since the differences are minor, so please
delete the definition of KDF_X(Y) in Section 2.

(2)
The definition for MK is given as "Master Key between the peer and the
EAP server" which sounds very similar to the PSK.  Consider expanding
this definition to indicate that the MK is derived from the PSK, and is
session specific.  Perhaps something like

MK: A session specific Master Key derived from the PSK by the peer and
EAP server ...

(3)
In Section 3, third paragraph from the end of the section describes
the processing of GPSK-2 by the server as follows:
"The EAP server verifies the received Message Authentication Code"

This is necessary but not sufficient.  In addition to the MAC, the EAP
server needs to verify that the parameters it included in GPSK-1 were
correctly repeated in GPSK-2. (Otherwise, there is no value in repeating
them!)  This would be consistent with the packet processing rules in
section 10.

Similar requirements (to verify the server and selected ciphersuite)
extends to processing GPSK-3 by the peer and should be specified in
the following paragraph.

(4)
Section 10:

When processing GPSK-3, the processing rules do not involve ID_SERVER.
Shouldn't the peer verify the ID_SERVER is the same as in GPSK-1 and GPSK-2?
And if ID_SERVER does not match, what are the processing rules?
2008-11-04
17 Tim Polk [Ballot Position Update] Position for Tim Polk has been changed to No Objection from Discuss by Tim Polk
2008-11-04
17 Tim Polk [Ballot Position Update] Position for Tim Polk has been changed to Discuss from No Objection by Tim Polk
2008-11-04
17 Tim Polk
[Ballot comment]
(1)
The notation KDF_X(Y) is defined in Section 2 but is never used.
KDF-X(Y,Z) [A..B] is defined in Section 4, and is used …
[Ballot comment]
(1)
The notation KDF_X(Y) is defined in Section 2 but is never used.
KDF-X(Y,Z) [A..B] is defined in Section 4, and is used extensively.

This is a bit confusing, since the differences are minor, so please
delete the definition of KDF_X(Y) in Section 2.

(2)
The definition for MK is given as "Master Key between the peer and the
EAP server" which sounds very similar to the PSK.  Consider expanding
this definition to indicate that the MK is derived from the PSK, and is
session specific.  Perhaps something like

MK: A session specific Master Key derived from the PSK by the peer and
EAP server ...
2008-11-04
17 Tim Polk [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Tim Polk
2008-11-04
17 Tim Polk
[Ballot comment]
(1)
The notation KDF_X(Y) is defined in Section 2 but is never used.
KDF-X(Y,Z) [A..B] is defined in Section 4, and is used …
[Ballot comment]
(1)
The notation KDF_X(Y) is defined in Section 2 but is never used.
KDF-X(Y,Z) [A..B] is defined in Section 4, and is used extensively.

This is a bit confusing, since the differences are minor, so please
delete the definition of KDF_X(Y) in Section 2.

(2)
The definition for MK is given as "Master Key between the peer and the
EAP server" which sounds very similar to the PSK.  Consider expanding
this definition to indicate that the MK is derived from the PSK, and is
session specific.  Perhaps something like

MK: A session specific Master Key derived from the PSK by the peer and
EAP server ...

(3)
Section 3, third paragraph from the end of the section (starting with
"The EAP server verifies the received Message Authentication Code"):

In addition to the MAC, the EAP server needs to verify that the
parameters it included in GPSK-1 were correctly repeated in GPSK-2.
(Otherwise, there is no value in repeating them!)  I suggest adding a
MUST statement here...
2008-11-04
17 Pasi Eronen State Changes to IESG Evaluation from Waiting for AD Go-Ahead by Pasi Eronen
2008-11-04
17 Pasi Eronen
[Ballot comment]
Jouni Malinen's email on 2008-10-28 and Joe Salowey's SecDir review
on 2008-11-03 identified couple of editorial nits. I've asked the
authors to send …
[Ballot comment]
Jouni Malinen's email on 2008-10-28 and Joe Salowey's SecDir review
on 2008-11-03 identified couple of editorial nits. I've asked the
authors to send text for RFC Editor note.
2008-11-04
17 Pasi Eronen [Ballot discuss]
Holding a DISCUSS for IANA.
2008-11-04
17 Pasi Eronen [Ballot Position Update] Position for Pasi Eronen has been changed to Discuss from Yes by Pasi Eronen
2008-11-03
17 (System) State has been changed to Waiting for AD Go-Ahead from In Last Call by system
2008-11-02
17 Dan Romascanu [Ballot Position Update] New position, No Objection, has been recorded by Dan Romascanu
2008-10-31
17 Amanda Baber
IANA Last Call questions and comments:

The IANA has reviewed draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-15.txt which is
currently in Last Call, and has the following comments regarding
its publication: …
IANA Last Call questions and comments:

The IANA has reviewed draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-15.txt which is
currently in Last Call, and has the following comments regarding
its publication:

IANA Has Questions:

- In Action 2, the CSuite/Specifier is specified as only 16 bits,
but "Table 3" looks to have 32 bits. Which is more correct: the
IANA Considerations request for 16 bits, or the table specification
of 32 bits?

- In Action 4, is Failure Code 0x00000000 Reserved or Available for
Assignment?

- In Action 5, is Op Code 0x00 Reserved or Available for Assignment?


Action 1:

Upon approval of this document, the IANA will make the following
assignments in the "Method Types" registry at
http://www.iana.org/assignments/eap-numbers

Value Description Reference
-------------- ------------ ---------
[TBD] EAP-GPSK [RFC-emu-eap-gpsk-15]


Action 2:

Upon approval of this document, the IANA will create the
registry "EAP-GPSK Ciphersuites" at
http://www.iana.org/assignments/TBD


Registration Procedures: IETF Review
Initial contents of this registry will be:


+-------------+----+-------------+----+--------------+----------------+---------------------+


| CSuite/ | KS | Encryption | ML | Integrity / | Key Derivation |


Reference |


| Specifier | | | | KDF MAC | Function |
|



+-------------+----+-------------+----+--------------+----------------+---------------------+


| 0x00000001 | 16 | AES-CBC-128 | 16 | AES-CMAC-128 | GKDF
|[RFC-emu-eap-gpsk-15]|



+-------------+----+-------------+----+--------------+----------------+---------------------+


| 0x00000002 | 32 | NULL | 32 | HMAC-SHA256 | GKDF
|[RFC-emu-eap-gpsk-15]|



+-------------+----+-------------+----+--------------+----------------+---------------------+
|0x0003-0xFFFF| Available for Assignment |


|[RFC-emu-eap-gpsk-15]|



+-------------+----+-------------+----+--------------+----------------+---------------------+

Action 3:

Upon approval of this document, the IANA will create the
registry "EAP-GPSK Protected Data Payloads" at
http://www.iana.org/assignments/TBD

Registration Procedures: IETF Review
Initial contents of this registry will be:

Mandatory
PData/Specifier Description Confidentiality Reference
--------------- ----------- --------------- ---------
0x0000 Reserved [RFC-emu-eap-gpsk-15]
0x0001-0xFFFF Availble for Assignment [RFC-emu-eap-gpsk-15]


Action 4:

Upon approval of this document, the IANA will create the registry
"EAP-GPSK Failure Codes" at http://www.iana.org/assignments/TBD

Registration Procedures: IETF Review
Initial contents of this registry will be:

Failure Code Description Reference
------------ -------------- -----------
0x00000001 PSK Not Found [RFC-emu-eap-gpsk-15]
0x00000002 Authentication Failure [RFC-emu-eap-gpsk-15]
0x00000003 Authorization Failure [RFC-emu-eap-gpsk-15]
0x00000004 -
0xFFFFFFFF Available for Assignment [RFC-emu-eap-gpsk-15]


Action 5:

Upon approval of this document, the IANA will create the registry
"EAP-GPSK OP Codes" at http://www.iana.org/assignments/TBD

Registration Procedures: IETF Review
Initial contents of this registry will be:

Op Code Description Reference
------- ------------ ----------
0x01 GPSK-1 [RFC-emu-eap-gpsk-15]
0x02 GPSK-2 [RFC-emu-eap-gpsk-15]
0x03 GPSK-3 [RFC-emu-eap-gpsk-15]
0x04 GPSK-4 [RFC-emu-eap-gpsk-15]
0x05 GPSK-Fail [RFC-emu-eap-gpsk-15]
0x06 GPSK-Protected-Fail [RFC-emu-eap-gpsk-15]
0x07-0xFF Available for Assignment [RFC-emu-eap-gpsk-15]


We understand the above to be the only IANA Actions for this document.
2008-10-28
16 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-16.txt
2008-10-27
17 Pasi Eronen Placed on agenda for telechat - 2008-11-06 by Pasi Eronen
2008-10-27
17 Pasi Eronen [Ballot Position Update] New position, Yes, has been recorded for Pasi Eronen
2008-10-27
17 Pasi Eronen Ballot has been issued by Pasi Eronen
2008-10-27
17 Pasi Eronen Created "Approve" ballot
2008-10-21
17 Samuel Weiler Request for Last Call review by SECDIR is assigned to Joseph Salowey
2008-10-21
17 Samuel Weiler Request for Last Call review by SECDIR is assigned to Joseph Salowey
2008-10-20
17 Amy Vezza Last call sent
2008-10-20
17 Amy Vezza State Changes to In Last Call from Last Call Requested by Amy Vezza
2008-10-20
17 Pasi Eronen State Changes to Last Call Requested from AD Evaluation::AD Followup by Pasi Eronen
2008-10-20
17 Pasi Eronen Last Call was requested by Pasi Eronen
2008-10-20
17 (System) Ballot writeup text was added
2008-10-20
17 (System) Last call text was added
2008-10-20
17 (System) Ballot approval text was added
2008-10-16
15 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-15.txt
2008-10-16
14 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-14.txt
2008-10-15
13 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-13.txt
2008-10-10
17 (System) Sub state has been changed to AD Follow up from New Id Needed
2008-10-10
12 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-12.txt
2008-08-28
17 Pasi Eronen State Changes to AD Evaluation::Revised ID Needed from AD Evaluation::AD Followup by Pasi Eronen
2008-07-29
17 (System) Sub state has been changed to AD Follow up from New Id Needed
2008-07-29
11 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-11.txt
2008-07-22
17 Pasi Eronen State Changes to AD Evaluation::Revised ID Needed from AD Evaluation::AD Followup by Pasi Eronen
2008-07-05
17 (System) Sub state has been changed to AD Follow up from New Id Needed
2008-07-05
10 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-10.txt
2008-07-04
17 Pasi Eronen State Changes to AD Evaluation::Revised ID Needed from AD Evaluation::AD Followup by Pasi Eronen
2008-06-27
17 (System) Sub state has been changed to AD Follow up from New Id Needed
2008-06-27
09 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-09.txt
2008-03-18
17 Pasi Eronen [Note]: 'document shepherd: Joe Salowey <jsalowey@cisco.com>' added by Pasi Eronen
2008-03-18
17 Pasi Eronen State Changes to AD Evaluation::Revised ID Needed from Publication Requested by Pasi Eronen
2008-03-14
17 Pasi Eronen Responsible AD has been changed to Pasi Eronen from Tim Polk
2008-01-28
17 Tim Polk Responsible AD has been changed to Tim Polk from Sam Hartman
2008-01-10
17 Dinara Suleymanova
PROTO Write-up

(1.a) Who is the Document Shepherd for this document? Has the Document
Shepherd personally reviewed this version of the document and, in
particular, …
PROTO Write-up

(1.a) Who is the Document Shepherd for this document? Has the Document
Shepherd personally reviewed this version of the document and, in
particular, does he or she believe this version is ready for forwarding
to the IESG for publication?

I am the document shepherd for this document and I have personally
reviewed the document and believe it is ready for forwarding to the
IESG for publication.

(1.b) Has the document had adequate review both from key WG members and
from key non-WG members? Does the Document Shepherd have any concerns
about the depth or breadth of the reviews that have been performed?

The document has received adequate review from both working group and
non WG members. At least one working group member, Jouni Malinen has
implemented the specification and provided feedback that has improved
the document. In addition the document has received review from
researchers from several universities an their feedback has been
incorporated. The document has also received some review from NIST.

(1.c) Does the Document Shepherd have concerns that the document needs
more review from a particular or broader perspective, e.g., security,
operational complexity, someone familiar with AAA, internationalization
or XML?

No

(1.d) Does the Document Shepherd have any specific concerns or issues
with this document hat the Responsible Area Director and/or the IESG
should be aware of? For example, perhaps he or she is uncomfortable
with certain parts of the document, or has concerns whether there
really is a need for it. In any event, if the WG has discussed those
issues and has indicated that it still wishes to advance the document,
detail those concerns here. Has an IPR disclosure related to this
document been filed? If so, please include a reference to the
disclosure and summarize the WG discussion and conclusion on this issue.

The working group had some discussion late in the process over whether
an approach using EAP-TLS with TLS-PSK was a better approach. The
EAP-GPSK document was preferred because:

1. Implementation experience has shown that EAP-GPSK is easy to
implement.
2. EAP-GPSK requires fewer cryptographic primitives than TLS and can be
implemented more compactly.
3. Currently EAP-TLS explicitly requires the use of certificates.

EAP-GPSK should be able to meet any future EAP channel binding
requirements because it defines a mechanism to carry payloads of
various types.

(1.e) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it
represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others
being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and agree with it?

The document represents a reasonably strong consensus with most of the
active members of the working group in favor of the document moving
forward.

(1.f) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
discontent? If so, please summarize the areas of conflict in separate
email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It should be in a
separate email because this questionnaire is entered into the ID
Tracker.)

No.

(1.g) Has the Document Shepherd personally verified that the document
satisfies all ID nits? (See http://www.ietf.org/ID-Checklist.html and
http://tools.ietf.org/tools/idnits/). Boilerplate checks are not enough;
this check needs to be thorough. Has the document met all formal review
criteria it needs to, such as the MIB Doctor, media type and URI type
reviews?

Yes

(1.h) Has the document split its references into normative and
informative? Are there normative references to documents that are not
ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state? If such
normative references exist, what is the strategy for their completion?
Are there normative references that are downward references, as
described in [RFC3967]? If so, list these downward references to
support the Area Director in the Last Call procedure for them
[RFC3967].

The document has split references with no downward or dependent
references

(1.i) Has the Document Shepherd verified that the document IANA
consideration section exists and is consistent with the body of the
document? If the document specifies protocol extensions, are
reservations requested in appropriate IANA registries? Are the IANA
registries clearly identified? If the document creates a new registry,
does it define the proposed initial contents of the registry and an
allocation procedure for future registrations? Does it suggest a
reasonable name for the new registry? See [RFC2434]. If the document
describes an Expert Review process has Shepherd conferred with the
Responsible Area Director so that the IESG can appoint the needed Expert
during the IESG Evaluation?

IANA considerations section exists and is consistent with the body of
the document. Appropriate registries are requested, identified and
populated with initial values.

(1.j) Has the Document Shepherd verified that sections of the document
that are written in a formal language, such as XML code, BNF rules, MIB
definitions, etc., validate correctly in an automated checker?

Not applicable

(1.k) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document Announcement
Write-Up. Please provide such a Document Announcement Write-Up? Recent
examples can be found in the "Action" announcements for approved
documents. The approval announcement contains the following sections:

Technical Summary

This Internet Draft defines an Extensible Authentication Protocol method
called EAP Generalized Pre-Shared Key (EAP-GPSK). This method is a
lightweight shared-key authentication protocol supporting mutual
authentication and key derivation. The method should be able to
support any future EAP channel binding requirements.

Working Group Summary

The base document for EAP-GPSK was originally created by a design team.
There was working group consensus to accept the document to meet the
Pre-Shared-Key EAP method on the working group charter.

Document Quality

There is an existing implementation of the protocol. NIST was consulted
and participated in the review of the document resulting in some
modifications to the key derivation function. The document has been
reviewed by external researchers and their feedback has been
incorporated. EAP experts within the EMU working group have reviewed
the document. This document meets requirements set forth in RF3748,
RFC 4017 and the EAP Key Management Framework.

Personnel

Joe Salowey, the EMU chair, is the document shepherd. The responsible
Area Director is Sam Hartman.
2008-01-10
17 Dinara Suleymanova Draft Added by Dinara Suleymanova in state Publication Requested
2007-12-04
08 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-08.txt
2007-11-19
07 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-07.txt
2007-07-06
06 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-06.txt
2007-04-06
05 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-05.txt
2007-03-12
04 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-04.txt
2007-02-07
03 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-03.txt
2007-01-08
02 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-02.txt
2006-11-07
01 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-01.txt
2006-10-18
00 (System) New version available: draft-ietf-emu-eap-gpsk-00.txt